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Abstract This thesis comprehensively examines financial structure choices of firms in three emerging economies of the East African region. It highlights the lack of research in this area and empirically examines three panel data models of financial structure (ownership, firm-specific factors’ and firm performance models, whilst incorporating the influence of macroeconomic factors) using panel data estimation techniques, including the method of moments framework. It estimates these models using panel data from 47 listed firms; and then data from 20 private firms. The original and significant contributions to knowledge of my thesis are as follows: it provides novel insights into the relation between ownership structure and firm financial structure; it provides new understanding of the relation between firm-specific factors and financial structure of quoted and private firms in emerging economies (an area where research has been lacking); it provides new understanding and additional evidence with respect to the effect of ownership structure on the performance of firms in the East African region; it incorporates the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors  on financial structure choices; and it proposes frameworks for reviewing knowledge of financial structure choices, which can be used for further scholarly work on financial structure of firms in emerging economies. The findings of this research have implications for a possibility of a new theoretical framework for researching financial structure choice of firms in emerging economies; for policy makers to design deliberate policies that enhance access to finance for firms operating in an emerging economy; and for policy makers to regulate institutions (banking sector and capital market) as they develop to ensure equitable access (particularly for the private firms) to finance by all firms operating within the economy. Taken together, the results have implication for future scholarship in that they provide clearer and useful insights on ownership structure, financial structure choices and performance of both quoted and private firms in emerging economies; and the methods used are highly replicable and can be replicated in future studies of financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. It has also invoked further questions that require answers.  
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1 Introduction  Corporate ownership structure, financing decisions and firm performance are critically important topics, particularly in the wake of the recent dramatic changes in the global economy.  Although they are among the most highly researched topics in finance, there are still many unanswered questions. Recent studies have focused on identifying variations in financial structure across nations with different legal and institutional backgrounds. Cross-country research (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 2000a; 2000b; Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Claessens and Klapper, 2005; and Alves and Ferreira, 2011) shows that there are systematic differences in corporate financial structure across nations.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) provide evidence from international data that countries with well-developed financial markets tend to provide the institutional framework that is necessary for firms to raise external finance. However, much of this research concentrates on how financial structure theories apply to publicly listed firms rather than private (unlisted) firms. In addition, a high proportion of research has been concerned with industrial countries, less on emerging markets and even less still on Africa. 
1.1 Background to the research topic The concept that a firm’s ownership structure can influence its financial structure through features such as agency, transactions, and financial distress costs have been given substantial attention by scholars but few studies have looked at the direct relationship between ownership combinations and financial structure.  Even fewer studies, if any, have looked at ownership combinations of firms in sub-Saharan Africa and how they impact on the financial structure choice of these firms.  For example, how does ownership by a foreign parent influence the financial structure choice of an African firm?  What types of debt are used to lever the firm? How varied is the relationship between ownership combinations and leverage across levered foreign-owned firms?  These are some of the questions that require answers and that have motivated this research. 
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1.2 Rationale for the research The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive empirical examination of the financial structure of firms (listed and private) in the emerging economies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The rationale for this is that, for firms in these countries, research on the three relationships examined is lacking. The first relationship examined is the relationship between ownership structure and financial structure choice of firms in emerging economies. The second is the influence of ownership structure on firm performance in these countries. Whilst the third is the relationship between firm-specific factors and financial structure of firms. Similarly, there is essentially no published research on the influence of ownership structure and firm-specific variables on financial structure choices, and ownership structure on performance of private firms in emerging economies.  Research on the relationship between financial structure and ownership concentrates mainly on the agency problem of ownership and control (an area that has seen numerous studies).  These studies have been inspired by the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who studied ownership structure in the context of the way in which the risk of bankruptcy and consequent transfer of control to debtholders may influence the leverage level of a firm. By empirically examining how ownership structure on firms influences financial structure choices and performance, this research provides new insights into and understanding of what influences financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. In the same way, by empirically examining the influence of firm-specific factors on leverage of the East African firms, this research should provide a clearer picture of the influences on financial structure of listed firms in emerging economies than had been done before. Its findings should provide theoretical frameworks that can be used for future financial structure research and therefore have implications for future scholarly works. The practical implication of this research is that it would assist policy makers in less developed economies make informed policy decisions about the role of firms in economic growth. 
Chapter 1  Introduction | 3  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
1.3 The research aims, objectives and questions This research examines the role of role of ownership structure in explaining corporate financial structure choices and performance of both listed and private firms in less developed economies.  It also examines the role of other firm-specific factors in explaining corporate financial structure choices of these firms. It has been conducted to achieve the following research aims and objectives and answer three key research questions. The research aims and objectives and questions are presented and briefly discussed in this section.  
1.3.1 The research aims and objectives The aim of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between the ownership structure of firms (both quoted and unquoted) in developing economies and their financial structure. The research also aims to empirically examine the influence different ownership combinations have on the performance of these firms. It also aims to examine the relationship between other firm-specific factors and financial structure choices of these firms. The research objectives are therefore:  
Objective 1: To use data from firms (listed and private) in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to empirically examine the influence of ownership structure on financial structure choices of these firms. 
Objective 2: To use data from firms (listed and private) in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to empirically examine the influence of ownership structure on performance of these firms. 
Objective 3: To use data from firms (listed and private) in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to empirically examine the influence of firm-specific factors on financial structure choices of these firms. 
1.3.2  The research questions The research aims and objectives presented in section 1.3.1 have been translated into three research questions: 
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Question 1: Do ownership combinations in firms (indigenous/foreign, concentrated/dispersed, or institutional/non-institutional) in the emerging markets of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda influence their financial structure decisions? 
Question 2: In what way do ownership combinations of firms (quoted and private) operating in the emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, influence firm performance? 
Question 3: For firms (quoted and private) operating in emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, what are the firm-specific factors that influence financial structure choice? Three models were formulated to address the three research questions, for which three main hypotheses were developed. These hypotheses were set out in sections 2.2.4, 2.3.4 and 2.4.4 of Chapter 2. In this research, a firm’s financial structure is measured by the leverage (gearing level). In terms of financial structures of firms in emerging economies, the impetus for gearing and improved performance is to obtain funds required to meet a firm’s investment and operational requirements.  The limits on gearing come in three forms. In the first model, gearing depends on the owners’ influence, which is determined by different combinations of ownership, on managers. In the second model, firm performance, as measured by return on assets, is a function of ownership structure. The owners’ influence on managers drives firm performance, and different combinations of ownership determine the level of influence. Whilst in the third model, the gearing level depends on the firm’s age, size, assets structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge. In the author’s view even though a firm decides to use debt finance, the actual use of debt finance would depend on the firm’s access to finance. Voutsinas and Werner (2011) found that, for Japanese firms, financial structure choices were influenced by monetary conditions and supply of credit. However, the supply of credit or availability of finance should, largely be dependent on the state of the economy.  Macroeconomic and institutional factors, such as GDP growth trend, inflation rates 
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movements, interest rates movements and the level of capital market development, would therefore be expected to allocate credit available to listed rather than private firms. Research by Cantillo and Wright (2000) suggests that macroeconomic factors influence how firms choose their lenders, in that during favourable economic conditions, less constrained firms would issue more debt as Cantillo & Wright (2000), Korajczyk & Levy (2003) and Levy (2007) observed. Levy’s (2007) research noted that due to agency problems, firms' financial structure choice depended on macroeconomic factors. In addition, research by Korajczyk and Levy (2003) found that leverage firms that are financially unconstrained varied with changes in in macroeconomic conditions. They found that such firms timed the issue of debt to coincide with periods of favourable macroeconomic conditions, unlike constrained firms. Furthermore, Bougheas, Mizen, and Yalcin (2006) found that corporate finance responded to monetary policy. Accordingly, the current research also carried out cross-country comparison of the financial structure choices of firms in the three East African economies, to examine the effect of macroeconomic and institutional factors. The samples of firms from Tanzania and Uganda were combined into one sample, as individually they were too small to allow any meaningful cross-country comparison.  It is worth noting though, that some of the quoted firms had cross-listed in the three stock markets (Nairobi Stock Exchange, Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange and Uganda Stock Exchange) and their consolidated reports included results influenced by all three countries’ contexts. In addition, over the period covered by this research, the East African countries have been working towards economic and political re-integration and had harmonised numerous laws. These might have some bearing on the results of the cross-country comparison. This study did not examine influences on financial structure and performance of firms in the banking and insurance sectors, which were excluded from the empirical investigation. 
1.4 Summary of chapters This sections summarises the chapters that form the remainder of the thesis, which comprise of nine chapters. 
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Chapter two presents the survey of relevant literature on cross-country tests of theories of financial structure; the relationship between ownership structure and financial structure; the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance; and factors that determine financial structure choices. The chapter identifies gaps and omissions in the existing literature, and proposes hypotheses that are tested in this research. Chapter three provides the contextual information about the financial and economic environment of the sample countries. It briefly discusses the historical background, and economic systems and sectors of the three East African countries included in the sample. It also briefly discusses the reform and divestiture of public enterprises; capital market development; banking sector development; and the trend in economic growth in the sample countries during the period, 2000 to 2011, covered by the research.  Chapter four discusses the research design developed for this research. It presents the procedures followed in this research; the measures used for the variables included in the models formulated for the research; sample selection and data description; and the limitation of the sample. It discusses how ownership and financial structure have been modelled in this research and presents the three models (ownership-financial structures model, ownership structure and performance model, and firm-specific factors’ model) developed for this research. It also presents the regression diagnostics and describes the methods, fixed effects, random effects and generalised methods on moments (GMM), used to estimates the models. Chapter five is the first empirical chapter. It briefly discusses the conceptual issues related to ownership and financial structures. It then presents the estimation methods chosen to estimate the ownership-financial structures model. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the findings from the estimation of the model using the fixed effects and random effects methods.  The chapter then presents and discusses a cross-country comparison of the estimation of the ownership-financial structures model to incorporate the effect of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on the relationship between ownership and financial structures. 
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Chapter six is the second empirical chapter. It briefly discusses the conceptual issues related to ownership structure and firm performance. It then presents the estimation methods chosen to estimate the ownership structure and performance model. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the findings from the estimation of the model using the fixed effects and random effects methods.  The chapter then presents and discusses a cross-country comparison of the estimation of the ownership structure and performance model to incorporate the effect of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on the relationship between the ownership structure and firm performance. Chapter seven is the third empirical chapter. It briefly discusses the conceptual issues related to firm-specific factors and financial structure. It then presents the estimation methods chosen to estimate the firm-specific factors’ model. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the findings from the estimation of the model using the GMM techniques.  The chapter then presents and discusses a cross-country comparison of the estimation of the firm-specific factors’ model to incorporate the effect of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on the relationship between eight firm specific factors (age, size, assets structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) and financial structure. Chapter eight is the fourth empirical chapter, which focusses on private firms. It presents the estimation the three models (ownership-financial structures model, ownership structure and performance model, and firm-specific factors’ model) that were estimated in chapter four, chapter five and chapter six using data from private firms. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the findings from the estimation of the models using private firms’ data.  Finally, Chapter nine concludes the thesis. It summarises the findings of the four empirical chapters to provide an overarching conclusion. This is followed by the presentation of the conclusions drawn from these findings. The chapter also highlights the contributions and implications of the findings. It finally presents the limitation of the thesis and the author’s final reflections.  
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2 Survey of Relevant Literature This chapter reviews the relevant strands of literature on financial structure theory, determinants and choices; focusing on ownership and performance issues.  It presents a discussion of financial structure theory, determinants and choices based on a review, interpretation, and synthesis of ownership, performance and a broad range of other relevant literature.  It surveys literature on the financial structure of quoted and unquoted (private) companies and the relationship between ownership combinations and financial structure both for quoted and unquoted (or private) firms.  It also provides a synthesis of existing research on financial structure choices in less developed economies.  The effect of ownership combinations on firms’ financial structure choices is addressed.  Special attention is given to the contribution of the literature on financial structure choices in less developed economies. Economic interest in financial structure choice can, intemperately, best be described as a fascination.  It was the issues of the cost of capital to a firm funded by a mixture of equity and debt, which were raised by Modigliani and Miller in 1958 that stimulated economists’ interests in financial structure.  Even though there has been extensive economic interest in financial structure, little research has addressed the problems inherent in financial structure choices of firms in less developed economies, and the effect of ownership combinations. Furthermore, private firms are increasingly and rightfully recognised as agents of growth and development in an economy.  The growth and survival of private firms offer a unique mechanism of development to less developed economies.  However, for these firms to grow and survive, they need to finance their capital investments.  Few studies seem to have focused on the financial structure of these firms. This literature survey reviews cross-country tests of financial structure theories in section 2.1. It then identifies aspects of ownership and financial structure where a lot of attention has been focussed so far, but also identifies areas that have not been given much attention in section 2.2. This is followed by a review of ownership structure and firm performance in section 2.3 and relevant factors in financial structure choice in section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 concludes the chapter. In each of sections 2.2 to 2.4, the gaps in literature are identified and hypotheses, which are tested in the current research proposed. 
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2.1 Cross-country tests of theories of financial structure A growing body of research that tested financial structure theories across countries, this body of research, e.g. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002), 
Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004), has investigated firm characteristics, macroeconomics features of the countries and institutional settings, and linked them to financial structures across countries. Since the study by Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated whether factors that explained firms’ leverage in the United States (US) could explain leverage across the Group of Seven (G7) countries, several studies have examined financial structures across countries.  These studies have examined the influence of three key factors on financial structure choices, viz.: firm-specific, macroeconomic and institutional factors. 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002), Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found that financial structure choices are influenced by both firm-specific factors and country-specific factors (e.g. legal traditions and institutional settings).  Institutional settings influence the trade-off between financial distress costs and tax benefits in addition to the costs of information asymmetry.  As Öztekin and Flannery (2012) found out, tax benefits of debt are more valuable in countries with weak institutional settings and therefore subject to high bankruptcy and agency costs of debt. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008a, 2008b) studied financial structure choices and speed of adjustment to optimal leverage of firms in the Group of Five (G5)1 countries.  They identified firm-specific and macroeconomics factors such as tangibility of assets; firm-size; profitability; growth opportunities; interest rates; share price performance; equity premium; and effective tax rate.  They also found that the differences in macroeconomic situations, institutional environments and country traditions contribute to financial structure decisions. 
                                                        1 G5 countries comprise two market-oriented economies – the United Kingdom (UK) and the US – and three bank-oriented economies – France, Germany and Japan. 
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Studies by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) tested the main theories of financial structure (trade-off, pecking order and market-timing).  Financial structure theories make specific postulations on how leverage relates to observable firm characteristics.  These studies document that industry median leverage, market-to-book assets ratio, asset tangibility, profitability, firm-size and inflation (for US firms – Frank and Goyal, 2009); and market-to-book assets ratio, asset tangibility, profitability and firm-size (for G7 countries – Rajan and Zingales, 1995), statistically affect leverage across various treatment of data. To find out whether firm-specific, macroeconomic and institutional factors equally affect financial structure choices, Öztekin and Flannery (2012) examined a panel of 37 countries.  Using both book and market definitions of leverage, they found that only industry median leverage, asset tangibility, profitability and firm-size had consistent signs and statistical significance across these countries.  Past leverage was the most significant factor in all the countries; capturing up to 70% of the variation in leverage across the countries.  This is consistent with the postulations of dynamic trade-off theory. 
The uniqueness of emerging economies Following from the preceding discussion of cross-country comparison of financial structures, in the author’s view, firms’ financial structure decisions vary considerably across the world. However, different country-specific factors may influence firms’ financial structure choices in emerging economies as compared to those in developed economies.  Moreover, even if the same factors apply, the extent to which such factors influence firms’ choices might be expected to vary between developed and emerging economies. The next three paragraphs review factors that are distinctive to emerging economies, which have been considered in the literature.  If emerging economies were just different countries, we would expect that the same factors would impact on firms’ financing decisions across all the emerging countries. However, differences in capital market developments, institutional settings, ownership structure, debt market arrangements, political factors and other 
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variables should all help determine financial structure choices in emerging economies.  In extant literature, the uniqueness of emerging economies has been identified both implicitly and explicitly. 
Economic and capital market developments have been explicitly identified as key factors in firm financing decision in emerging economies.  Booth et al. (2001) analysed financial structure choices of firms in ten developing countries and found that the same firm-specific factors, as in developed countries affect financial structure decisions in these countries, i.e. firm-size, tangibility of assets and profitability.  However, they also found that, variations in country macroeconomic and institutional variables, e.g. gross domestic product (GDP), growth rate, inflation rate, and capital market development affect leverage. Similarly, Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) showed that stock market development influences financial structure choices.  They empirically analysed the effects of stock market development on firms’ financing decisions. They observed that in emerging economies with emerging stock markets, one might expect the use of bank loans by firms to decrease as the stock market develops. However, the data they analysed showed that an emerging capital market produces a higher debt-equity ratio for firms and therefore more business for banks. They also analysed the impact of the capital market in such economies on large firms relative to small firms, and found that large firms become more levered as the stock market develops, whilst small firms were apparently not significantly affected by such development. Moreover, studies by Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Levine (1996a, 1996b) analysed various indicators (stock market size, market liquidity, market concentration, market volatility, institutional development, and integration with world capital markets) of stock market and financial intermediary development in both developed and emerging economies.  They found that there is a link among stock markets, economic development, and corporate financing decisions. Emerging economies, with markets concentrated in a few stocks tended to have smaller, less liquid and less internationally integrated markets.  They found the impact of regulatory and institutional factors distinctive to emerging economies. However, there was a systematic variation in the impact of these factors on financing decisions among the emerging economies included in their sample.  The variation was due to the 
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regulatory framework (such as publishing requirements, accounting standards, and rules regarding capital flows) that was in force and how the regulations were enforced. Inrelation to the East Africa countries sampled, Ngugi (2008) investigated capital financial behaviour of 22 firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. She found evidence of lagged adjustment to the level of debt of these firms, which was similar to that observed in major industrialised economies. For the Kenyan firms, capital structure choice tended to be influenced by factors such as: non-tax shields and the effect of tax exhaustion; and capital market imperfections, which determine the ease of access to and availability of information and finance (ibid.). Ngugi (op cit.) also provides evidence that pecking order theory applied in these firms, and that the firms tended to observe target debt ratios to mitigate the costs of financial distress, information asymmetry and the opportunity cost of lost investment. She observed that, overall; the Kenyan firms had low debt ratios.  Empirical studies of financial structure have mainly used data from secondary sources.  However, secondary data are often compiled for purposes other than the empirical research that eventually utilises them. For emerging economies, quality data seem to be rare.  Nevertheless, financial structure research on emerging economies, for example studies by Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Levine (1996a, 1996b), and Booth et al. (2001) both used the IFC’s Emerging Markets Database; whilst 
Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) used the IFC’s Emerging Markets Database, IFC’s Corporate Finance Database, Global Vantage Database and Coopers & Lybrand Database. In addition, Ngugi (2008) used data from annual reports of firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
2.2 Ownership and financial structures This section discusses literature on ownership typology, ownership combinations as determinants of financial structures, gaps in the literature and proposes hypotheses that have been tested in the thesis. Vernimmen et al. (2009:995) define financial structure as “the proportion of net debt to equity in the company’s 
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financing”.  Financial structure is also referred to as capital structure.  Capital structure may be defined as the amount and type of permanent capital invested in a business firm.  A firm’s capital structure includes all outstanding capital stock and surplus, as well as long-term creditor capital.  It refers to the financing mix used to finance the firm.  Other items included in the capital structure are pension-fund liabilities, deferred taxes and other charges, and intermediate-term loans. Capital structures of firms and industries vary widely. They interact with strategy, risk, returns, and compensation. The ideal capital structure is one that provides sufficient capital for efficient and profitable operations, a maximum rate of return to the stockholders at a minimum of financial risk, and a minimum dilution of control.  
From the capital structure literature (e.g. Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; and Bancel and Mittoo, 2004), firms’ financial structure choices are influenced by various factors.  Across countries with different legal and institutional settings, capital structures are known to differ (Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, 2008; La Porta et al., 2002; and Wald, 1999). The agency perspective has been incorporated in studies of many problems having a co-operative nature.  An agent is expected to exercise control and make important decisions on behalf of the principal. Scholars in economics have mainly been interested in the influence of ownership combinations on the firm’s control and performance.  Relatively few studies that have focussed on the effect of ownership combinations on firms’ financial structure decisions.  The purposes of this section are to synthesise the literature on ownership combinations and to indicate aspects of ownership and financial structure that have seen much research and those that require more work. The issue of separation of ownership and control of firms has preoccupied scholars from the time of Smith (1776) to date.  Berle and Means (1932) noted that separation of ownership and control in large firms had long been recognised. However, to date, the probable effects of such separation on financial structure decisions of firms are less understood. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that in corporations, the agents who make key decisions do not necessarily have the main financial stake in the outcome of these decisions. This should mean that different 
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ownership combinations should affect the value of a firm and therefore the wealth of its owners differently.  However, this is an area that has seen little research. Earlier studies have focussed on control, though recently scholars’ focus has shifted to incentives and agency costs. Since Berle and Means (1932) studied the dispersion of ownership of large US corporations among small shareholders, several studies have looked at ownership. Earlier literature surveys provide a synthesis of studies that have looked at ownership, control, financial structure and performance of firms. These include McEachern (1975), Hay and Morris (1979), Lawriwsky (1984) and Short (1994).   These studies2 investigated the relationship between ownership, ownership concentration and financial structure. Most of this literature concentrated on firms in major industrial economies and evidence from such literature suggests that family ownership or large shareholder domination aimed to reduce agency costs.  The studies show that concentration of ownership reduces conflicts between outside shareholders and management.  However, less is known about the type of ownership typical in less developed economies and its impact on financial structure decisions. Leech and Leahy (1991) have noted that when ownership is widely dispersed there is no individual or group with the voting power or motivation to put into effect control and insist on profit maximisation.  With dispersed ownership, firm value enhancement would be expected to depend on the discretion of managers, on which goals they decide to pursue.  However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that there was no significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rates in US firms.  Similarly, the study by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), which considered large shareholdings as those with at least 15% of the outstanding shares, suggests a negative relationship between ownership concentration and leverage.  A question that would arise at this point is, could firms in less developed economies exhibit similar contrasting relationships? 
                                                        2 See McEachern (1975), Hay and Morris (1979), Lawriwsky (1984) and Short (1994) for detailed references. 
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Following Short’s (1994) survey, more studies focused on the influence of ownership structures on firms’ financial structures and performance.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) found that ownership concentration in large corporations in 27 wealthy nations was much higher than earlier predicted.  They found that ownership of large corporations was dominated by a single shareholder or shareholder group (usually derived from the family that founded the company).  They argued that the high ownership concentration could be treated as a possible antidote to the agency problem between ownership and control in large corporations.  Such high ownership concentration provides a framework for extracting rent from minority shareholders.  Wiwattanakantang (1999) studied the impact of ownership on financing decisions in a 1996 cross-section of Thai firms.  She found that debt ratios are determined by standard variables: non-debt tax shields, tangible assets ratios, size, profitability and market book ratio as identified by Rajan and Zingales (1995).  Her study found that there were significant differences between single family-owned firms and others: single family-owned firms have a significantly higher debt levels.  However, ownership concentration by itself had less impact on leverage (financial structure).  Using dummies to classify ownership, the study showed that single family-owned firms’ leverage is positively affected by managerial shareholdings but other measures of ownership concentration were not significant. These results to some extent support the view that dominant shareholders tend to reduce agency costs and debt costs.  However, would this apply to firms operating in countries in sub-Saharan Africa? Similarly, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) found that high level of ownership concentration is exhibited by firms in emerging markets. Whilst Khanna and Palepu (2000) established that the weak external institutions (capital markets and regulatory frameworks) in India (an emerging market) seemed to be compensated for by firms through strong internal structures. A recent study by Prasad, Green and Murinde (2006), reminiscent of early studies, found that in emerging markets, control within a firm was exercised through dominant shareholder, usually family or business group.  However, they recognized that business group control is through a more diverse structure.  Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), and Anderson and 
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Reeb (2003a, b) found that for large US firms, concentration of ownership tended to reduce the cost of debt finance.  They argued that lower agency costs show up in lower cost of debt capital, what other studies infer by a positive relationship between leverage and ownership concentration. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b), in explaining why French managers chose to retain a higher proportion of earnings than managers in other G5 European countries, argued that this was because French managers wanted to maintain a closely-held ownership structure. If so, ownership structure contributes directly to the firm’s financial structure choice.  
2.2.1 Ownership structure in literature Most financial structure studies have focused on the extent of ownership concentration in firms.  They have given attention to ownership structure in relation to separation between ownership and control, often linking it to firm performance.  However, studies involving company ownership have identified various forms of ownership.  Ownership is the basis of control and there are various definitions of control.  For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) defined ultimate shareholding in a firm as where shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 20 per cent.  Voting rights are used to measure control because they allow owners to determine dividend policies, investment projects and appointment of personnel within the firm.  Indirect voting rights are exercised through control of another firm that has voting rights in a firm in question.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argued that a 20 per cent holding is enough to exercise effective control.  They noted that many firms have a controlling shareholding.  However, as they rightly noted, company ownership is often difficult to assemble.  Driffield, Mahambare and Pal (2007) argued that the relationship between ownership and financial structure reflects the agency relationship between owners and managers. One form of ownership that has been identified is institutional ownership (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, 
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Djankov and Lang, 2000).  This is where institutions such as pension funds and financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) have a controlling shareholding.  Shares held by institutions are normally managed by professional portfolio managers.  Institutional owners tend to emphasise short-term financial results (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, Mohrman and Little, 1987).  This is probably because the performance of portfolio managers who manage institutional shareholding are evaluated frequently (Business Week, 1984).  Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) distinguish between inside institutional ownership and outside institutional ownership.  They found that, in relation to financial structure, institutional ownership (both internal and external) was associated with lower leverage (long-term debt to capital ratio). Another form of ownership is managerial ownership (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991) where company executives own a high proportion of the firm’s shares.  This type of ownership can be contrasted with another category of ownership, external ownership, where non-executive individuals or families who do not manage the firm control it. Family ownership is one form of ownership that has been identified in numerous studies (e.g. Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003).  High levels of family ownership tend to increase leverage (debt-to-capital ratio). Ownership has also been broadly categorised based on concentration into widely dispersed and significant (concentrated) owners (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009).  They further identified significant owners as families, government, financial institutions, and other companies.  Their study however focused on firms in countries with a significant stock market (measured by market capitalisation).  Nonetheless, this broad classification should apply to firms in emerging markets. 
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Another broad categorisation is into widely held and ultimate owners (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000).  They identified ultimate owners as family or individual, state, widely held financial institutions (bank or insurance company), widely held corporation, and miscellaneous (corporative, voting trust, or group) no single controlling investor.  Du and Dai (2005) and Bany-Ariffin, Nor and McGowan (2010) argued that ultimate ownership influences the financial structure of a firm as ultimate owners prefer high leverage.  To them high leverage is a means of maintaining control over a firm. For emerging economies, a distinction can be drawn between indigenous and foreign ownership (Ezeoha and Okafor, 2010).  In these economies control within the firm is mostly exercised through a dominant shareholder, usually family or business group (Prasad, Green and Murinde, 2006). Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) identified foreign ownership and state ownership for Chinese firms. In summary, this sub-section explored the taxonomy of ownership found in the ownership structure literature and found the categorisations that are commonly used include family ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, state ownership, private ownership, widely-held ownership, concentrated ownership, ultimate ownership, indigenous ownership and foreign ownership.  Pyramidal and horizontal structures of ownership have also been identified.  The above analysis provokes a series of related questions, three of which this thesis will address:  Would empirical study on Sub-Saharan East African countries, examining similar ownership variables, give similar results? What is the dominant form of ownership within the East African countries?  How does such dominant form of ownership influence financial structure choice of firms in these countries? 
2.2.2 Ownership combination as a determinant of financial structure The preceding section discusses different ownership forms. In this section, I discuss the impact of ownership on financial structure. The influence of the two predominant forms of ownership (institutional and family ownership) on financial structure decision has been examined in the literature, e.g. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999); and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000).  These studies concluded that institutional ownership tends to lower 
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leverage, whilst family ownership tends to increase it.  In a firm where shares are owned by both institutions and a family, there is a potential conflict as to the financial structure preferred by each group.  Managers, in such firms would prefer to raise finance from internal sources first, which supports the postulations of pecking order theory. Welch (2004) established that within US corporations, ownership concentration and management control were insignificant as determinants of financial structure. Managerial ownership seems not to have any significant impact on financial structure relationship (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991).  Regarding the emerging economies, the few studies into the impact of ownership on the firm’s financial structure decisions are generally inconclusive as to the degree and direction of such influence.  Huang (2006) found that state and institutional ownership had insignificant impact on the financial structure of Chinese listed companies. In a more recent study of firms in Malaysia and Thailand, Prasad, Green and Murinde (2009) identified a two-stage pecking order decision procedure but found that ownership concentration and management control are insignificant as determinants of financial structure. Ezeoha and Okafor (2010) argued that financial structures of locally owned firms differ from the financial structures of foreign owned firms. In contrast, Pandey (2004) found a negative relationship between ownership structure and financial structures. Whilst, Li, Yue and Zhao (2009: 471) found that, for Chinese firms, “… combination of ownership and institutional factors explains up to 6% of the total variation in firms’ leverage decisions, while the firm characteristics alone explain no more than 8% of the variation”.  They found that leverage increases with state and private ownership, and decreases with foreign ownership. For the Chinese firms studied state ownership tended to increase access to debt finance.  Li, Yue and Zhao (ibid.) found that among Chinese firms, ownership structures and institutional environments affected large and small firms differently.  They provide evidence that small firms are more likely to be squeezed out of the long-term loan market than larger firms. 
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2.2.3 Gaps and omissions in the existing literature The review of literature in the preceding subsections has revealed gaps and omissions in the existing literature to which this thesis will contribute. It discusses how the current research is distinct from prior studies that have examined ownership and financial structure issues. Firstly, in the literature reviewed, some researchers (e.g. Mahrt-Smith (2005), Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002), Cho (1998), and Jensen and Meckling (1976)) examined the impact of the agency relationship between ownership structure and financial structure; and others (e.g. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990)) focused on the relationship between one type of ownership and financial structure. However, no attempt has been made to look at the impact of ownership combinations on financial structure choices in less developed economies.  The current research looks beyond the agency relationship between ownership structure and financial structure.  It seeks to investigate the role of ownership combinations of firms in less developed economies in enabling them to access the finance necessary for survival and growth, and the impact of ownership combinations on the financial structure choice of these firms.  It empirically explores the consequences of the combinations of ownership on financial structure choices of firms in such economies.  Variations in ownership combinations should reveal interesting insights into the financial structure choices of firms in less developed economies. Secondly, the survey of extant literature on ownership and financial structure revealed that not much work has been undertaken especially on less developed countries. It revealed that no attempt has been made to look at the impact of ownership combinations on financial structure choices in less developed economies. The literature survey also shows that research on financial structure of firms in developed economies has not substantially diminished since the work of Modigliani and Miller in 1958 and seems unlikely to do so because high quality financial data on firms in industrialised economies are easily accessible.  Contrary to this, high quality financial data on firms in less developed economies have been less readily 
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accessible. Until there is a more widespread willingness and effort to gather and make accessible high quality original data, the way in which financial structure of firms in less developed economies is understood, analysed and researched will lag behind.  The current study utilises high quality financial data of quoted and unquoted firms prepared by Certified and Chartered Accountants, guided by ethical codes of their professional accounting bodies. Thirdly, the literature reviewed revealed that in developed economies the agency theoretical framework of financial structure implies that ownership structure influences firms’ financing decisions. Driffield, Mahambare and Pal (2007) noted that the relationship between ownership and financial structure reflects agency relationship between owners and managers. Accordingly, controlling ownership type (indigenous or foreign, ultimate or diverse, institutional or individual) would be expected to influence firms’ financing choices. The role of ownership combinations of firms in less developed economies in enabling them to access the finance necessary for survival and growth, and the impact of ownership combinations on the financial structure choice of these firms has not been examined.  The current research empirically explores the consequences of the combinations of ownership on financial structure choices of firms in such economies.  Variations in ownership combinations should reveal interesting insights into the financial structure choices of firms in less developed economies. Fourthly, from the literature survey, most research on financial structure starts from the assumptions contained in the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Myers (1977) that firms operate in complete and perfect financial markets; and it is market imperfections, in practice, that leads to financial distress costs.  Research that starts with the assumptions that firms operate in incomplete and imperfect financial markets is lacking. The current study seeks to identify financial structure determinants beginning from the opposite assumptions, which depict the features of financial markets in less developed economies.  It assumes that firms operate in incomplete and imperfect financial markets and these imperfections means they do 
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not have access to the wide variety of financial instruments that are available in perfect markets.  The study asks the following questions: do these firms have an optimal financial structure at which firm value is maximised?  How can their financial structure choices be modelled? Finally, in the literature reviewed, little attention has been paid to the financial structure choices of private (unquoted) firms. There is a widely-held belief that private enterprises are engines of growth in any economy and yet their financial structure has not been adequately researched.  Issues considered here concern whether financial structure choices of unquoted companies can be modelled in similar ways to those of quoted companies. The current research has sourced raw accounting information on quoted and unquoted firms directly from the certified accountants who prepared them.  These data were then prepared to meet the requirements of this study.  In addition, data from official sources were used to provide country-specific information. It investigates financial structure choices of firms in the less developed countries of East Africa in a broader context including the role ownership combinations play in influencing financial structure choices of unquoted firms, time series and cross-sectional variations in financial structure, and cross-country differences. 
2.2.4 Proposed ownership-financial structure hypotheses The literature survey has shown that where shareholders of a firm have a controlling shareholding, they would be expected to have a decisive influence over the firm’s managers and their financing decisions. Ezeoha and Okafor (2010) found that among Nigerian firms, locally-owned firms carried more debt than foreign-owned firms. Inadequate access to the capital market for locally-owned firms leads to most of them relying on short-term debts and internal capital.  Similarly, Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) found, for Chinese listed firms, that leverage decreased with foreign ownership. The author therefore predicts that for East African firms, indigenous ownership (where local owners have controlling shareholding) is positively associated with leverage; whilst foreign ownership (foreign owners have controlling shareholding) is negatively associated with leverage. 
Chapter 2   Literature Survey | 23  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
The literature survey also shows that, based on concentration, firms have either dispersed or concentrated shareholding (La Porta et al. 1999; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009).  Welch (2004) found that for US corporations, ownership concentration had insignificant influence on financing choice. The mechanistic effects of stock returns on the debt-equity ratios of US corporations are more influential than the other factors (including ownership concentration) in determining their financial structure choices. The stock prices have more influence on financial structure choice (ibid.).  Welch’s (op cit.) finding is similar to Prasad, Green and Murinde (2009). The author therefore predicts that ownership concentration (concentrated or dispersed ownership) does not have a significant influence on financial structure of East African firms. Finally, the author examines the relationship between institutional ownership (where institutions have controlling shareholding) and financing choice; and non-institutional ownership (where non-executive individuals or families who do not manage the firm control it) and financing choice. Chaganti and Damapour (1991) found that institutional ownership was associated with lower leverage. Institutional owners emphasise short-term results (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, Mohrman and Little, 1987). For emerging economies, Huang (2006) found that institutional ownership did not have a significant influence on financial structure of Chinese listed firms, but Pandey (2004) found that there was a negative relationship between institutional ownership and financial structure of Malaysian firms. However, family and inside institutional shareholding may moderate the relationship between outside institutional shareholding and financial structure. Accordingly, high levels of family and non-executive individuals’ ownership would increase leverage. Where individuals’ ownership is ultimate (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000), we would expect leverage to be high (Du and Dai, 2005; Bany-Ariffin, Nor and McGowan, 2010) since high leverage is a means of control over a firm. Overall, the author predicts, for East African firms, that institutional ownership is negatively associated with leverage; whilst non-institutional ownership is positively associated with leverage; foreign ownership is negatively associated with leverage; 
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and there is an insignificant relationship between ownership concentration and leverage. These are the ownership types, which could be identified in the available data. Other ownership types that were identified in section of 2.2.2 could not therefore all be considered. The hypotheses are based on the consensus of the empirical results. 
Research Hypothesis 1 (H1): “For unquoted and unquoted firms in emerging economies, a firm’s financial structure is related to ownership type: indigenous or foreign; concentrated or dispersed; and institutional or non-institutional.” 
Lower-level hypotheses: H1a: Indigenous ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. H1b: Foreign ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. H1c: Concentrated ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. H1d: Dispersed ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. H1e: Institutional ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. H1f: Non-institutional ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. 
 These lower level hypotheses were derived from the literature reviewed in the preceding subsections and Table 2-1 summarises the hypotheses and the prior studies from which they were derived.        
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Table 2-1: Ownership-financial structure hypotheses The ownership-financial structure hypotheses that are proposed for the current research. Prior studies, which findings shaped the proposed hypotheses are included in the column labelled ‘Basis’.  
Hypotheses Basis 
H1a: Indigenous ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. Driffield et al. (2007); Ezeoha and Okafor (2010); Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) 
H1b: Foreign ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. Driffield et al. (2007); Ezeoha and Okafor (2010); Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) 
H1c: Concentrated ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Driffield et al. (2007); Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009); La Porta et al., 1999; Prasad, Green and Murinde (2009); Welch (2004) 
H1d: Dispersed ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. Driffield et al. (2007); La Porta et al., 1999; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009); Welch (2004); Prasad, Green and Murinde (2009) 
H1e: Institutional ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991); Drucker (1986); La Porta et al., 1999; Mitroff, Mohrman and Little (1987); Pandey (2004) 
H1f: Non-executive individual ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. Bany-Ariffin, Nor and McGowan (2010); Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000); Du and Dai (2005); La Porta et al. (1999).   
2.3 Ownership structure and firm performance The debate, in the corporate finance literature, on the relationship between ownership structure and company performance is still inconclusive. Demsetz (1983) argued that listed companies’ ownership structure is an endogenous consequence of shareholders’ decisions and trading of shares on the stock market. He argued that shareholding might become more dispersed either when shareholders of private companies list on the stock market or when shareholders in quoted companies agree to a new ancillary distribution of shares. These decisions or the subsequent trading of shares reflect potential and existing shareholders’ desire to alter their ownership stakes, which would lead to changes in the ownership structure. Demsetz (ibid.) also noted that mergers and acquisitions tend to lead to concentrated ownership structure. Therefore, ownership structure of listed firms, dispersed or concentrated, tends to be the direct consequence of existing and 
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potential shareholders’ decisions to maximise their wealth through profit-maximisation. This implies that there should be no logical relationship between ownership structure and performance. 
2.3.1 Measures of firm performance and ownership structure Since Demsetz (1983), many empirical studies (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; and Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan, 1999) have been conducted in various contexts. These studies3 mostly focused on the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership structure. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) noted that, in US corporations, ownership structure and value maximisation were related. They found instability in profit rate to be one of the factors that explained variation in ownership structure among the US firms. They argued that where firms cater for amenity potential, they would be expected to maximise owners’ utilities but not necessarily owners’ profits. In the literature, performance is often measured by the Q ratio (Craswell, Taylor and Saywell, 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). But other measures include: return on the stock market (Han and Suk, 1998; and Mudambi and Nicosia, 1998), accounting profit rate (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), net income (Lauterbach and Vaninsky, 1999), ratio of real outputs to real inputs (Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994), firm value (De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre, 2004), and return on equity (Górriz and Fumás, 1996). Table 2-2 provides a list of and context of selected prior studies using these measures. The most often used measure of the ownership structure is the proportion of managerial shareholding (Craswell, Taylor and Saywell, 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007).                                                          3 A comprehensive summary of these studies can be found in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
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Table 2-2: Measures of Firm Performance in Literature 
Measure Authors Context Rate of return on the stock market Han and Suk (1998) US (COMPUSTAT data) Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) UK (financial services) 
Q ratio     
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) Greece Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) Australia Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Loderer and Martin (1997); Cho (1998); Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999); Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999); and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
US (data from Fortune 500 firms, COMPUSTAT, SEC, Business Week Annual R & D Scoreboard, CRSP, CDE, Moody’s Manuals, Commercial and Financial Chronicles, Bank Quotation Record). Accounting profit rate Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) US Net income Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) Israel Ratio of real outputs to real inputs Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) Japan Firm value De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre (2004) Spain Return on equity Górriz and Fumás (1996) Spain  However, other measures used include: proportion of institutional shareholding (Craswell, Taylor and Saywell, 1997; Han and Suk, 1998; and Lauterbach and Vaninsky, 1999), fraction of shareholders owned by five largest shareholding interest (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; and Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta, 2008), family shareholding (De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre, 2004), control by partnership of individuals (Lauterbach and Vaninsky, 1999), less than 50% voting rights blockholding (ibid.), intercorporate shareholding (Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994), and proportion of insider holding (De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre, 2004). Table 2-3 provides a list of and context of selected studies using these measures.   
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Table 2-3: Measures of ownership structure 
Measure Authors Context 
Managerial shareholding   
  
Han and Suk (1998); Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Loderer and Martin (1997); Cho (1998); Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999); Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999); and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
US (data from Fortune 500 firms, COMPUSTAT, SEC, Business Week Annual R & D Scoreboard, CRSP, CDE, Moody’s Manuals, Commercial and Financial Chronicles, Bank Quotation Record). Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) Greece Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) Australia Institutional shareholding     
Han and Suk (1998) US (COMPUSTAT data) Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) Israel Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) Australia Fraction of shares owned by five largest shareholding interest 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) Greece Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) US 
Family shareholding   Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) Israel De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre (2004); Górriz and Fumás (1996) Spain Control by partnership of individuals Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) Israel Less than 50% voting rights blockholding Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) Israel Intercorporate shareholding Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) Japan Proportion of insider shareholding De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre (2004) Spain  
2.3.2 Ownership structure influences on firm performance The findings of the empirical studies indicate many unresolved issues regarding the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) found that firms’ contracting environment determined managerial ownership and performance of firms from the COMPUSTAT universe. They found that managerial ownership was determined by the contracting environment but changes in managerial ownership had no effect on firm 
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performance. Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) found, from UK financial services industry’s data, that the relationship between managerial shareholding and firm performance was non-monotonic.  This finding can be compared with Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) who found that for Israeli firms, owner-manager firms are less efficient in generating income, with family-owned and run firms performing worst. They concluded that disperse ownership and non-owner manager structure promoted firm performance. In contrast, Andres (2008) focused on family ownership structure in German listed companies. He found that family-owned firms performed better than firms with other types of ownership, although this was mainly where the founding family is active in the management of the firm. This is probably because such families, having strong bonds with the firms they founded, may feel they have obligations to other shareholders, if they serve on the board. Similarly, Maury (2006) compared profitability among family controlled and non-family controlled firms in Western Europe and found that active family control is positively associated with higher profitability. This suggests that active family reduces the agency problem between owners and managers and improves performance. But in economies where shareholder protection is low, such active family involvement in management may be expected to lead to conflicts between the family and minority shareholders. For Finnish listed companies, Maury and Pajuste (2005) found that when the effect of multiple large shareholders on firm value is considered, multiple blockholding positively affects firm value. This was more pronounced in family-controlled firms where the family is actively involved in management. They also found that more equal distribution of voting rights among the multiple blockholders enhances firm value since it allowed blockholders to monitor each other, hence reducing private benefit extraction by any individual blockholder (ibid.). This positive relationship can be compared to Anderson and Reeb (2003), who found that among S&P 500 firms there was a non-linear relationship between family holdings and firm performance. They found that performance of family-owned firms, where family members served as CEOs, was better than performance of firms with outside CEOs.  
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In comparison, Villalonga and Amit (2006) also focused on family ownership; however, they examined whether involvement of founders of family firms in management of such firms, e.g. as CEO or Chairman, influences firm value. They found that family ownership augments firm value when founders served as CEO or Chairman but reduces firm value where descendants, rather than founders, served as CEO or Chairman. Villalonga and Amit (ibid.) also compared the effect of owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms on firm value with the effect of family-nonfamily shareholders’ conflict in founder-CEO firms on firm value. They found that the family-nonfamily conflict is more destructive to firm value than owner-manager conflict. In addition, Górriz and Fumás (1996) examined whether family ownership and non-family ownership influenced firm performance; and found that although family controlled firms have higher productivity, such efficiency did not translate into higher profitability than in nonfamily controlled firms. In respect of ownership concentration, Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) provides evidence that, for UK financial services industry, increased ownership concentration inversely influenced performance; whilst control by large shareholding groups was positively correlated with performance. In comparison, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) found that for Greek listed firms, concentrated ownership was positively related to firm performance measured by profitability. In contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that in US corporations, ownership concentration had no significant relationship with accounting profit rate. De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre (2004) found that in Spanish listed firms the relationship between firm value and ownership concentration is influenced by convergence-of-interest between owners and managers’ entrenchment, monitoring of management and expropriation by management.  Pertaining to institutional ownership Han and Suk (1998) found a positive relationship with firm performance in US firms, which may indicate that institutional ownership leads to active monitoring of management. However, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (op cit.) found that, in Australian listed companies, institutional ownership was not an important determinant of firm performance. 
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They attributed this to possible temporal instability of the equity ownership structure and endogeneity of ownership structure. Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) considered intercorporate shareholding and found that for Japanese companies, intercorporate shareholding has a negative impact on the performance of firms. However, ownership structure of Japanese firms differs widely from that of firms in Western economies (Craswell, Taylor and Saywell; 1997). In addition, Han and Suk (op cit.) investigated the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance and found that for the US firms, level of insider ownership was positively related to firm performance measured by stock returns. But this was only to a certain level of insider ownership beyond which increased insider ownership hurt performance. Han and Suk (ibid.) suggest that as managers’ equity ownership increases, their interests coincide more with those of outside shareholders but increased insider ownership would lead to entrenchment and associated problems. Meanwhile, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) found that for Australian listed firms, there was a weak curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. 
2.3.3 Gaps and omissions in the existing literature The review of relevant ownership structure and performance literature in the preceding subsections has revealed gaps and omissions in the existing literature to which this thesis will contribute. The review of literature, in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 shows that most research on firm performance (e.g. Maury (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002), and Cho (1998)) examined the impact of the agency relationship between ownership structure and performance; whilst others focused on the relationship between one type of ownership and performance (e.g. Andres, 2008; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). However, no attempt has been made to look at the impact of ownership combinations on firms’ performance in less developed economies.   
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The findings of these empirical studies show many unresolved issues, which led the author to pose a question in relation to firms in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: In what way, if at all, do the ownership types that are typical to East Africa influence firms’ performance? The current research seeks to investigate the impact of ownership combinations of firms in less developed economies on the performance of these firms.  It empirically explores the consequences of the combinations of ownership on performance of firms in such economies.  Variations in ownership combinations should reveal interesting insights into the performance of firms in less developed economies. The current research looks beyond the agency relationship between ownership structure and performance.  It seeks to investigate the impact of ownership combinations of firms in less developed economies on the performance of these firms.  It empirically explores the consequences of the combinations of ownership on performance of firms in such economies.  Variations in ownership combinations should reveal interesting insights into the performance of firms in less developed economies. In addition, the review of literature shows that residency of shareholders can determine the culture that exists in a company’s boardroom, and therefore influence the firm’s decision-making and performance. To the author’s knowledge, the relationship between the residency dimension of ownership structure and firm performance has not been examined. Furthermore, the review shows that concentration of ownership should increase the influence of the major shareholders on management. Major shareholders in a firm play an important role in monitoring the management, which would be expected to positively impact on performance. Indeed, Maury and Pajuste (2005) found that in Finnish firms, and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) in UK financial services industry, multiple large shareholdings positively affected firm value. Concentrated ownership may therefore be expected to lead to better performance. In contrast, Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999), and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) provide evidence that disperse ownership structure promoted firm performance in Israeli and UK (financial) firms respectively. There is therefore a contradiction in the extant literature. 
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Finally, in the literature reviewed, little attention has been paid to the ownership structure and performance of private (unquoted) firms.  Issues considered here concern whether the relationship between ownership structure and performance of unquoted companies can be modelled in similar ways to those of quoted companies. The current research investigates the role ownership structure plays in influencing the performance of unquoted firms, time series and cross-sectional variations in performance, and cross-country differences. 
2.3.4 Proposed ownership structure and firm performance hypotheses As discussed in the preceding subsection, the review of the extant ownership-performance literature shows that market-mediated ownership structures should yield no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance. It shows that ownership structure is determined, among other factors, by firm performance itself. However, in emerging economies e.g. the East African economies, the degree to which firm performance determines ownership structure is debatable. Demsetz (1983) implies that there should be no logical relationship between ownership structure and performance; whilst Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that listed firms should be expected to maximise owners’ utilities but not necessarily owners’ profits.  The author therefore predicts that, for firms in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, residency of shareholders is significantly associated with performance. He also predicts, for the East African firms, no association between the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders and performance. In addition, the review indicates that institutional ownership might lead to close monitoring of management. A firm with a higher proportion of institutional shareholders in its ownership structure should benefit from the close monitoring.  Han and Suk (1998) found a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in US firms; whilst, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) found that, in Australian listed companies, institutional ownership was not an important determinant of firm performance.  For firms in East Africa, the author expects a positive association between the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders and performance. 
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The survey of literature shows that the findings of the empirical studies vary as to the definition of ownership structure and firm performance, as well as to the relationship between the two variables for similar definition.  This thesis will address the key question arising from such unresolved issues analysed in this sub-section:  Would empirical study of Sub-Saharan East African countries, examining similar ownership and performance variables, give similar results? The following hypotheses are proposed for this research. The author predicts, for East African firms, that firm performance is related to the three ownership combinations (residency, proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders and institutional ownership). Again these hypotheses are based on the consensus of the empirical results discussed in sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2. 
Research Hypothesis 2 (H2): “For firms in emerging economies, a firm’s performance is related to: the residency of the shareholders; the proportion of shareholding by top five shareholders and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders.” 
Lower-level hypotheses: H2a: The residency of shareholders is associated with performance. H2b: The proportion of shareholding held by top five shareholders has no association with performance. H3c: The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders is positively associated with leverage.  These lower level hypotheses were derived from the literature reviewed in the preceding subsections and Table 2-4 summarises the hypotheses and the prior studies from which they were derived.     
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Table 2-4: Ownership structure and firm performance hypotheses The ownership structure and firm performance hypotheses that are proposed for the current research. Prior studies, which findings shaped the proposed hypotheses are included in the column labelled ‘Basis’.  
Hypotheses Basis 
H2a: The residency of shareholders is associated with performance. No known research study 
H2b: The proportion of shareholding held by top five shareholders is negatively associated with performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007); and Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta (2008) 
H2c: The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders is positively associated with leverage. Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997); Han and Suk (1998); and Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999)  Ownership structure factors, such as managerial ownership, family ownership, less than 50% voting rights, intercorporate shareholding, and proportion of insider shareholding, were initially considered but dropped because necessary data was not available. 
2.4 Relevant factors in financial structure choice This section reviews key factors identified in the literature that influence financial structure choices.  Under perfect market conditions, financial structure choices would not have any impact on the market value of the firm. However, in the real-world taxes, financial distress, bankruptcy costs, and information asymmetry all introduce frictions within the capital market, and influence financial structure choice.  Empirical research reviewed in this sub-section has identified many factors that might explain cross-sectional and time-series variation in firms’ leverage ratios. Factors that are relevant to financial structure choice can be broadly grouped into three categories: firm-specific factors, macroeconomic factors, and institutional factors. Within these three broad categories there are more than a dozen factors that determine capital structure choices. However, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) noted, the true determinants of financial structure are difficult to measure.  Most studies have therefore used proxies i.e. variables such as profitability, size, and growth to 
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represent factors that influence financial structure choices.  Furthermore, Harris and Raviv (1990; 1991) observed that leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and firm size. In contrast leverage decreases with volatility, advertising expenditure, the likelihood of bankruptcy, profitability, and uniqueness of the product. 
2.4.1 Firm specific factors This sub-section reviews the firm-specific factors (e.g. firm age, firm size, asset structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, uniqueness of products and effective tax charge)  identified in extant literature as determinant’s of financial structure choices.  It discusses the nature and direction of the influence of these determinants on leverage that are evident in the literature. 
Firm age: Age has been identified as a factor influencing financial structure.  As Huisman and Hermes (1997) noted, young firms tend to be more vulnerable to the problem of information asymmetry, and therefore are likely to use debt and avoid the equity market. In support of this, access to finance studies of developing countries, e.g. Huisman and Hermes (1997) suggest that the industrial policies of these countries provide small and young firms access to cheap credit, which makes debt cheaper, more accessible and more attractive than equity. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that small and young companies may not have the necessary collateral to obtain debt and would rely on equity finance.  
Firm size: Firm size affects the level of leverage but an analysis of the literature shows that the effect of size on leverage is indefinite.  Firm size is normally measured by the logarithm of total assets or sales. Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that large firms tend to have higher level of leverage because they are more diversified and therefore less likely to fail.  Bankruptcy costs for smaller firms tend to be relatively higher than for larger firms (Gruber and Warner, 1977; Ang, Chua and McConnell, 1982).  This is consistent with trade-off theory that there is an inverse relationship between firm size and the likelihood of bankruptcy, and consequently a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
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Firm size can also be used as a proxy for information asymmetry between managers as firm insiders and investors as outsiders. In this regard, large firms operating in capital markets are more closely observed by analysts, which imply that they would be more capable of issuing informationally sensitive equity than smaller firms.  This is in line with pecking order theory, i.e. there is a negative relationship between firm size and leverage.  If a firm is to choose between debt and equity, larger firms exhibit increasing preference for equity relative to debt. There is a common strand in the body of work on determinants of financial structure choice in developed economies that firms’ issue debt to maintain financing flexibility. Studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995), who investigated whether factors that explained firms’ leverage in the United States (US) could explain leverage across the G7 countries, found among other factors that, in all the countries they analysed firm size was positively correlated with leverage. More recently Frank and Goyal (2009) also studied US firms and found that firm size positively affects leverage. Likewise, Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b), who investigated financial structure choices and speed adjustment to optimal leverage of firms in the G5 countries, identified firm size as a factor that was positively related to leverage ratio across the G5 countries. These findings indicate application of the trade-off theory in the different countries researched. As for firms in developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) investigated financial structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries and found that firm size was one of the factors that, positively affect financial structure decisions.  Likewise, Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) studied capital structure choice of Indian firms and identified firm size as one of the key factors that positively affected leverage.  This is similar to what Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) found in their studies of developed countries. 
Asset structure: Tangible assets are used as security for debt and tangibility can be regarded as a measure of the level of collateral a firm can offer to its debtors.  Tangibility can be measured using proxy variables such as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; and the ratio of research and development expenditure to sales. If a firm has high fixed-to-total assets ratio it, offers debtors a 
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high level of security since it can liquidate the assets in case of bankruptcy.  This can be contrasted with a low ratio, which offers debtors little security in case of bankruptcy. In addition, assets can be used directly to secure debt. Like firm size, the influence of tangibility of assets on financial structure choice is indefinite, although it is reasonable to suppose that tangibility makes debt less risky.  Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that shareholders in levered firms are inclined to overinvest, which is likely to lead to shareholder-debtholder conflict. Nonetheless, if the debt is secured against the firm’s tangible assets, debtholders’ guarantee of repayment would be improved and rate of recovery of the debt would be high.  One would therefore expect a positive relationship between proportion of tangible assets in a firm and leverage, because of the lower expected financial distress and bankruptcy costs, and debt-related agency costs.  This is what the trade-off theory predicts. Bankruptcy costs, which are highly dependent on the characteristics of assets owned by the firm, play a key role in the firm’s choice of debt finance.  High debt levels can result in bankruptcy (Alderson and Betker, 1995).  Firms with firm-specific assets or assets that can only be traded in an illiquid secondary market would avoid high debt levels (Myers, 1977; Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Firms with lower levels of tangible assets that can be used as security have higher agency costs of managers consuming more than the optimal level of privileges (Grossman and Hart, 1982).  The explanation for this is that managers of firms with high leverage are closely monitored by debtholders and therefore are less able to consume excessive privileges.  In addition, as observed by Harris and Raviv (1991), the low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets makes issue of equity less costly.  It can therefore be argued that the costs of monitoring managers of firms with fewer tangible assets are higher than for firms with more tangible assets. One would expect firms with fewer tangible assets (in terms of consumption of perquisites) to choose higher debt levels to limit consumption of perquisites.  On this view, a negative relationship exists between tangibility of assets and leverage under the pecking order theory. 
Chapter 2   Literature Survey | 39  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
In firms within the G7 countries, Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that in all the countries they analysed tangibility of assets was positively correlated with leverage.  Frank and Goyal (2009) also found that tangibility positively affected leverage within US firms.  Similarly, Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b) identified a positive relationship between leverage ratio and tangibility of assets within firms in the G5 countries.  In the same vein, in developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) found that tangibility of assets positively affects financial structure decisions.  Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) also identified collateral value as one of the key factors positively influencing capital structure choice of Indian firms. 
Profitability: Profitability is another factor that affects financial structure choice.  In the literature, two measures of profitability, the return on assets and the gross margin, are commonly used.  The return on assets is calculated as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to assets, whilst the gross margin is computed as the ratio of operating income to sales. When profitability increases, expected bankruptcy costs decrease.  Also since interest payments are deductible against profits for tax purposes, more profitable firms are most likely to use debt finance. These are the predictions of the trade-off theories (Section 2.2) of financial structure.  Tax shield, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs induces firms to have higher leverage.  Jensen and Meckling (1976); Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) argued that higher leverage helps to control agency problems because it compels them to pay more out of the firm’s excess cash. Accordingly, managers are committed to pay out a larger fraction of pre-interest earnings for debt payments.  This commitment suggests that book leverage is positively correlated to profitability.  This is consistent with Ross’ (1977) observation that managers’ use of higher levels of debt signals an optimistic future for the firm. This is a prediction of signalling models (John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992). In contrast, it can also be argued that firms prefer to raise finance from retained earnings, then debt, and finally issue of new equity.  This hierarchy of financing choices, which is due to the adverse selection costs associated with new issue of 
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equity given information asymmetry, is what the pecking order predicts.  Higher earnings should for that reason result in less leverage.  In a firm following the pecking order model, debt tends to grow when investment exceeds retained earnings and fall when investment is less than retained earnings. Because profitable firms are likely to have more retained earnings, there should be a negative relationship between leverage and profitability in such firms. For firms in the G7 nations, Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that profitability negatively influences financial factors across all the countries.  Similarly, the recent study by Frank and Goyal (2009) found that for US firms, profits negatively affect leverage. In a similar vein, Jensen (1986) argued that firms with more investment opportunities tend to have less need for the disciplining effect of debt on managers (the free cash flow theory).  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008), also identified profitability as a factor influencing financial structure, and found a negative relationship between leverage ratio and profitability across the G5 countries. Similarly, Booth et al. (2001) investigated financial structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries and found that, in line with pecking order theory, profitability negatively affects financial structure decisions. They found that profitability was negatively correlated with debt ratios. Whilst Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) also identified, for Indian firms, that profitable firms tend to invest more. 
Growth opportunities: Another factor influencing financial structure that is identifiable in literature is growth opportunities.  In the literature growth opportunities are commonly measured by the market-to-book assets ratio (M/B ratio).  The M/B ratio attempts to identify undervalued or overvalued securities thereby providing a good proxy for growth opportunities. Nonetheless, growth opportunities are also occasionally measured by the change in logarithm of total assets; or the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. With regards to growth opportunities, the postulations of pecking order theory are not clear.  One version of the theory suggests a positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunity; i.e. debt would grow when investment exceeds 
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retained earnings and fall when investment is less than retained earnings.  Another version of the pecking order theory posits that firms with high growth opportunities tend to have higher debt-related agency costs. As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), leverage appears to induce managers to engage in asset substitution and underinvestment.  Accordingly, if a firm is profitable, its book leverage should be high if it has more investment opportunities.  Trade-off theory predicts that firms with more investment opportunities would have less leverage because they have stronger incentives to avoid underinvestment and asset substitution that might arise from shareholder – debtholder agency conflicts. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that, across the G7 countries they analysed, the M/B ratio was negatively correlated with leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) also found that M/B ratio negatively affects the leverage of US firms.  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) identified growth opportunities as one of the key factors influencing financial structure but found a negative relationship between the leverage ratio and growth opportunities across the G5 countries. This can be contrasted with another recent study of financial structures of firms in Malaysia and Thailand by Prasad, Green and Murinde (2009), who found that higher growth in firms is associated with higher equity and short-term debt, whilst lower growth is associated with long-term debt and retained earnings (internal financing).  They argued that high risk firms use less short-term debt and more equity, retentions and long-term debts. In addition, Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) identified growth as one of the key factors influencing financial structure choice of Indian firms. 
Earnings and cash flow volatility: Cash flow volatility is another factor that can be identified in literature.  The standard deviation of returns is mainly used to approximate cash flows.  Diamond (1991a; 1991b) noted that theoretical models envisaging an association between cash flow and maturity structure is complex and probably varied.  Diamond (ibid.) argued that the firms at the lower end of the quality spectrum tend to depend more on short-term borrowing and as their credit worthiness increases they would depend more on long-term borrowing.  Nevertheless, a probable cost of long-term borrowing is that firms might not be able 
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to take advantage of opportunities. For that reason, as Diamond (ibid.) observed, debt maturity choice involves a trade-off between borrowers’ preference for short-term borrowing due to private information and liquidity risk arising from opportunistic lenders.  
Tax considerations: Tax has been identified in the literature as one of the determinants of financial structure.  A variety of variables (e.g. top statutory tax rate, ratio of the net operating loss carry-forward to assets, the ratio of depreciation expense, and the ratio of investment tax credit to assets) have been used to measure the effect of taxes on financial structure.  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b) established that across the G5 countries the effective tax rate varied, which suggests that differences in institutional frameworks and traditions influence financial structure choices. Furthermore, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argued that non-debt tax shields, often measured by the ratio of depreciation to operating income or the ratio of tax loss carried forward to operating income or the ratio of investment tax credits to operating income, are substitutes for tax benefit of debt financing.  Firms with large non-debt tax-shields would be expected to have low leverage.  Ross (1985) argued that if firms issue excessive debt, its tax-shield might be exhausted, which leads to crowding out of debt.  On the contrary Scott (1977) and Moore (1986) argued that firms with significant non-debt tax shield tend to have considerable collateral assets which can secure debt.  Secured debt is generally less risky than unsecured debt and should encourage such firms to have high leverage. Ngugi (2008) found that use of debt by Kenyan firms was influenced by the size of the non-debt tax shields and the effect of tax exhaustion. 
Debt rating: Another factor that has been documented as a determinant of financial structure is debt rating.  For example, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Lemmon and Zender (2010) argue that firms with restricted access to debt markets tend to use more equity than debt in their financial structures.  Moreover, firms with investment-grade rating should find it easier to access debt markets than those without. Investment-grade rated companies therefore tend to have higher leverage. 
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In contrast, as Bessler, Drobetz and Kazemieh (2011) noted, having a credit rating means a lower information asymmetry.  In accordance with the postulations of the pecking order theory, such firms would use less debt in their financial structure.  Therefore, credit rating influences financial structure. Kisgen (2009) documented that when credit-rating of a firm is about to change, the firm issues less debt.  However, as noted by Bessler, Drobetz and Grüninger (2011), credit rating as a variable in empirical financial structure studies suffer from measurement problems. 
Signalling: Firms can signal their quality to outside investors in various forms, e.g. by paying regular dividends.  In the literature, signalling is often measured by the ratio of dividend payments to net operating income. A regular dividend payment is a costly signal of earnings:  firm that can convincingly signal its quality to investors can avoid an information premium when accessing external finance, particularly equity. As John and Williams (1985), Miller and Modigliani (1961; 1963), and Miller and Rock (1985) observed, a firm with a reputation of paying regular dividend faces less information asymmetry in accessing the equity market.  Dividends might also be a signal of better financial health and therefore more debt-taking capacity. In this case, dividend payments would be positively related to leverage.  Besides signalling models, agency models also link dividend payment and leverage, as observed by Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992).  Agency models predict that dividend payments and debt issues are substitutes in mitigating agency problems. Accordingly, existing financial structure theories predict an inverse relationship between leverage and dividend payment. 
Product uniqueness: Firms with unique products are likely to spend more on research and development as such products are less likely to be duplicated by other firms.  Furthermore, such firms are likely to incur high selling expenses to promote their unique product.  Uniqueness of products is typically measured by the ratio of research and development expenditure to sales or the ratio of selling expenses to sales. Titman and Wessels (1988) observed that firms, which produce unique products, are likely to be less leveraged. This is probably because a firm with a 
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unique product would impose potential costs on their customers, input suppliers, and workers when facing liquidation. Such firms would also find it difficult to borrow because their specific use of capital reduces the likelihood of an alternative use in the event of bankruptcy.  The residual value of capital of such firms may also be lower. Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) also identified product uniqueness as one of the key factors influencing capital structure choice of Indian firms. 
2.4.2 Macroeconomic and institutional factors This sub-section reviews the macroeconomic and institutional factors (e.g. GDP growth, inflation, capital market development and banking sector development) identified in extant literature as determinants of financial structure choices.  It discusses the nature and direction of the influence of these determinants on leverage that are evident in the literature. 
Macroeconomic factors: Macroeconomic factors are among country-wide factors that influence firms’ financial structure.  Booth et al. (2001) found, for firms operating in developing countries, that in addition to the firm-specific factors discussed in this section the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and inflation rate in an economy systematically and variedly affect leverage ratio. These macroeconomic factors reflect the level of development of the institutional frameworks within which firms operate.  Correspondingly, in their study of US firms, Frank and Goyal (2009) identified that in addition to the firm-specific factors inflation statistically (and positively) affects leverage. Likewise, Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b), who investigated financial structure choices and speed of adjustment to optimal leverage of firms in the G5 countries, identified key macroeconomic factors.  They found that there was a negative relationship between leverage ratio and interest rates across the G5 countries. These factors might be particularly important to explaining financial structure in emerging economies (see Section 2.2.3).  
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Capital market conditions and development: How firms are financed is influenced by the legal system and financial market development of the country in which they operate (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 2000a; 2000b; Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Claessens and Klapper, 2005; and Alves and Ferreira, 2011). In countries where creditors and shareholders’ rights have less protection, the financial markets tend to be less developed and firms operating in such countries have limited options.  Such firms use the equity markets to raise finance less (Cotei 
et al., 2011). Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who studied the relationship between financing decisions of firms and level of financial market development, found that stock market development was negatively related to leverage ratios (both short-term and long-term). They found that in countries with legal systems based on civil law the financial markets were underdeveloped and external finance tend to be raised through the banks.  Whilst in countries with legal systems based on common law, financial markets are more developed and external finance tend to be raised through the markets.  Similarly, Booth et al. (2001) found, for firms operating in developing countries, that development of capital market systematically affected leverage ratio.  Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b) established that there was a negative relationship between leverage ratio and share price performance across the G5 countries.  They also established that across these nations, equity premium varied, which suggests that differences in institutional frameworks and traditions influence financial structure choices.  In addition, Welch (2004) studied how US firms counteract the costs of their financial structure and established that stock price variations explain 40% of debt ratio dynamics of US corporations. He found that once stock prices are included in the model, conventional variables were less significant in explaining financial structure. 
Industry effects: Industry characteristics have been identified as one of the determinants of financial structure.  For example, Harris and Raviv (1991) found that the sector in which a firm operates determined its leverage level.  They found 
Chapter 2   Literature Survey | 46  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
that drugs, instruments, electronics and food industrial sectors had low leverage, whilst paper, textile, steel, airlines and cement had high leverage.  Similarly, (Bhaduri, 2002a; 2002b) found for Indian firms that industry characteristics explained the firm’s financial structure.  In addition, Frank and Goyal (2009) found that in listed American firms, industry median leverage was one of the factors that could reliably explain cross-sectional variations in leverage.  Bessler, Drobetz and Kazemieh (2011) argued that firms may use the industry median leverage as a benchmark for their individual firm’s leverage. 
2.4.3 Gaps and omissions in the existing literature This sub-section focuses on the gaps and omissions in the existing literature on determinants of financial structure to which this thesis will contribute. It discusses how the current research is distinct from prior studies that have examined financial structure issues. As discussed in subsection 2.2.3, much of the existing literature on financial structure starts from the assumptions contained in the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Myers (1977) that firms operate in complete and perfect financial markets; and it is market imperfections, in practice, that leads to financial distress costs.  None of the literature review starts with the opposite assumptions. The current research seeks to identify financial structure determinants beginning from the opposite assumptions, which depict the features of financial markets in less developed economies.  It assumes that firms operate in incomplete and imperfect financial markets and these imperfections means they do not have access to the wide variety of financial instruments that are available in perfect markets.  The current study asks the following questions: do these firms have an optimal financial structure at which firm value is maximised?  How can firm-specific factors and their financial structure choices be modelled? Furthermore, in the literature reviewed, little attention has been paid to the firm-specific factors that determines financial structure choices of private (unquoted) firms.  Issues considered here concern whether the relationship between firm-
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specific factors and financial structure of unquoted companies can be modelled in similar ways to those of quoted companies. The current research investigates financial structure choices of firms in less developed countries specifically East Africa in a broader context including the role firm-specific factors play in influencing financial structure choices of unquoted firms, time series and cross-sectional variations in financial structure, and cross-country differences. 
2.4.4 Proposed firm-specific factors’ hypotheses The review of relevant literature shows that various firm-specific factors appear to influence financial structure choices of the firm. Financial structure choices are driven by the age of the firm or firm size or asset structure or firm performance or growth opportunities or volatility in earnings or cash flows or product uniqueness or tax considerations (subject of research question 3). Based on the discussion in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 the author predicts, for the East African firms, that: firstly, firm’s age is negatively associated with leverage; secondly, there is a positive association between firm size and leverage; thirdly, asset structure (tangibility) positively influences financial structure choices; fourthly, there is a negative association between level of profitability and firms’ leverage; fifthly, growth opportunity is positively associated with the firms’ debt level; sixthly, there is a negative association between earnings and cash flow volatility; seventhly, there is a negative association between product uniqueness and leverage; and finally, the direction of the effect of non-debt-tax-shields on leverage is unresolved. Therefore, the hypotheses formulated for this research are as follows: 
Research Hypothesis 3 (H3): “For firms in emerging economies, a firm’s financial structure is positively related to: firm size, asset structure, growth opportunities and effective tax charges; but negatively associated with, firm age, firm performance, earnings and cash flow volatility and product uniqueness.”  
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Lower-level hypotheses: H3a: Firm size is positively associated with leverage. H3b: Asset structure is positively associated with leverage. H3c: Growth opportunity is positively associated with leverage. H3d: Effective tax charges are positively associated with leverage. H3e: Firm age is negatively associated with leverage. H3f: Firm performance is negatively associated with leverage. H3g: Earnings and cash flow volatility is negatively associated with leverage. H3h: Product uniqueness is negatively associated with leverage. 
 These lower level hypotheses were derived from the literature reviewed in the preceding subsections and Table 2-5 summarises the hypotheses and the prior studies from which they were derived. 
Table 2-5: Firm-specific factors’ hypotheses The firm-specific factors’ hypotheses that are proposed for the current research. Prior studies, which findings shaped the proposed hypotheses are included in the column labelled ‘Basis’.  
Hypotheses Basis 
H3a: Firm age is negatively associated with leverage. Huisman and Hermes (1997); Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) 
H3b: Firm size is positively associated with leverage. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008a; 2008b); Frank and Goyal (2009); Myers and Majluf (1984); Öztekin and Flannery (2012) 
H3c: Asset structure is positively associated with leverage. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008a); De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008); Frank and Goyal (2009); Huang (2006); Noulas and Genimakis (2011); Öztekin and Flannery (2012) 
H3d: Firm performance is negatively associated with leverage. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004); Frank and Goyal (2009); Myers and Majluf (1984); Öztekin and Flannery (2012); Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
H3e: Earnings and cash flow volatility is negatively associated with leverage. Diamond (1991a; 1991b) 
H3f: Growth opportunity is positively associated with leverage. Bevan and Danbolt (2002; 2004); Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b); Myers and Majluf (1984) 
H3g: Product uniqueness is negatively associated with leverage. Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b); Titman and Wessel (1988) 
H3h: Effective tax charges are positively associated with leverage. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b); Barakat and Rao (2012); Modigliani and Miller (1963); Öztekin and Flannery (2012) 
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A couple of firm-specific factors (i.e. industry effects and debt rating) were excluded from the study because preliminary analysis showed that no meaningful classification of the necessary data for East Africa was available. Overall, positive association between firm size, asset structure, growth opportunity, and effective tax charge and leverage; and negative association between age, firm performance, earnings and cash flow volatility, and product uniqueness and leverage, are expected. 
Incorporating country-specific and institutional influences in the model: The literature in section 1.2.2 identified various country-specific and institutional factors that influence financial structures of firms. Firms’ financial structure is influenced by economic growth rate or inflation rate or banking sector development or capital market development. However, since these only vary over time with cross-sectional variation only across countries, the author has incorporated these variables in the cross-country analysis of the models. Institutional factors, such as regulatory framework, market liquidity, market concentration, market signalling, and integration with world markets, were initially considered but dropped because necessary data was not available. An additional hypothesis is tested to accomplish this. 
Research Hypothesis 31 (H31): “For firms in emerging economies, a firm’s financial structure is positively related to: economic growth rate; inflation rate; banking sector development; and capital market development.” 
2.5 Conclusion This chapter has reviewed and assessed the emerging literature on capital structure theories, determinants and choices. It has also reviewed the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure and firm performance. I give credit to prior studies in literature, as discussed in preceding sections, for paradigm innovation; they have variously provided the theoretical framework and empirical designs on which the current study is based.  The literature synthesised in this chapter sketches out the landscape of ownership combinations and financial 
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structure decisions.  However, the current work differs from earlier studies in a variety of ways. Several conclusions can be drawn from the survey of the relevant literature on financial structure. Firstly, the effects of ownership on financial structure of a firm, and the degree and direction of such influences are still not clear. Studies that have examined the influence of the types and structure of ownership on financial structure of the firms have contradictory findings as to the magnitude and direction of the influence. The review highlights the view that although dispersed ownership might exacerbate agency problems, it also has advantages that offsets such problems. The literature identifies family, managerial, foreign/indigenous, concentrated/dispersed, and institutional/individual ownership types. For Africa, foreign/indigenous has been identified as the dominant nature of ownership in Nigeria. The current study identifies the ownership type that is typical in East Africa. The extent and direction of the influence of ownership on financial structure have been examined in numerous studies.  These studies focused on how ownership structure relates to financial decisions and performance, and mainly on firms in developed economies. There is therefore need for more research in this area, particularly regarding developing economies, to provide insights into the role of ownership and the application of conventional financial structure theories to firms in these economies. Secondly, the literature indicates that the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is context-dependent. Different measures have been used for both ownership structure and firm performance, which can possibly be explained by the wide variation in ownership structure among firms in different countries. To my knowledge, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in firms in Africa has not been investigated. My study examines the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in firms in East Africa. In the ownership-performance literature, ownership structures are market-mediated, and the relationship between ownership types and firm performance is inconclusive. The findings of the ownership-performance studies were inconsistent and few studies focused on developing countries. 
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Thirdly, the review highlights many factors as determinants of firm’s use of debts financing. Theories of financial structure have emphasised factors, such as financial distress and bankruptcy costs; agency costs; information asymmetry; market timing, and signalling as important factors that influence a firm’s financial structure.  However, these factors cannot be directly observed and researchers can only capture them by noting their impact on observable variables. The taxonomy of determinants of financial structure choice that are reviewed in this chapter are the observable impacts of the theories on leverage.  The review highlights that firm-specific as well as country-specific (macroeconomic and institutional) factors influences financial structure decisions. These determinants therefore fall into three major categories i.e. firm-specific factors, institutional factors, and macroeconomic factors. Moreover, these categories are interrelated and interdependent. The factors are intricately related to the financial structure theories, and are proxies for premises such as tax shield, distress and bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and information that underlie these theories; and the financial structure theories predict the impact of these factors on financial structure choice.  Together the factors form components of a model of optimal financial structure choice.  By studying the components of the model in context and interactions among the factors, a clearer picture should emerge as to what constitutes optimal capital structure in less developed economies. Fourthly, emerging countries appear to have unique features that variously affect financial structure decisions.  These features tend to be country-specific, macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory in nature. Empirical research on emerging markets should therefore clearly define the context of the sample, to contextualise the findings.  Although the East African countries have similar historical and economic backgrounds, they might have differing country-specific features that affect financial structure choices. For both developed and emerging economies, firms whose data are available on official databases are only a small proportion of the population of such firms.  Accounting and market data on firms in countries from some geographical areas, particularly where emerging economies are located, are lacking.  Moreover, even where country data may be available, gaps 
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might exist in that data.  Modern econometric methods (e.g. panel data method) reduce the impact of such anomalies on the findings of empirical research.  Also, economic variables are difficult to measure and data from official sources provide only proxies for the variables examined. Overall, the review indicates the need for further research in capital structure choices of firms in less developed countries. The current study examines, for East African quoted and unquoted firms: the ownership types that are typical in the region and their influence on financial structure choice; the influence of the typical ownership structure on firms’ performance; and the firm-specific and country-specific factors that may determine financial structure choice. It provides a possible basis for improving capital structure choices of firms (quoted and unquoted) in less developed economies. It contributes to capital structure theory and practice and might have key policy implications.  The examination of the influence of ownership combinations on the financial structure of private companies will be empirically validated and the validation may lead to additional steps in theorising about firms’ capital structure choices in less developed economies. Theoretical models (including the static trade-off theory, the agency theoretic framework, and the pecking order model) and their variants have been formulated to explain the financial structure choices in both developed and less developed economies.  However, the postulations of a single model might not fully explain the financial structure of a firm. The outcomes of empirically validating the country-specific determinants of financial structure might provide a foundation for incorporating contextual issues, such as time, institutional factors, cultural factors, and so on.  Additionally, policy makers may address policy making with greater acumen when they are better informed regarding how institutional factors impact on capital structure choices and consequently on firm value, through the firm’s investment strategy.  The current study is distinct from prior studies that have examined financial structure issues.  Credit is given to prior research in the relevant literature discussed in preceding subsections, for paradigm innovation. The literature have variously 
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provided the theoretical framework and empirical designs on which the current study is based.  They sketch out the landscape of ownership combinations and financial structure decisions.  However, the current work differs from the earlier studies in a variety of ways as shown in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The three main hypotheses and their lower levels breakdown, were tested in these chapters. The test of these hypotheses required development of a robust research design, which is discussed in Chapter 4.    
  
54 
3 Economic and Financial Environment of the 
Sample Countries The countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from which the sample of 47 firms were drawn are three of the six countries, which form the East African Community (EAC). They are the founder members of the EAC, a regional intergovernmental organisation of six countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. This chapter presents historical, macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory information (the economic and financial environment) about the three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda that is important to understanding the main body of this thesis. It shows the economic uniqueness of the East African region.  The first section will briefly discuss relevant general historical background of the three countries; the second section will  discuss the economic systems exhibited by the sample countries; the third section will look at the reform and divestiture of public enterprises undertaken by the sample countries; the fourth section discusses capital market development in the countries; whilst the fifth section will focus on the banking sector development within the countries; the sixth will discuss economic growth within the East African economies; the seventh section will discuss inflation trend within the three countries; and the eighth section will conclude the chapter. 
3.1 Historical Background All three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were colonised by Britain. The economic and legal systems that were adopted by the three countries were therefore largely influenced by the British economic and legal systems. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2010), the British East Africa was the initial name used to refer to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Tanzania), which were under British control. British control started with the control of Zanzibar in the last quarter of the 19th century.
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Then in 1888 the Imperial British East Africa Company claimed Kenya; followed by the creation of British protectorates over the sultanate of Zanzibar in 1890 and the Kingdom of Buganda (Uganda) in 1894. In 1895 Kenya was transferred to the crown as the East Africa Protectorate (after 1920 it became the Kenya Colony and then the Kenya Protectorate). When the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 and then enacted in 1920, Britain was given the former German territory of Tanganyika as a League of Nations mandate. All of these territories achieved political independence in the 1960s, and Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania in 1964 (ibid.). After independence the three countries remained members of the Commonwealth of Nations. 
3.2 Economic Systems and Sectors of the East African Countries  The economic systems followed by the three East African countries are similar.  Since independence, in 1963, Kenya adopted a mixed economic system up to early 1990s, when it changed to a capitalist economic model.  However, Tanzania adopted a socialist economic model from independence in 1964 to the late 1980s and then a mixed economic system up to late 1990s and then market capitalism. In contrast, Uganda adopted a mixed economic system from independence in 1962 to early 1970s followed by state socialism economic system (coupled with political and economic instability) up to early 1980s; followed by a mixed economic system up to early 1990s and then market capitalism thereafter. The Kenyan economy has been the most stable of the three East African economies. The EAC’s economies mainly comprise of four key sectors: agricultural, industrial, construction and service sectors.  Most of the companies that are listed on the three stock exchanges (see section 3.4) operate in these sectors. The sectors are generally less developed and the following sub-sections discuss the state of each of the four sectors. 
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3.2.1 The agricultural sector Agriculture is one of East Africa’s most important sectors, with about 80 percent of the population of the region living in rural areas and depending on agriculture for their livelihood. The agricultural sector is dominated by smallholder mixed farming of livestock, food crops, cash crops, fishing and aquaculture. 
3.2.2 The industrial sector The industrial sector in the EAC region is still small; although, it has developed into one of the main components of national and regional economic structures. According to the EAC Secretariat (2017), in 2017 the contribution of manufacturing to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in East Africa is estimated at 8.9%, which is considerably below the average target of about 25% that all the five partner states have set for themselves to achieve by 2032. The industrial sector has the potential to contribute significantly to the EAC economies by creating jobs, stimulating the development of other sectors like agriculture and services, increasing foreign exchange earnings, and modernising the lives of people. Therefore the EAC governments have made deliberate efforts to create and effectively coordinate policies that would eliminate constraints to enterprise and growth in this sector (ibid.).  The EAC hopes that such efforts will lead to identification of key factors that can accelerate the industrialisation process within the region. In Uganda, with a deceleration in the rate of growth of all other subsectors, particularly manufacturing, the overall rate of growth of the industrial sector during the fiscal year 2015/2016 was significantly lower than in 2014/2015 (World Bank, 2017). 
3.2.3 The construction sector The building and construction sector in the EAC region is principally driven by government initiatives. For example, the government of Kenya has been undertaking the construction of the standard gauge railway (SGR) between 
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Mombasa and Nairobi. The construction of the 609km-long line began in October 2013 and was scheduled to be completed by December 2017.  It was expected to cost $3.8 billion, with the China Exim Bank providing 90% of this, whilst the Kenyan government provided the remaining 10%. The SGR project is to be extended to connect Mombasa in Kenya to Malaba on the Kenyan-Ugandan border; and to continue onward to Kampala, Uganda’s capital city. It is also to be extended to Kigali in Rwanda with a branch line to Juba in South Sudan. Further branch lines are to be extended to Kisumu in Kenya, Kasese in Uganda and Pakwach in Uganda. In August 2013, the governments of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda signed a three-way agreement to fast track the development of the SGR. Consequently the Ugandan section of the SGR line was launched in October 2014; whilst the line from Mombasa to Kigali is expected to be completed by 2018.  Another example is the recent Ugandan government initiative to improve its population’s living standards, the tourism industry and regional integration through the construction of improved transport network. In 2014, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) approved US$109 million loan to the Government of Uganda for the construction sector; money that has been used to improve the transport network in south-western and eastern parts of Uganda. The beneficiaries were the Rukungiri-Kihihi-Ishasha-Kanungu and Bumbobi-Lwakhakha roads, which have been upgraded from gravel to bitumen standard. In Uganda, during 2015/2016, increased construction activities significantly boosted the contribution of the industrial sector (World Bank, 2017). The construction sector, increased to approximately 5.7 percent of the GDP in 2015/2016. This is twice the 2.5 percent contribution to GDP made by the sector in 2014/2015. This growth in the construction sector was driven by the take-off of many large public construction works. In addition to the governments’ initiatives, the private sector has also invested heavily in the construction sector to satisfy the increasingly rising demand for houses by the middle class. Most of the East African governments’ construction projects, particularly roads projects in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, are undertaken by the Chinese contractors. 
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3.2.4 The service sector The service sector in the EAC region is still small. Tourism is the main sub-sector of this sector; however, financial and insurance services, information and communication, real estate transport and logistics, education, and accommodation and restaurant are also important. Banks (particularly Kenyan banks) have opened branches in other countries within the region.  In Kenya, the service sector was one of the main foreign exchange earners in 2015/2016. The CIA (2017) World Factbook shows that the services sector accounted for 47.3 % of GDP in 2016. From the World Bank (2017) data, Kenyan service sector grew at 5.2 per cent ahead of manufacturing (3.6) and agriculture (2.5) in 2015/2016. The Kenyan government has also been supporting high-tech upstarts in a bid to make Nairobi the Silicon Valley of Africa. Consequently renowned technology firms, e.g. Google, Intel and Microsoft have sites in Nairobi. IBM has also established the IBM Innovation Centre (the firm’s first research lab in Africa) in Nairobi. Kenya, is constructing a techno-city at Konza, which is 60 km from Nairobi. In comparison, in Tanzania, the services sector also accounted for 47.3 % of GDP in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). The Tanzanian government has relied on tourism to diversify its economy. In 2016, transport and logistics was the fastest growing subsector (grew by 17.4%) followed by financial and insurance activities (by 13%), information and communication (by 13%). As Deloitte (2016) noted, in 2016 the tourism sector directly contributed US$ 2.1bn (i.e. 4.7% of total GDP) to the Tanzanian economy. The contribution of the tourism subsector was forecasted to rise by 3.7% in 2017, with the potential to even grow further. However, according to the World Bank (2017), in Uganda, the services sector was the key driver of growth during the fiscal year 2015/2016. It accounted for approximately 52% of all economic activities during that period. During 2015/2016, the services sector in Uganda grew by 6.6% and the information and technology sub-sectors were the main contributors to this growth (ibid.). 
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Overall, the EAC governments push manufacturing and commercial agriculture as priority areas; however, Kenya has become a service-driven economy and is less dependent on the agriculture and industrial sectors. 
3.3 Reform and Divestiture of Public Enterprises  According to Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2002) privatization has been a key feature of economic policy in Africa since the early 1990s. In Kenya, the reform and divestiture is guided by the Privatisation Act (2005); in Tanzania it is guided by Privatisation Trust Act (1997); whilst in Uganda it is guided by the Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Act (1993). These Acts provided the legal framework for the reform and divestiture of public enterprises. They established organisations that were responsible for the implementation of each government’s programme on reform and divestiture of public enterprises and any other related matters. The main reasons advanced to justify divestiture of public enterprises are that they were: inefficient and unable to generate the financial resources for investment and operational requirements; subject to excessive political interference; financial indiscipline; and deteriorating quality of management and staff morale (Privatisation Unit MOFEP, 2011). Privatisation is one way the governments can relieve the pressure on their budget, the level of public debt, and direct and indirect subsidies that were often required of these enterprises. In each country, privatisation was accompanied by measures aimed to restore stability and operations of these enterprises.  Even though the sequencing and intensity of reforms and divestitures in the East Africa regions have varied from country to country (as evidenced by the dates the three countries enacted the law to guide the process), the pace of implementation was initially influenced by development partners (donors). The development partners demanded reduced government participation in business in return for their support (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002). Given the state of the public enterprises, most of the privatization programmes were viewed positively by the governments and they were implemented despite domestic public opposition. In addition, the 
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politicians and bureaucrats saw in the programmes private benefits, as they were in position to influence the sales of these enterprises to their own benefits and the benefits of their supporters (ibid.). These privatisation programmes have resulted into a number of public limited companies. Most of the shares in these companies were purchased by institutional investors, with the remaining shares going to a large number of individual shareholders. The shareholding pattern resulting from the reforms and divestiture is that institutional investors control most of the East African companies. Two main types of institutional shareholders can be identified in East Africa: the public pension funds (National Social Security Fund (NSSF) viz. NSSF Kenya, NSSF Tanzania and NSSF Uganda); and foreign listed companies. 
3.4 Capital Markets Development  The three East African countries, each has a stock market: the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), the Dar-es-Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) and Uganda Securities Exchange (USE).  
3.4.1 The NSE The NSE is the oldest of the securities exchanges. In 1953 London Stock Exchange (LSE) officials recognized the setting up of the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) as an overseas stock exchange. This allowed the NSE to be created in 1954 as a registered voluntary association of stockbrokers under the Societies Act 1954. It was charged with the responsibility of developing the securities market and regulating trading activities within the then East African Community.  It then operated as a regional market in East Africa By 1968, the were 66 publicly listed securities on the NSE of which 45% were for Government of Kenya, 23% Government of Tanzania and 11% Government of Uganda. In other words these 66 securities comprised listed industrial shares and public sector securities issued by the Governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
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i.e. the then East African Community (EAC). However, the three EAC members experienced changing political regimes, which took various decisions that affected free movement of capital. These decisions ultimately led to the delisting of companies domiciled in Uganda and Tanzania from the NSE. The original EAC collapsed in 1975, during which time the Government of Uganda compulsorily nationalized companies that were either listed on the NSE or subsidiaries of companies listed on the NSE. It was only in 1988 when the first privatization through the NSE occurred in Kenya. There was a successful sale of a 20% the Government’s stake in Kenya Commercial Bank, with the Government of Kenya and affiliated institutions retaining 80% ownership of the bank. Then, in 1990, the Capital Markets Authority Act (1989) led to the constitution of the Capital Markets Authority in Kenya, which was mandated to promote and facilitate the development of orderly and efficient capital market in Kenya. The NSE was only incorporated as a private limited company in 1991. In 2014, the NSE demutualized and self-listed and its board of directors and management team are comprised of Africa’s leading capital markets professionals. By 2017 there were 63 companies listed on the NSE, with a total market capitalization of approximately US$ 22 billion. Recently, companies in Kenya have turned to the bond market to raise medium to long term debt.  The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has implemented policies aimed at stabilizing interest rates (Africa Financial Markets Initiative, 2017). According to Osano (2011) by the end of 2009, the NSE had issued corporate bonds of over US$ 750 million dollars. Most of these corporate bonds are tradable. There is also government bonds (the infrastructure bonds) that are issued by the Kenyan government. They are the longest government bond in the East African region with a yield curve of up to 30 years (ibid.).  
3.4.2 The DSE In 1994 Tanzania enacted the Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act (1994). The Act led to the formation of the Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA), a government agency, which was mandated to promote and regulate securities 
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business in Tanzania. Under the Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act (1994), the DSE was incorporated in 1997. However, in 2016 the CMSA demutualized the DSE by approving its Initial Public Offer and Self Listing. By 2017 there were 26 companies listed on the DSE, with a total market capitalization of approximately US$ 10 billion. Seven of these companies are cross-listed on the NSE and USE. Currently, there are over 100 treasury bonds and 5 corporate bonds on the DSE. Bonds worth approximately Tshs 3,500 billion are traded on the DSE but of these only 2% are corporate bonds, 98% Government bonds, with no Municipal or Local government bonds. According to Osano (2011) by the end of 2009, the DSE had issued corporate bonds of just over US$ 100 million dollars. The DSE’s bond market mostly deals in government bonds that are issued by the Tanzanian government through the Bank of Tanzania. 
3.4.3 The USE In 1996, the Capital Markets Authority Act (1996) created the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) of Uganda. The Act mandates the CMA to promote, develop and regulate the capital markets within Uganda. The CMA also has the responsibility to protect investors and ensure market efficiency. The enactment of the Capital Markets Authority Act in 1996 paved way for the establishment of the USE, as a company limited by guarantee, in 1997. It was licensed by the Capital Markets Authority to operate as an approved securities exchange in 1998.   Licensed brokers and dealers trade in securities on the USE, and it has provided a valuable platform for firms in Uganda (and East African region) to raise capital. The securities traded in include debt, equity and other instruments, which are issued to the investors. The USE is used by both the government and private firms to raise the finance that is required for investment and operations. In August 2017, the USE demutualized and self-listed. By 2017, there were 16 companies listed on the USE, with a total market capitalization of approximately Ushs 20 trillion (US$ 5.7 billion). 
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In Uganda the use of the bond market to raise medium to long term debt is limited to the Bank of Uganda and commercial banks.  The Bank of Uganda (BOU) has implemented policies aimed at stabilizing interest rates (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2017). According to Osano (2011) by the end of 2009, the USE had issued corporate bonds of just US$ 40 million dollars. The USE’s bond market mostly deals in government bonds that are issued by the Ugandan government through the Bank of Uganda. 
3.4.4 The EAC markets Overall, there is no common stock exchange for the region but in recent years, the 
partner states of the East African Community have formulated policies to integrate the 
East African stock markets. The East African Securities Exchange Association (EASEA) 
was formed in 2009 to help the stock markets of the partner states progress the integration. The capital markets of the East African region are relatively shallow in comparison to the capital markets in Northern and Southern Africa. Kenya’s capital market is the oldest and most developed of the three East African capital markets. The EAC has been working on interlinking the EAC payment systems since 2010 through the EAC Monetary Policy Committee. The committee comprises the EAC central banks. Generally, the bond markets in Sub-Saharan African countries are still at an embryonic stage of development. In the East African region, the bond market is largely underdeveloped.  Kenya has by far, the largest and most developed bond market in the region, comprising about 67% of the total outstanding government bonds in issue. However, efforts to create regional and sub-regional capital markets are in advanced stages, with initiatives such as the East African Common Market Protocol aimed at the integration of the East African financial markets. In addition, the East African Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA), which brings together the EAC partner states’ capital markets regulators, is drafting legislation to allow companies in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda to float bonds within the EAC.  
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3.5 Banking Sector Development According the World Bank (2017), the EAC has made key progress in improving access to financial services. However, the Bank has noted that the cost of credit still remained high for many years, information on borrowers is scarce and difficult to obtain, resulting in high interest.  The World Bank (ibid.) believes that making more information available on borrowers (by ensuring that more credit providers report data to the credit bureaus, diversifying financial products, and institutionalizing the development of financial sector skills) would go a long way in reducing interest rates in the three East African countries. This would allow more people and firms to access credit, allowing existing businesses to expand and new ones to emerge, and enable households to smooth consumption and accumulate physical and other assets, which in turn could reverse the economic downturn that the region experienced recently, accelerate growth and reduce poverty. The World Bank (2017) observed that across the EAC there is an increased interest in the financial systems. This has resulted from episodes of banking system’s distress. The key debates has concerned interest rate capping and innovations that has been made possible by advancement in information and communication technology, i.e. the mobile money technology. From the World Bank, Official data, from 2000 to 2012, the lowest lending rate within the East African economies was 13% in Kenya in 2004 and the highest was 26% in Uganda in 2012. This can be compared with lowest and highest rates in the United Kingdom of 0.5% and 6% respectively; in the United States of 3% and 9% respectively; and in China of 5% and 7% respectively during the same period 2000 to 2012. Governments in the EAC are financing their fiscal deficit through the domestic debt market, crowding out the private sector’s access to credit. According to the World Bank (2017), Ugandan total public debt stock increased to about 39 percent of GDP by the end of the fiscal year 2016/2017 (two-thirds of this debt stock comprised external public debt). However, Uganda’s public debt was lower than Kenya’s (53 percent of GDP) and Rwanda’s (44 percent of GDP). Tanzania’s public debt stock was approximately at the same level as Uganda’s (ibid.). 
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3.6 Economic Growth The four categories of the sectors EAC’s economies, i.e. agricultural, industrial, construction and service sectors contribute to economic growth of the region. However, in most economic analysis, the construction sector is included as a subsector of the industrial sector.   As of 2017, the World Bank categorise Kenya as a Lower Middle Income country; whilst Tanzania and Uganda are classified as Low Income countries. As Table 3-1 shows, the average GDP growth rate (measured percentage change in GDP at constant prices) in the EAC’s economies, between the years 2000 and 2012 ranged from 4.1% in Kenya to 7.1% in Uganda. These can be compared with the GDP growth rate for the wider Sub-Saharan Africa during the sameperiod, which was 5.7%. The average for the advanced group of countries was 1.8%; whilst, the average inflation rate for the world over the same period was 4.0%. 
Table 3-1:  Percentage change in gross domestic product at constant prices is reported for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base year is country-specific. Expenditure-based GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices (including the free on board value of exports of goods and services), less the free on board value of imports of goods and services. Comparative figures for the Sub-Saharan group of countries, advanced group of countries and the World are provided in the last three columns. 
Year Kenya Tanzania Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Advanced World 2000 0.3 4.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.8 2001 4.0 6.0 8.8 4.8 1.6 2.4 2002 0.5 7.0 7.1 6.5 1.7 3.0 2003 2.9 6.4 6.2 5.1 2.0 4.3 2004 4.6 7.2 5.8 7.0 3.2 5.4 2005 5.7 6.5 10.0 6.4 2.8 4.9 2006 5.9 4.7 7.0 6.4 3.0 5.5 2007 6.9 8.5 8.1 7.1 2.7 5.6 2008 0.2 5.6 10.4 5.9 0.1 3.0 2009 3.3 5.4 8.1 3.9 -3.4 -0.1 2010 8.4 6.4 7.7 7.0 3.1 5.4 2011 6.1 7.9 6.8 5.1 1.7 4.3 2012 4.6 5.2 2.2 4.4 1.2 3.5 
Average 4.1 6.3 7.1 5.7 1.8 4.0  
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017 
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The  World Bank (2017) data for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 2000 to 2012 show that the average annual GDP growth rate for Tanzania was 6.5% and Uganda 6.9% but only 4.2% for Kenya. The EAC countries achieved economic growth at an average growth of 2.2%, 3.3% and 6.9% for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda respectively during the 1990s.  The World Bank (2017) data shows that Kenyan GDP at market prices (constant 2010 US$) for 2011 was US$ 42.44 billion; whilst comparative figures for Tanzania and Uganda were US$ 33.89 billion and US$ 22.13 billion respectively. Kenya’s GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) in 2011 was US$ 1,025 compared to those of Tanzania (US$ 741) and Uganda (US$ 646). According to the African Financial Markets Initiative (2017), GDP growth in the EAC is dependent on macroeconomic stability and government efforts to stamp out corruption. GDP growth in the EAC is mainly driven by strong performances in the industry and services sectors. Table 3.2 shows the composition of GDP by sector in the three countries. GDP growth is also influenced by investment in public infrastructure and other priority sectors (ibid.). Large infrastructure projects boost manufacturing and services (e.g. tourism) sectors. Another driver of economic growth in the EAC is private consumption. 
Table 3-2: GDP Composition by Sector of Origin – 2016 Percentage contribution of the three key sectors (agricultute, industry and service) to the GDP in 2016 is reported for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  
Sector Kenya Tanzania Uganda Agriculture 35.6% 24.5% 25.4% Industry 17.2% 27.6% 22.7% Services 47.3% 47.3% 51.9%  
Source: CIA – The World Factbook (2017)   
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3.7 Inflation The average inflation rate (measured by rise in average consumer prices) in the EAC’s economies, between the years 2000 and 2012 was less than 10%. As Table 3-3 shows, the average inflation rate for Kenya and Tanzania was the same, 7.8%; whilst the average inflation rate for Uganda was slightly lower, at 7.4%. These can be compared with the average inflation rate for the wider Sub-Saharan Africa during the sameperiod, which was 10%. The average for the advanced group of countries was 2.0%; whilst, the average inflation rate for the world over the same period was 4.2%. The lowest annual average inflation rates for Kenya over the period, was 2.2% (in 2002) and the highest was 15.1% (in 2008). However, for Tanzania the lowest rate was 4.1% in 2004 and the highest 16.0% in 2012; and for Uganda the lowest rate was -0.3% in 2002 and the highest 15.0% in 2011. The volatility of changes consumer prices in the three countries was therefore similar over the period 2000 to 2012. 
Table 3-3: Inflation rates for the three East African countries – 2000 to 2012 Percentage change in inflation, rise in average consumer prices, is reported for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Annual percentages of average consumer prices are year-on-year changes.  Comparative figures for the Sub-Saharan group of countries, advanced group of countries and the World are provided in the last three columns. 
Year Kenya Tanzania Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Advanced World 2000   7.8   6.0   3.4 14.7 2.3 4.7 2001   5.8   5.1   1.9 13.6 2.2 4.6 2002   2.2   4.6  -0.3 10.3 1.5 3.7 2003   6.0   4.4   8.7 10.7 1.8 3.9 2004   8.4   4.1   3.7   9.0 2.0 3.8 2005   7.8   4.4   8.6   9.5 2.3 4.1 2006   6.0   7.3   7.2   7.4 2.4 4.1 2007   4.3   7.0   6.1   5.4 2.2 4.3 2008 15.1 10.3 12.0 12.8 3.4 6.3 2009 10.6 12.1 13.0   9.8 0.2 2.7 2010   4.3   7.2   3.7   8.1 1.5 3.7 2011 14.0 12.7 15.0   9.4 2.7 5.0 2012   9.4 16.0 12.7   9.3 2.0 4.1 
Average   7.8   7.8   7.4 10.0 2.0 4.2 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017 
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3.8 Summary The East African countries are categorised by the World Bank and IMF and lower middle and low income countries.  Although the East African countries have similar historical and economic backgrounds, they have differing country-specific features that affect financial structure choices. These features are unique to sub-Saharan Africa and should variously affect financial structure decisions.  Because these features are country-specific, macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory in nature, this research has provided the context of the sample, to contextualise the the research and its findings.  
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4 Research Design and Methodology  The survey of literature in Chapter 2 ascertained many concepts, terms, measures, methods and results related to empirical studies of firms’ financial structure, as well as several unanswered questions. This chapter discusses the research questions that have arisen from the literature survey; the formal statement of hypotheses flowing from the research questions; and the research design, data and empirical methods. The research design has been formulated to incorporate the specialised methods required to deal with the hybrid combination of cross-sectional and time-series data gathered for this study. Although such a panel data set provides the samples required for effective estimation, diagnostic checking, and inference, it requires specialised econometric methods. 
4.1 The research questions and hypotheses 
4.1.1 The research questions 
Q1: Do ownership combinations in firms (indigenous/foreign, concentrated/dispersed, or institutional/non-institutional) in the emerging markets of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda influence their financial structure decisions? 
Q2: In what way do ownership combinations of firms (quoted and private) operating in the emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, influence firm performance?  
Q3: For firms (quoted and private) operating in emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, what are the firm-specific factors that influence financial structure choice? The research hypotheses that are developed to answer these questions were outlined in sections 2.2.4, 2.3.4 and 2.4.4. These hypotheses form the basis of the empirical tests that are reported in the four empirical chapters 5 to 8.  
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The hypotheses are structured hierarchically and focus on the strength and direction of the expected effects of the relevant variables on a firm’s financial structure choice or performance. As shown in Chapter 2, each of the main hypotheses presented is broken into subordinate hypotheses for narrower or lower-level effects. The research questions and hypotheses influenced the research design, which is discussed in section 4.2 and the choice of methods used in this research. 
4.2 Research design This section discusses how the variables of this study are measured, how the data has been collected, procedures that have been followed, sampling, and how validity has been achieved. The research design determined the statistical methods used. 
4.2.1 Procedures followed This sub-section discusses the procedures that have been followed in the construction and empirical estimation of the ownership, firm-specific, performance and financial structure models. Economic models normally isolate certain features of actual phenomena to understand them and predict their future status under novel conditions. In this study, the author isolates features of a firm, the economy within which the firm operates, and the institutions within the corresponding economy, and the firm’s financial structure. These features are described in terms of the causal relationship between them. It is assumed that a stochastic causal mechanism has generated data for this study. The data collected for the study were coded and checked for missing values and other possible anomalous elements. The researcher also carried out diagnostic tests of the distribution of the data and residuals in the models of the data before arriving at the final model estimation. Summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum value, the quantiles and maximum value) of the variables were computed. In addition also diagnostics of the data were undertaken; and then selected groups of predictor or exogenous variables were tested for causes of changes in leverage or performance. The author focussed on specific sections of 
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the models to explore relationships between leverage and the predictor variables. Fixed-effects, random-effects and GMM regression analyses were undertaken to establish any causal relationships that exist between the variables and test the hypotheses that were formulated. The models were estimated using data sets created using STATA statistical software.  
4.2.2 Variables measurement This subsection defines the measures that have been used for the variables that have been used in this study. These variables are explained in section 4.3, where financial structure of private and quoted companies, has been modelled using them. Table 4.1 summarises the measures and predicted signs for the predictor variables. 
4.2.3 Sample selection and data description 
Sample selection: The sample consists, as far as practicable, of East African firms that apply international accounting and financial reporting standards. The sample for unquoted firms was restricted to firms registered as limited companies, with six or more years of data available and audited by external accountants. For quoted firms, the initial sample is drawn from all firms listed on the three East African Stock Exchanges (the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), Uganda Stock Exchange (USE) and Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE)) in 2011, with six or more years of data.  The author selected 20 private companies and 47 quoted companies and collected data over the twelve-year period 2000 to 2011, which is an unusually long time-series for any emerging market.  Financial firms are excluded, as their financial structures are substantially different from those of non-financial firms. Companies whose data contain inconsistencies that could not be reconciled were also excluded. Because the firms selected are of different ages my panel is systematically less random and unbalanced. The data set was constructed to ensure equivalence of selection of firms included in the sample i.e. each firm included in the sample had an equal chance of being selected. Diagnostic tests were undertaken to enhance validity.  
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Table 4-1:  Measures and predicted signs of predictor variables This table shows the variables used in this thesis, how they have been measured, and the predicted signs based on review of empirical studies. The sign ‘+’ means that leverage increases with increase in the variable; ‘–’ means that leverage decreases with increase in the variable; and ‘?’ means there is no clear theoretical prediction or empirical result, and in this study predicted to be +/– or insignificant. 
Variable How Measured Empirical Studies’ Sign 
Financial structure (LEV) Book leverage is the firm’s leverage as measured by the debt ratio (book debt to book equity)4  Indigenous ownership type (IND) Proportion of indigenous shareholders have controlling shareholding in the firm Ϯ + Foreign ownership type (FOR) Proportion of foreign shareholders that have controlling shareholding in the firm Ϯ – Ownership concentration (TOP5) Proxy for concentrated ownership, proportion of shareholding of the top five largest shareholders * ? Institutional ownership type (INS) Institutional shareholders have controlling shareholding in the firm + Non-institutional ownership type (EXI) Shareholders who are non-executive individuals have controlling shareholding in the firm – Firm size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total sales + Asset structure/tangibility (ASTAN) Tangibility ratio (ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets) + Firm performance (PROF) Profitability (return on assets) – Growth opportunities (GRO) Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets ? Earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) Standard deviation of operating profit – Firm age (AGE) Difference between year in question and firm’s birth year reported by the firm – Product uniqueness (PDT) Ratio of selling expenses to sales – Effective tax charge (TAX) Ratio of tax paid to operating profit + Economic growth rate (GDPCA) Gross domestic product per capita + Inflation rate (INF) Percentage change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) ** + Banking sector development (BASEDE) A proxy for bank development, the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to GDP *** + Capital market development (CAPMADE) A proxy, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP –  
Ϯ The variables IND and FOR are proportions that measure residency and are complementary, i.e. IND + FOR = 1. Therefore, they cannot both be used in a model. Similarly, INS + EXI = 1 and both cannot be used in a model.  * TOP5 is my measure for concentrated ownership type where a few shareholders have controlling shareholding in the firm or dispersed ownership type where majority of shareholders have controlling shareholding in the firm. ** Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. *** GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.                                                         4 Book debt = total assets – book equity; whilst book equity = total assets – (total liabilities + preference shares) + deferred tax + convertible debt 
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This sample was selected for a couple of reasons. First, previously Ngugi (2008) has analysed a sample drawn from this population and (1) found evidence of lagged adjustment to the level of debt in firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, which was similar to that observed in major industrialised economies; (2) identified that capital structure choice in these firms tended to be influenced by non-tax shields and the effects of tax exhaustion and capital market imperfections; and (3) found evidence that these firms tended to observe target debt ratios in order to mitigate agency costs. Second, the robustness of the tests would be maximised by examining the period 2000 to 2011 that straddles the 2008 financial crisis. 
Data source description and summary statistics: Data for the models were collected by downloading annual financial reports of the East African quoted companies from African Financials database. However, reports for some of the years were missing from the African Financials database. The author downloaded these reports from the companies’ websites, where available, and requested reports that were not available from either African Financials or the companies’ websites directly from the companies. Data for the private companies were obtained from the database of an accounting firm (one of the big four firms). Because data for some of the years were missing, the panel of data collected was unbalanced. For the unbalanced panel, ownership structure and firm characteristics data for each firm-year observation were collected. In addition, market and macroeconomic information for each of the three countries for each country-year observation were gathered. Ownership structure and firm characteristics data were obtained for the years 2000 to 2011 from the firms’ financial statements and annual reports. This was the maximum amount of data readily available in consistent form for quoted and unquoted companies. The market and macroeconomic information for the same period were obtained from the Word Bank Economic Indicators database. Using accounting information from financial reports and market and macroeconomic data, meant that variables could be measured consistently. Although accounting techniques may vary from firm to firm, regulations that are set out within accounting standards frameworks allow for such variations to be minimised. Using such information allowed the research questions and hypotheses to be meaningfully addressed. It also ensured that the statistical procedures applied 
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to analyse the data were suitable. These ensured that the appropriateness dimension was satisfied, and that there was a panel of firms rather than a single cross-section. Table 4-2 describes the data collected and shows key summary statistics for the sample and its sub-samples (panels).  
Table 4-2: Summary statistics of the variables 
 This table presents the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum value, 25th quantile, median, 75th quantile and maximum value) of the variables used in the regression models. Panel A shows summary statistics for leverage firm-year observations: leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Panel B shows summary statistics for ownership structure firm-year observations: residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND); TOP5 is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders; and institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). Panel C shows summary statistics for firm characteristics firm-year observations: age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. All variables are measured at the end of a year. ASTAN, PROF and GRO are scaled by total book assets at the end of a year. Panel D shows summary statistics for market and country information for country-year observations: economic growth rate (GDPCA) is the gross domestic product per capita; inflation rate (INF) is measured by the consumer price index; banking sector development (BASEDE) is the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to gross domestic product; and capital market development (CAPMADE) is the ratio of stock market capitalisation to gross domestic product.   
4-2a: Quoted firms       -------------- Quantiles --------------  Variable N Mean S. D. Min .25 Median .75 Max Panel A: Leverage LEV 443 1.25 7.71 -93.94 0.40 0.72 1.49 69.72 Panel B: Ownership structure RES 514   0.97   1.67   0.00   0.02   0.20   1.28    9.00 TOP5 514 71.24 15.23 24.28 60.66 71.38 83.30 100.00 INEX 514   7.25 16.24   0.00   1.62   3.06   5.32 100.00 Panel C: Firm characteristics AGE 562 46.24 25.87     3.00 28.00 44.50 59.00 142.00 SIZE 443 17.76   1.62   11.74 16.69 17.77 18.80   21.43 ASTAN 443   0.56   0.23     0.04   0.37   0.60   0.74     1.00 PROF 444   0.17   0.22    -1.21   0.05   0.14   0.25     1.40 GRO 443   0.10   0.22    -0.23   0.02   0.05   0.12     4.33 ECFV 562   0.08   0.08     0.01   0.03   0.06   0.10     0.40 PDT 444   0.06   0.08     0.00   0.01   0.03   0.07     0.57 TAX 441 16.28 20.86 -138.94   0.52 16.88 28.97 116.65 Panel D: Market and country information GDPCA 564 520.17 157.52 220.63 395.60 471.04 699.77 779.40 INF 564     9.95     5.71    -0.29     5.74     9.82   11.62   26.24 BASEDE 564     5.06     4.22     1.29     2.64     3.88     6.02   18.08 CAPMADE 546   26.28   15.90     0.60   10.10   28.03   35.83   50.56  
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4-2b: Private firms 
      -------------- Quantiles --------------  Variable N Mean S. D. Min .25 Median .75 Max Panel A: Leverage LEV 116 1.80 3.76 -11.23 0.63 1.26 2.91 27.89 Panel B: Ownership structure RES 152   1.12   0.81     0.00     0.49     1.00     1.00    1.00 TOP5 152 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 INEX 151   92.07 27.09     0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Panel C: Firm characteristics AGE 156 19.27 24.51     0.00   5.00   9.00 14.50   87.00 SIZE 116 16.63   2.04   11.12     15.59 16.68 18.07   19.77 ASTAN 116   0.47   0.26     0.01   0.24   0.51   0.66     0.94 PROF 116   0.04   0.25    -1.43   0.01   0.06   0.11     0.51 GRO 116   0.08   0.10     0.00   0.02   0.05   0.11     0.54 ECFV 156   0.14   0.17     0.02   0.03   0.05   0.13     0.65 PDT 116   0.02   0.03      0.00   0.00   0.01   0.04     0.11 TAX 116   0.17   0.21    -0.53   0.00   0.13   0.31     0.98 Panel D: Market and country information GDPCA 156 332.79   93.97 220.63 237.78 331.19 429.69 469.82 INF 156     7.25     5.15    -0.29     3.56     6.72   10.37   18.68 BASEDE 156     2.95     1.56     1.29     1.73     2.66     3.17     6.45 CAPMADE 130   10.70   14.54     0.60     0.79     1.19   21.32   45.97 
 
4-2c: All firms 
      -------------- Quantiles --------------  Variable N Mean S. D. Min .25 Median .75 Max Panel A: Leverage LEV 559 1.36 7.07 -93.94 0.41 0.80 1.65 69.72 Panel B: Ownership structure RES 666   2.46   1.03   0.00 121.50 64.16 30.78    1.00 TOP5 544 72.83 16.20 24.28   60.66 72.63 84.50 100.00 INEX 665 26.51 40.42   0.00     1.78   3.93 27.09 100.00 Panel C: Firm characteristics AGE 718 40.38 27.88      0.00 14.00 40.00 57.00 142.00 SIZE 559 17.53   1.77    11.12     16.45 17.63 18.69      21.43 ASTAN 559   0.54   0.24       0.01   0.35   0.58   0.73     1.00 PROF 560   0.14   0.23     -1.43   0.05   0.11   0.23     1.40 GRO 559   0.09   0.20     -0.23   0.02   0.05   0.12     4.33 ECFV 718   0.10   0.11       0.01   0.03   0.06   0.11     0.65 PDT 560   0.05   0.07      0.00   0.01   0.03   0.07     0.57 TAX 557 12.92 19.68 -138.94   0.05   5.37 26.02 116.65 Panel D: Market and country information GDPCA 720 479.57 165.23 220.63 383.22 432.96 687.97 779.40 INF 720     9.37     5.70    -0.29     5.31     9.76   11.62   26.24 BASEDE 720     4.61     3.90     1.29     2.61     2.92     5.77   18.08 CAPMADE 676   23.28   16.80     0.60     8.08   24.17   35.17   50.56 
 It was also necessary to divide the main sample into sub-samples for testing the hypotheses.  Accordingly, the sample of the quoted non-financial firms was divided 
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into sub-samples: indigenous and foreign ownership, concentrated ownership and diverse (widely-held) ownership, and institutional and non-institutional ownership.  A similar division was also undertaken for the unquoted firms. 
4.2.4 Validity of the variables In this study, relationships are observed between variables, and the validity of the variables of a model is important. Internal validity was assessed using internal causal criteria of whether there is a reasonable causal explanation for the observed relationship and there are plausible alternative explanations. Empirical relationship is necessary for causation; however, it must be meaningful (i.e. greater than what might be expected to occur by chance or coincidence).  The empirical relationship has an internal statistical validity when it is not due to chance. Internal validity provides confidence that the dependent variable has been caused by the predictor variable and not some other variable. It ensured that the measures used in the study measure what they are intended to measure. High internal validity permits conclusions of cause and effect; and a confounding or extraneous variable5 is a major threat to internal validity. 
4.2.5 Limitations of data (sample size) Although this research was carefully designed and executed, the author is still aware of the potential limitations and constraints that the sample size might impose on the interpretation of its findings. The population of firms from which the sample was drawn is small as the three East African stock markets are still at an embryonic stage of development. The sample size might make it difficult to find significant relationships from the data. However, the author has attempted to mitigate this impact by increasing the period over which data was gathered to 12 years, which increased the number of firm-year observations. In addition, Ngugi (2008) used a sample of only 22 firms from the NSE and was able to find significant relationships from the data.  Notwithstanding this, the reader need to bear this limitation in mind and exercise care when interpreting the findings of this research.                                                         5 A variable other than the independent variable that co-varies with the independent variable and might be an alternative cause of the dependent variable. 
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4.3 Modelling financial structure, ownership structure and 
firm performance The literature on financial structure has identified a variety of possible determinants of financial structures. To exploit the double dimensionality of a panel dataset (data observed on cross-sections of units and over time) researchers have used various estimation approaches. This section describes the economic phenomena studied; states the purposes of the economic models that have been formulated; discusses simplifying assumptions that underpins the models; and identifies the key variables and parameters of the models. The basic approach in many of previous empirical studies of financial structure consists of cross-sectional and time series regressions of two-way fixed-effects model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝ + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖               (4-1) (i = 1, 2, 3, …, N firms; t = 1, 2, 3, …, T observations per firm) The three-part error structure: 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the financial structure measure (normally leverage or debt ratio) for the 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ firm at time t, a measure of leverage; α is the intercept; 𝛽𝛽 is the model parameter; and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a (1 × k) vector, the explanatory variable for the 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ firm at time t. In the three-part error structure: 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the firm fixed-effects (control for permanent differences between firms); 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is the time fixed-effects (impacts common to all firms but varying by year); and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error term for firm i at time t. 
4.3.1 Description of variables In the current study, a variant of the basic empirical approach is employed. Leverage is used as the measure of financial structure. However, data availability, discussed in Section 4.2, constrained chronological coverage and choice of variables for the empirical analysis in these specifications. As discussed in Chapter 2, leverage has been variously defined in literature. However, for the current study, leverage is defined as: 
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (4-2) (i = 1, 2, 3, …, N firms; t = 1, 2, 3, …, T observations per firm) Where: LEV is leverage       D is book value of debt       E is book value of equity Table 4-1 defines and Table 4-2 describes the variables that have been used in the study. The variables are those common in literature and relevant to this study.  The variables which have been incorporated in each model are explained later. To test each of the hypotheses outlined above, the specifications discussed in sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 were adopted for equation (4-1). 
4.3.2 Ownership-financial structure model The type of ownership of a firm might influence the financial structure of a firm. In my panel, there are data for indigenous or foreign controlled firms, firms with concentrated or dispersed ownership, as well as firms controlled by institutions or non-institutions. Ownership type determinations were based upon the standard classifications available in literature, and the classification of firms by three ownership types appeared most objective. To allow for the influence of the type of ownership on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 I include dummy variables in the model; I estimate the equation: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                 (4-3) where:  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is a compound error = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖       𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 =  𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷�     (4-4)       𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋 =  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼�        (4-5)   
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This model addresses research question 1 and tests research hypothesis H1.  Equation 4-3 shows that for East African firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage (debt ratio) at time t)6 is a function of the firm’s ownership type according to: residence of controlling shareholders (RES), concentration of controlling shareholders (TOP5), level of control by institutional shareholding (INEX), and the three part error structure: 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the firm fixed-effects (control for permanent differences between firms); 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is the time fixed-effects (impacts common to all firms but varying by year); and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error term for firm i at time t with a mean of zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2.  The intercept term is α, and 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5, and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 are the estimators of the explanatory variables, and of interest are the signs of these estimators. The definitions of all the variables used in the ownership model, including FOR, IND, INS and EXI, are provided in Table 4-1; with summary statistics in Table 4-2. As Flannery and Rangan (2006) observed, several recent financial structure studies have been robust across various definitions of book and market leverage.  Although, for most studies, market leverage is preferred because it is a better measure, where the analysis involves unquoted companies, there is the niggling problem of identifying the market values to use for the computation of market leverage.  The definition of leverage as used in this study is book leverage, the only measure of leverage that can be reliably computed when dealing with unquoted firms. The current study involves both quoted firms (for which market values can be easily established) and unquoted firms (for which market values are very difficult to establish). The book value of debt and equity is used because even though market value (of both variables) would have been a better measure, it is very difficult to establish for unquoted firms. For the current study, the author also identify all–equity firms7, those that used no (zero) long-term debt over the period 2000 to 2011. The leverage of all-equity firms                                                         6 The author has defined leverage as the use of fixed-charge sources of funds, e.g. debt and preference capital, along with owners’ equity in the financial structure. For this study, an appropriate financial structure is one where the debt-equity ratio maximises the market value per share and minimises the cost of capital. An appropriate financial structure would have the following physiognomies: maintains maximum profitability or return; ensures solvency (i.e. minimises the risk of insolvency); is flexible; conserves a firm’s operational capacity; and maintains the control status of the business firm. 7 The author defines all-equity as <5% leverage. 
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is truncated at zero. Levered firms are those that maintain a gearing ratio of at least 5%: where gearing is defined as the ratio of book value of debt (Book Debt = Total Assets – Book Equity) to book value of equity (Book Equity = Total Assets – [Total Liabilities + Preference Shares] + Deferred Taxes + Convertible Debt). 
Models’ Assumptions: The above model is based on the following simplifying assumptions: 1. There are only two sources of funds debt and equity. All providers of finance have the same expectations about future profits of any one firm. 2. Leverage is a function of debt and equity. The financial leverage chosen by a business firm is intended to earn more return on the fixed-charge funds than their costs. Fixed-charge funds can be obtained at a cost lower than the business firm’s rate of return on net assets. 3. Business firms aim to achieve an appropriate financial structure when making financing choices. A firm’s business risk is constant over time and independent of its financial structure. 4. The business firm has an infinite life; and ownership structure, and firm-specific, institutional and country-specific factors influence leverage. 4. Firms’ ownership types are correlated to firm-specific and country-specific factors. Within a country, there is little cross-sectional variation, among firms, in country-specific factors. 5. Panel data methods assumptions: both fixed-effects models and random effects models require that all the explanatory variables be strictly exogenous, i.e. the strict exogeneity assumption:  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� = 0  ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏, 𝑡𝑡 
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 for all values of τ and t          (4-6) 
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 Strict exogeneity requires τ ≤  t. Additionally, the random effects model assumption requires that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated to the firm-specific model error (firm effects or residuals) component, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 , i.e. the random effects model assumption: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) = 0       (4-7) It is assumed that firm effects (residuals) are drawn from a normal distribution, with a variance equal to 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2.  This assumption is required to make inferences about the regression coefficients. Iterative or feasible generalised least squares estimators of random effects model are approximately normally distributed in large samples, irrespective of whether the residuals are normally distributed. The estimation of the ownership model, to answer research question 1 and test research hypothesis H1, is the subject of Chapter 5. 
4.3.3 Ownership structure and firm performance model The ownership-performance model is based on the view that ownership structure is market-mediated and adjusts to suit the conditions that firms operate in. It is assumed that at current performance level, the investors in the market buy and sell shares with the aim of maximising their wealth and ownership structure adjust to a level that reflects the conditions firms are facing, which incorporates the influence of the different ownership variables.   
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +   𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖           (4-8) Equation 4-8 specifies that for the East African firms, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s performance (return on capital employed) at time t) is a function of the firm’s owners’ residence, the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders, ratio of institution to individual shareholders, and random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈2.  The intercept term is α, and 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 are the estimators of the explanatory variables, and of interest are the signs of these estimators. The estimation of ownership performance model, to answer research question 2 and test research hypothesis H2 is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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4.3.4 Internal firm-specific factors’ model To address research question 3 and test research hypothesis H3, a model was formulated. It includes leverage of a firm i in year t as depending on leverage in the prior year, the age of the firm, size of the firm, the asset tangibility of the firm, profitability of the firm, volatility of firm’s earnings and cash flows, growth potential of the firm, the uniqueness of the product in which the firm deals, and effective tax charge. The research therefore estimates the equation: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                  (4-9) Equation 4-9 shows that for firms operating in East African economies, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage (debt ratio) at time t) is a function of the firm’s age (AGE), size (SIZE), asset structure (ASTAN), performance (PROF), earning and cash flow volatility (ECFV), growth opportunities (GRO), product uniqueness (PDT), effective tax charge (TAX), and random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑈𝑈2.  The definitions of all the variables used in this study are provided in Table 4-1. The intercept term is α, and 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are the estimators of the explanatory variables, and of interest are the signs of these estimators. The firm-specific factors’ model is based on the assumptions in section 4.3.2. The estimation of this model, to answer research question 3 and test hypothesis H3, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Country and institutional factors: Besides the ownership structure and internal firm-specific factors, country-wide and institutional factors might influence the financial structure of a firm. In my panel of data (sample) there are data on the countries’ gross domestic product, consumer price indices, banking sector development and capital market development. However, since these variables only vary over time, there is no cross-sectional effect across firms. The effect on the firm is only an average effect on the firm with cross-sectional variation only among the three countries.  
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Thus, these variables were incorporated in the estimation of the ownership-financial structure and internal firm-specific factors’ models to enhance country comparisons. Their inclusion allowed for the influence of the environment in which the firm operates (i.e. the level of development of the country (GDPCA), the rate of inflation (INF), the level of banking sector development (BASEDE), and the level of stock market development (CAPMADE)) to be incorporated in the empirical tests. 
4.4 Methodology This section discusses the methodology used and the empirical tests undertaken by the author, which form the basis of the empirical analyses and discussions contained in the four empirical chapters, 5 to 8. Experiments were undertaken on mathematical representations of ownership structure, financial structure choices firm performance and firm-specific factors. 
4.4.1 Pre-tests Following Hsiao’s (1986, 2003, 2014) ideas, the author collected panel data over a 12-year period (2000 to 2011) to capture dynamic adjustment processes and control better for the effect of omitted variables. The main sample was separated based on the category of registration into quoted (listed) and unquoted (private) companies. Attempts to separate the main sample into industry types such as primary (extractive) and secondary (manufacturing) or by other similar secondary characteristics were not fruitful as they were too general or required too much subjective judgement. There also seems to be many conglomerates within the sample; however, this appears to be a problem that is common to emerging economies. The mathematical models and hypotheses in Section 4.1.2 were then used to examine the data in the sample. 
4.4.2 Estimation of parameters & hypotheses testing 
Estimation consideration: if there are unobserved fixed effects, the error term in dynamic models would be correlated with the explanatory variables, and dynamic models produce biased and inconsistent estimates. In such cases, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable suffers from an upward bias. 
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One key feature of my sample is that the sample of quoted firms was selected from a non-random population of all companies listed on the NSE, DSE and USE; whilst the sample of private companies was a convenient sample from a non-random population. The non-random nature of the samples can be controlled for by allowing for fixed effects. Another example of probable fixed effects bias is that firms in Kenya may, on average, invest more than firms in Tanzania and Uganda. However, as Goergen and Renneboog (2001) observed, using fixed-effects estimation can take care of attrition bias that might result from non-random exit from the samples. Both the fixed-effects models and the random-effects models were estimated, as both are conveniently implemented in the Stata software. As explained in section 4.5, the random-effects model estimators of the explanatory variables were found to be more efficient than the analogous fixed-effects model estimators, since the random-effects model assumptions (equations 4-6, and 4-7) were satisfied. The random-effects estimators would therefore be preferable because they would be more precise. For an unbalanced panel, a more efficient method to estimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). They take first differences of the model and then apply the generalised method of moments (GMMdiff) using lagged levels of the dependent variable and independent variables as instrumental variables. Taking first differences eliminates the fixed error term. Since the idiosyncratic shocks are not serially correlated, lagged levels t–2 and t–1 of the dependent variable and predictor variables can be used as instruments to achieve a consistent estimator. The Arellano and Bond method use available instruments more efficiently than other methods, e.g. the Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) technique. However, as Blundell and Bond (1998) showed, GMMdiff performs poorly where: the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is close to one; and the relative variance of the fixed effects is large. In such cases, the lagged levels of dependent variables are weak instruments and the GMMdiff provides a downward-biased estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Blundell and Bond (ibid.) use Monte Carlo simulations and show that, faced with the two situations described above, the system generalised method 
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of moments (GMMsys) yields better estimators than GMMdiff. GMMsys uses two equations, each with its own instruments: the first uses the lagged differences in the dependent variable and predictor variables as instruments; whilst, the second uses the levels of dependent and the predictor variables as instruments. In this study, all the models were estimated using fixed-effects, random-effects, first difference GMM and system GMM (these methods are compared in section 4.6). For each method of estimation, the author reports: (1) the coefficient, (2) standard-errors that are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity, (3) the value of the test statistic, (4) p-values of the test; and (5) the p-values for the Sargan and Hansen test. 
Hypotheses testing: The parameters of the variables under investigation in this study were explained in section 4.3. To make inferences about financial structure of firms (private and quoted) in emerging economies, the research hypotheses in section 4.2 were tested. Using a panel of data, regression coefficients were and inferential statistics were estimated. The hypothesized signs of the parameters are implicit in the research hypotheses, which indicate the relationship between leverage or performance and the explanatory variables. The types of variables (some categorical, others discrete, others continuous) included in the three models determined the statistical tests that were performed on the panel of data. Null hypotheses were formulated for the tests. The alternative hypotheses, which were non-directional, called for two-tailed tests; whilst those that were directional used one-tailed tests. The levels of significance (α) used were 0.05 and 0.01. Type II errors were also estimated to evaluate whether all the assumptions for the statistical tests were met. The p-values of test statistics were computed, and they form the basis of the rejection region at 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance. The calculations were all performed using Stata. Based on these findings, the results that are contained in Chapters 5 to 8 were described and conclusions drawn. 
4.5 Regression Diagnostics  Diagnostic tests were conducted to check the models that used the panel of data. The diagnostic testing process undertaken was the same for both the fixed-effects models and the random-effects models. The diagnostic tests carried out were for 
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model error normality (and outliers); heteroscedastic model errors; non-auto correlated model errors; nonlinearities; and parameter instability across the sample. In addition, generalised method of moments’ diagnostics were conducted. 
4.5.1 Tests for error normality and outliers This was undertaken to ensure that the parameter estimators are consistent and lead to asymptotically valid parameter inference (the model errors should have zero mean and be identically and independently distributed – IID). Departures from normality can be indicative of model misspecification, such as a need to apply logarithm transformation; or non-homogeneities across subsamples of the data; or the presence of an observation or two, which are overly outliers. In a panel data setting, there are two model errors to check for normality (to ensure that the data are homogenous across sub-samples): the firm-specific error component (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) and the idiosyncratic error component (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖). The author used the Shapiro–Wilk test of normality to test the null hypothesis that the sample follows a normal distribution. The results shown in Table 4-3 show a p-value of 0.0001 and reject the null hypothesis that the data are from a normally distributed population. The research therefore applied logarithm transformation to the data to address the slightly skewed distribution identified during the diagnostic test. Furthermore, graphical plots of the variables show that outliers (influential or otherwise) were not a serious problem in either error distribution for this data set. 
Heteroscedastic model errors: Heteroscedasticity in 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and idiosyncratic error component on the models’ error terms was tested for: non-autocorrelated model errors, nonlinearities, and collinearity. To test for heteroscedasticity, the author used the Breusch-Pagan test to test the null hypothesis that there is constant variance. The results in Table 4-3 shows a p-value of 0.0001, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and there is significant evidence that there is heteroskedasticity. An information matrix (IM) test for the regression model was also conducted, as well as an orthogonal decomposition into tests for heteroskedasticity, skewness, and kurtosis due to Cameron and Trivedi (1990). The IM test also highlights the problem of heteroscedasticity and skewness of the data. 
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Table 4-3: Regression diagnostics for the data 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data: Variable Obs W V Z Prob>z r 430 0.33903 194.95 12.578 0.00000***    
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity:          Ho: Constant variance          Variables: fitted values of LEV          chi2(1)      =   119.22          Prob > chi2  =   0.0000*** 
  
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test Source chi2 df p Heteroskedasticity 231.56 135         0.0000*** Skewness      18.47   15 0.2387 Kurtosis      2.27   1 0.1320 Total 252.30 151         0.0000*** 
  
Variance Inflation Factor Variable VIF 1/VIF CAPMADE 2.99 0.333925 GDPCA 2.81 0.355321 TOP5 1.97 0.506397 SIZE 1.8 0.555774 ASTAN 1.69 0.590970 INEX 1.64 0.608058 RES 1.63 0.613292 ECFV 1.59 0.630153 BASEDE 1.26 0.794384 AGE 1.23 0.810925 TAX 1.23 0.811142 PDT 1.2 0.835874 INF 1.19 0.842313 GRO 1.16 0.861205 PROF 1.13 0.884191 Mean VIF 1.64  
  
Model Specification Link Test LEV Coef. t p>t _hat  1.173983          5.75***        0.000*** _hatsq -0.083260 -1.55 0.121 _cons  0.280719   0.61 0.543   
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of LEV Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of LEV          Ho: model has no omitted variables          F(3, 406)      =   7.00          Prob > F  =   0.0001 
   Note: **, *** significant at 5 per cent and 1 per cent significance levels respectively 
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4.5.2 Parameter instability across the sample In checking the parameters for stability across the sample, homogeneity across firms as well as across time become an issue. Also, the issue of endogenous explanatory variables in a panel data setting needed to be addressed by formulating an additional model: the first-differences model. Generalised Hausman tests (Hausman, 1978) were conducted to compute an estimate of the joint sampling distribution of all the parameter estimators for both the fixed-effects and random-effects models.  The Hausman test allowed for heteroscedasticity within each estimated model, correlations of the parameter estimator sampling errors across the fixed-effects and random-effects models. Whilst, using the Stata vce(robust) option it allowed for heteroscedasticity in intrafirm serial correlation of the idiosyncratic errors. 
Table 4-4: Hausman Test     Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic                   chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)                           =       18.44                Prob>chi2 =      0.05  The author used the Hausman test to determine whether the fixed effects and the random effects panel estimators are consistent. At 95% level of significance, the p-value is 0.05. A small and insignificant Hausman statistic means a small and insignificant difference between fixed effects and random effects coefficients. Therefore, with a p-value of 0.05 the null that the two methods (fixed effects and random effects) would yield consistent estimations was not rejected.  
4.5.3 Test of model adequacy The three regression models (section 4.3) were analysed for any violation of model assumptions before inferences based on them were undertaken. The technique used in this study to test for adequacy included: the coefficient of determination (R2); the adjusted R2 to ensure that the model fits the observed data well. The value of the standard error of the models (S) was also checked. 
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 The next test conducted was residuals analysis. The residuals were plotted against the fitted values (𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖), against the predictor variable values (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), and against time or run-order sequence, in addition to a normal probability plot. The plots of residuals were used to check: whether the residuals follow the normal distribution, have a constant variance, and the regression function is linear, that a pattern did not exist when residuals were plotted in a time or run-order sequence, and there were no outliers. The author conducted Bartlett's and Levene's Test. Finally, the sum of squares due to lack-of-fit (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) was computed to identify any deficiency in fit due to departure from the perfect-fit model. The magnitude of the 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 provides an indication of how far from a perfect model, the models are. I used the F test to examine the lack-of-fit at 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels and obtained the following results. 
Table 4-5: Sum of Squares Lack-of-fit  Source         SS df MS  Number of obs = 425      F(15,   409) = 2.2     Model 1860.538    15 124.0359  Prob > F = 0.0059 Residual 23018.22 409 56.27927  R-squared  = 0.0748      Adj R-squared = 0.0409     Total 24878.76 424 58.67632  Root MSE = 7.502  As Table 4-5 shows, a linear regression established that the predictor variables could statistically significantly predict firms’ leverage, F(15, 409) = 2.2, p = 0.0059 and the predictor variables accounted for 4.1% of the explained variability in leverage. However, the p-value is smaller than the significance level α = 0.05, which implies that the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative should be rejected. There is sufficient evidence at α = 0.05 level to conclude that there is lack of linear fit. The next section discusses the methods used to estimate the models specified for this research.  
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4.6 Fixed-effects vs. random-effects vs. GMM estimators This section compares the three estimation methods that were used in this study.  
4.6.1 Fixed-effects:  The use of fixed-effects model requires an assumption that the slope coefficients (𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5,  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) are fixed in repeated samples and the same for all firms and years. However, this assumption is not reasonable, and for this study it has been relaxed. To accommodate the relaxation of this assumption, the model error term is decomposed into three components: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 =  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖             (4-10) 
where: 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)         𝑖𝑖 = 1 … .𝐶𝐶      𝑡𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  is a firm-specific component, which is fixed not random,  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a year-specific component,  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  the idiosyncratic shock, 
𝐶𝐶 is the number of firms in the sample (= 67; 47 quoted and 20 private), and 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is the number of observations available for each firm i (= 12).  Variability for 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 can be firm-specific and year-specific, but the expected value of 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  is assumed to be zero for all the firms and years. Heteroscedasticity in 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  is also ignored as 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 was found to be independently distributed for all values of i and t. For the models in equations 4-3, 4-8 and 4-9 to be estimated using the fixed-effects, the models can be transformed using the within-group transformation. The values of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 … 𝑣𝑣47 from the decomposition of 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 in Equation 4-10 were taken to be a set of M (=47 or 20) fixed constants, effectively shifting the intercept for each of the firms. The within transformation, which involves the deduction of the sample mean of the variable or error component over all the sample data for a firm from its original value, was applied to the data to prepare it for fixed-effects estimation. The year specific error component 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 has been treated as fixed in the equations 3-3, 3-8 and 3-9. For this research,  𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be fixed in repeated samples, thus Equation 3-10 allows the intercept to vary across years in the sample, effectively 
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two-way fixed-effects. The number of observations for each firm (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) varies from 4 to 12 years and the variation in 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 has been captured by including 11 appropriately defined dummy variables (𝑑𝑑2001𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 … 𝑑𝑑2011𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) in the model specification.  Dummy variable 𝑑𝑑2001𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is set to one for all observations from 2001 and to zero otherwise. The other dummy variables are similarly defined. The dummy variable 𝑑𝑑2000𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 has 
been excluded as the intercept α is not dropped from the model specification. The inclusion of the dummy variables allowed for time-heterogeneity in the intercept.   The inclusion of the dummy variables is appropriate because the ratio of average number of periods per firm to the number of firms is relatively small as is typical of panel data. The author allowed for the impact of firm-specific factors in 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  by including the dummy variables in the model. The term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in Equation 4-10 is the variation in the expected value of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) across the M (47 quoted and 20 private) firms, which is not explained by the across-firm variation in the explanatory variables:  𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. For the fixed-effects estimation, 𝑣𝑣1 … 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀 are treated as fixed in repeated samples. Applying within transformation eliminates 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 from the models and allows OLS to be used to obtain the fixed-effects estimators. But the within transformed regression model can lead to inconsistent parameter estimates if any of the explanatory variables is only weakly exogenous. Strict exogeneity is a necessary condition for consistent parameter estimation in the context of fixed-effects. Using OLS with cluster-robust error revealed that there was no obvious trend in the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables. When the null hypothesis that all the year-dummy coefficients are zero was tested, the results showed that:       F(16,    323) =    1.02             Prob > F =    0.4358  The test does not reject the null hypothesis, with a p-value of 0.4358; therefore, the dummy variables are excluded from the model. Indeed, fixed-effects can be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters of equations 4-3, 4-8 and 4-9, as they would explicitly or implicitly estimate 47 (or 20) firm-specific dummy variable coefficients corresponding to the firm-specific fixed-effects. Also, it makes it impossible to estimate or control for the impact of time-invariant variables, e.g. 
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ownership may not change much over time. Furthermore, one cannot use lagged values of the dependent variable as explanatory variable in the fixed-effects estimation; such inclusion makes fixed-effects parameter estimators inconsistent.  Where appropriate, the inclusion of lagged LEV as an explanatory variable was essential in modelling economic dynamics of financial structure choices. This is because the leverage of companies adjusts towards a target leverage and the target leverage itself is determined by several factors and depend on the pre-existing leverage level. The random effects estimation should resolve the defects of the fixed-effects estimation outlined above; though it requires the strengthening of the strict exogeneity assumption if it is to provide consistent parameter estimates.  
4.6.2 Random-effects For the random-effects estimation, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is specified as a random variable (i.e. not fixed in repeated samples). Random-effects assume that the explanatory variables are exogenous with respect to firm-specific component of the error term, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖. Under the random-effects framework, the overall model error in Equation 4-10 (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) is decomposed into a firm-specific component (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) a time-specific component (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖) and an idiosyncratic component (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖).  As under the fixed-effects framework, the time-specific component (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖) is modelled by including 11 time-dummy variables (𝑑𝑑2001𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 … 𝑑𝑑2011𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) as explanatory variables in the regression model. This leaves 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 equals to the sum of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 . However, since the null hypothesis that all these year–dummy coefficients are zero was rejected (section 4.6.2), the dummy variables are excluded from the model. The random-effects treat 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 as single random variable, which is assumed to be distributed IID (0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2), independently of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 . Therefore, the remaining specification of the joint distribution of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 reduces to the determination of a single parameter (𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2/𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2, the ratio of the variance of the firm-specific component of the model error to the variance of the idiosyncratic component). The parameter 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2/𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 is easy to estimate consistently and is taken to be known in a large sample. 
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The random-effects avoid the efficiency loss in the fixed-effects by treating the M firm-specific error components as a random component error term (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) of the regression equations, with known (or at least consistently estimated) value for 
𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣
2/𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2. There is a need to exploit the consistent estimate of 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2/𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 to undo the serial correlation in 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖   +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, to obtain both efficient parameter estimators and consistent standard error estimators. 
Random-effects vs. fixed-effects: The fixed-effects and random-effects models require that all the explanatory variables be strictly exogenous (the strict exogeneity assumption). The fixed-effects approach is preferable in situations where the primary interest is in policy-relevant inference of the effects of individual characteristics. However, when the selection mechanism is well understood and the researcher has access to rich data, the random-effects (or multilevel or mixed) model should be preferred because it can produce policy-relevant estimates while allowing a wider range of research questions to be addressed. Moreover, random-effects estimators of regression coefficients and shrinkage estimators of firm-effects (firm residuals) are more statistically efficient than those for fixed-effects. It is often assumed that the panel data regression model is correctly specified and that the regressors are independent of the individual-specific effects (or the random-effects’ assumption). If this is true, the random-effects estimator would be asymptotically efficient and the difference between the random-effects and the fixed-effects estimators will tend to be small. However, if the random-effects assumption fails but the model is otherwise correctly specified, the fixed-effects estimator remains consistent and the random-effects estimator inconsistent. The difference between the random-effects and the fixed-effects estimators may therefore be large. By comparing the random-effects and fixed-effects estimators, the Hausman test can indicate the correctness of the random-effects assumption. Both fixed-effects and random-effects yield consistent parameter estimators, which indicate that the random-effects model assumption (Equations 4-6, 4-7, and 4-10) is valid. In section 4.5.3 the Hausman test showed that both the fixed-effects and random-effects could be used; however random effects estimators are more efficient. The generalised methods of moments framework, brings in further advantages as discussed in section 4.6.3. 
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4.6.3 Generalised method of moments (GMM) The GMM estimator might be considered the ‘workhorse’ of modern econometrics, with various options of GMM available to researchers. Normally, a set of equations, specifying the expected values of functions of the dependent variables and the independent variables and the model errors, makes it possible to estimate the coefficients in a regression model. Generically, these equations are referred to as 
moment conditions (population moment conditions) because any function of random variables is itself just a random variable. GMM estimation provides consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of the model parameters where least square curve fitting and maximum likelihood estimation approaches are awkward or infeasible. The author estimates the dynamic models for ownership, performance and firm-specific factors based on a panel data from the 67 (47 quoted and 20 private) East African firms. Theoretically, it is easier to view GMM estimators for panel data as system estimators with N observations on a system of T equations, where N is the number of units (i.e. firms) and T the number of periods, rather than a single equation with NT observations. Although instrumental variables are specified for each of the T equations, each of the T equations is the same. In dynamic panel-data models, lagged variables of the dependent variable are included as regressors (in each of equations 4-3, 4-8 and 4-9, one lag of dependent variable was introduced). The error component (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) can either be a fixed-effect or a random-effect term and we do not require the regressors to be independent of it. Therefore, even with the assumption that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2) fulfilled, the presence of both 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in the model renders fixed-effects and random-effects estimators inconsistent (Nickell, 1981). Similarly, OLS estimator of 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 on 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 and the regressors will be inconsistent because 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 will be correlated with the error term. The dynamics introduced imply that 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡−1 cannot be strictly exogenous. 
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The GMM (Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover8 GMM estimators) is used to estimate the dynamic ownership and financial structure panel data models based on equations 4-3, 4-8 and 4-9. The estimators are linear estimators. The GMM estimation yields asymptotically efficient estimation. Asymptotic optimality is a key advantage of GMM. Whilst the OLS can be viewed as MM estimator, the 2SLS can be viewed as a GMM estimator. For this research, GMM estimators (equivalent to IV), which are based on a weight matrix that assumes the error terms are IID, are used to estimate the dynamic ownership model. The GMM estimation framework is more robust than the fixed effects and random effects estimation methods. It computes and provides more consistent and reliable estimates of the model parameters. The GMM estimators offer features, e.g. Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected standard errors to account for the bias in the traditional two-step GMM standard errors, in dynamic panel-data models.  However, to make the empirical test robust, the models’ parameters were estimated using the three alternative methods of estimation: fixed effects, random effects and GMM (one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM and two-step system GMM.). 
4.7 Summary This chapter discussed the empirical methodology and associated methods that were used in this study to ensure that the research aims and objectives were met; the research questions adequately answered; and research hypotheses robustly tested. It discussed how the data were gathered and prepared for analysis; how the research hypotheses were formulated; how the models were formulated; the pre-tests that were conducted to ensure that the methods suited the data set and the models were adequate before they were estimated. These methods and tests are operationalised in empirical chapters 5 to 8 to ensure that the study is robust and the quality of findings high. 
                                                        8 Arellano, M. & Bond, S. 1991, "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 277-297; and Arellano, 
M. & Bover, O. 1995, "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-components Models", Journal 
of Econometrics, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 29-51. 
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5 Ownership Structure and Financial Structure of 
Quoted Companies This chapter empirically examines the relationship between ownership and financial structure of quoted firms in the emerging economies of three East African countries: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It examines the relationship between three facets of ownership (residency of shareholders, concentration and level of institutional shareholding) and firm leverage. It demonstrates that through agency relationships between owners and managers, ownership structure influences leverage choice. In chapter 2, the author highlighted Berle and Means’ (1932) observation that as countries industrialised and developed their markets, ownership and control of firms became separate. However, as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), and La Parta et al. (1997, 1999) noted, the relationship between ownership and control observed by Berle and Means is mostly applicable to the USA and the UK. La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) found that family firms or controlling shareholders, and not board-based shareholders are the most common form of ownership around the world. Prasad, Green and Murinde (2006) found that control within a firm, in emerging markets, was often exercised through a dominant shareholder usually family or business group. This research is of interest for two reasons: Firstly, while much research has focused on the relationship between firm-specific variables and financial structure choice (as discussed in Chapter 2), very little is known about the influence of residency of shareholders, ownership control structure and the proportion of institutional shareholding in a firm on the firm’s financial structure choice. Secondly, the East African economies offer a quality data set in the context of ownership structure and financial structure of quoted companies that could be used to empirically examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm financial structure choice. In the panel data (sample) for this research, there are data for different ownership combinations: indigenous/foreign; concentrated/diverse; and institutional/ non-institutional for the firms studied.     
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The results of the empirical tests show that residency and the level of institutional shareholding are the most significant ownership variables that influence firms’ choice of financial structure. The results of the concentration variable were inconclusive. This chapter uses two empirical methods (fixed effects and random effects) to test the relationship between the ownership structure variables and financial structure.  Since firms’ ownership structure is of continuous nature and changes slowly over time, dynamic model methods, such as the GMM, is not suitable. The results of the static (fixed-effects and random-effects methods) would be better at showing the effects of changes in ownership structure on financial structure. Moreover, because ownership structure changes continuously and over a long period, the introduction of the lag in a dynamic model masks the long-run effects of ownership structure on financial structure choice. The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 5.1 presents the conceptual issues surrounding ownership structure; section 5.2 presents the ownership-financial structure model and the theoretical framework on which it is based, and discusses the choice of methods used in this research; section 5.4 presents the results of the fixed-effects and random-effects estimation; section 5.5 discusses and analyses the empirical findings from the methods used; whilst section 5.6 presents a cross-country analysis; and section 5.7 concludes the chapter.  
5.1 Conceptual issues – ownership and financial structures This section briefly discusses the theoretical basis from which the ownership-financial structure model was derived. To my knowledge few prior studies have looked at the relationship between firm ownership structure and financial structure in emerging economies. Accordingly, this chapter demonstrates that through agency relationships between owners and managers, ownership structure influences firms’ leverage (financial structure choice) in the emerging markets of the three East African countries. 
There is a view in the literature that although dispersed ownership might exacerbate agency problems, it has advantages that offsets such problems (Demsetz 
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and Villalonga, 2001). Literature identifies family, managerial, foreign/indigenous, concentrated/dispersed, and institutional/individual ownership types. The literature on ownership structure (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; 1999) indicates that in the USA and the UK family firms’ ownership are most common. In contrast, in emerging economies control within the firm is mostly exercised through a dominant shareholder, usually family or business group (Prasad, Green and Murinde, 2006). However, in the East African data, three aspects of ownership structure: residency of shareholders (indigenous or foreign); proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders; and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholdings were identified. It is worth noting that the ownership structure and financial structure literature shows that ownership structures are market-mediated.  In this chapter, the three aspects of ownership structure, identified in the East African data, are examined. Ownership is first treated as an exogenous and then as an endogenous variable, a treatment, which determined the research design and the empirical techniques employed. For the East African firms, focus is on the influence of foreign/indigenous, concentrated/dispersed, and institutional/ non-institutional ownership types on financial structure choice. Quoted companies in East Africa were not family founded (IPOs for these firms resulted from divestiture of public corporations); and the dominant shareholders seem to be business groups or institutional shareholders. In addition, the quoted companies in East Africa have substantial shareholding by foreign shareholders. 
5.2 The ownership-financial structure model and choice of methods This section restates briefly the ownership-financial structure hypotheses explained in section 2.2.4. It also describes and discusses the ownership-financial structure model that represents the hypotheses. The model is the basis of the empirical design employed to examine the influence of ownership structure on financial structure choice of firms in emerging economies. The section also briefly explains the choice of empirical methods used.  
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5.2.1 Ownership-financial structure hypotheses As discussed in section 2.2.4, the hypothesis developed for the relationship between ownership structure and financial structure is: 
H1: For quoted firms in emerging economies, a firm’s financial structure is related to ownership type: indigenous or foreign; dominant (concentrated) or dispersed (widely-held); and institutional or non-institutional.  This hypothesis has been broken down into six lower-level hypotheses: H1a: Indigenous ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. H1b: Foreign ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. H1c: Concentrated ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. H1d: Dispersed ownership of a firm has no association with leverage. H1e: Institutional ownership of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. H1f: Non-institutional ownership of a firm is positively associated with leverage. These lower level hypotheses were derived from the literature discussed in Chapter 2, and Table 2.1 summarises the hypotheses and the work on which they are based. However, before the ownership hypothesis could be tested, the lower level hypotheses have been reformulated to reflect the nature of the East African sample data (please see section 5.1). The re-specified hypotheses are: 
H1aa: The proportion of foreign to indigenous shareholders of a firm is negatively associated with leverage. H1bb: The proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders of a firm has no association with leverage. H1cc: The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding of a firm is negatively associated with leverage.   Lower level hypothesis H1aa combines hypotheses H1a and H1b since shareholders in each company in the sample data are either foreign or indigenous; and one hypothesis can be used to represent the association between residency of the shareholders and financial structure. Hypotheses H1c and H1d have been reformulated into hypotheses H1bb as in the sample data concentration of shareholding has been represented by the proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders. Finally, hypothesis H1cc combines hypotheses H1e and H1f since 
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shareholders in each company in the sample data are either institutional or non-institutional; and one hypothesis can be used to represent the association between the proportion of institutional shareholding and financial structure. The ownership hypothesis and its reformulated lower level breakdown were tested in this study, and the tests of these hypotheses as represented in the ownership structure model are discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
5.2.2 The ownership-financial structure model The model for the relationship between financial structure and various ownership combinations was specified in Chapter 4 (Equation 4-3).  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                      (4-3) Equation 4-3 shows that for firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage (debt ratio) at time 
t) is a function of the residency of shareholders (RES), the proportion of dominant shareholding (TOP5), the proportion of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (INEX), and random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and variance 
𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇
2. The intercept term is α, and 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5 and  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 are the estimators of the explanatory variables; and of interest are the signs of these estimators9.  The original data was logarithmically transformed to address the slightly skewed distribution identified during the diagnostic tests10. The purpose of the transformation is to obtain residuals that are approximately symmetrically distributed about zero. The spread of the residuals changes systematically with the values of the dependent variable heteroscedasticity, and the transformation removes the heteroscedasticity to achieve approximate homoscedasticity.  The regression diagnostics suggest that there was no error in data entry, and that fixed effects and random effects estimations would be consistent and effective. The quoted firms’ panel is unbalanced. Most of the missing observations are towards the 
                                                        9 The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 4.1 and equations 4-4 and 4-5. 10 Regression diagnostics are presented in section 4-5. 
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beginning of the time-period covered in this research, whilst towards the end of the period the observations are more complete. This is partly because some firms in the sample went public later in the period covered by the research. Summary statistics for the quoted firms’ panel are presented in Table 4-2. For the ownership and financial structure variables, the number of observations varied from 443 to 514. Section 5.3 discusses the results of the fixed and random effects estimation. 
5.2.3 Choice of estimation methods The static fixed-effects and random-effects methods were used to test the relationship between financial structure and various ownership structure types in the East African data. These methods show the effects of changes in ownership structure on financial structure better than the GMM methods explained in section 4.6. Use of the GMM methods tends to mask the long-run effects of ownership structure on financial structure choice since ownership structure changes continuously and slowly over a long period. The introduction of a lag to translate the ownership-financial structure model into a dynamic model to allow the use the GMM methods turned out to be intuitively meaningless. Nonetheless, to make the research robust, a dynamic ownership-financial structures model was formulated and the GMM estimations conducted. For a detailed account of tests using the GMM methods, including the results obtained, the interested reader should refer to Appendix 1. 
5.3 Ownership-financial structure model estimations using 
fixed-effects and random-effects methods The data was from a 47-firm sample of firms from all sectors but financial institutions of the East African economy, for which there were data on ownership and accounting variables for 2000 to 2011. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4-2; whilst, table 5-2 presents the results of estimating the ownership model based on Equation 4-3 using the fixed-effects and random-effects frameworks respectively. 
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5.3.1 Fixed-effects estimates For the East African firms, as Table 5-1 shows an increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to a decrease in the firm’s leverage. However, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of shareholding of the top five largest shareholders or the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders and the firm’s leverage. Yet, only the residency and the ratio of institutional shareholding coefficients were statistically significant at 95% confidence level. The coefficient for the concentration of shareholding in the largest top 5 shareholders was not statistically significant at both alpha level of 0.05 and 0.10 (i.e. 95% and 90% confidence levels respectively). As previously explained11 the fixed-effects estimation appears to be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters in Equation 4-3. Therefore, the properties of the random-effects method and its suitability for estimation of the ownership-financial structures model based on transformed Equation 4-3 (transformed using quasi-difference transformation) were explored. 
Table 5-1: Fixed-effects (within) & random-effects (GLS) estimations of the 
ownership-financial structure model results Ownership structures and leverage across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011, using an unbalanced panel. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 346 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The Table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t (z) statistics.  lnLEV  Coef. Robust Std. Err.    FE Ϯ RE Ϯ Ϯ FE RE FE RE 
     t p>|t| z p>|z| lnRES  -0.2159  -0.1520 0.0973 0.0829 -2.13 ** 0.040 -1.86 * 0.063 lnTOP5  0.5437   0.5354 1.1367 1.0380  1.11 0.273     1.19 0.238 lnINEX  0.2612   0.2090 0.1417 0.1179  2.57 ** 0.014    2.44 ** 0.016          _cons -2.9562 -2.7942 2.2046 2.3470 -1.42 0.164   -1.51 0.131 sigma_u    1.0410   0.9573   sigma_e    0.5066   0.5066   rho    0.8085   0.7812 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level.   Ϯ  Fixed-effects   Ϯ Ϯ  Random-effects                                                         11 The fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods are explained in section 4.4. 
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5.3.2 Random-effects estimates The results of the random-effects model GLS regression (Table 5-1) show that an increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to a decrease in an East African firm’s leverage. However, the relationship between the proportion of shareholding of the five largest shareholders or the ratio of institutional to individual shareholders and firm’s leverage is positive.  Interestingly, only the residency and the ratio of institutional ownership coefficients were statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05 and 0.10 (i.e. 95% and 90% confidence levels).  The coefficient for the proportion of shareholding by the top five largest shareholders was not statistically significant at both 95% and 90% confidence levels. 
5.3.3 Fixed-effects versus random-effects estimation methods What is revealing, about both the fixed-effects and random-effects (GLS) estimators, is that residency of a firm’s shareholders is negatively related with leverage; whilst level of institutional shareholding is positively related to leverage.  As explained in section 4.4, the random-effects model assumption is satisfied in this study, and the random effects estimators of the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5, and 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  could be used instead of the analogous fixed-effects estimators. The estimators of the two regressions are mostly the same; though, the random-effects regression coefficients estimates would be preferable because they are more precise. Yet, if the coefficient estimates of the two regressions are significantly different from one another, the fixed-effects regression estimates would have been preferable because the random-effects regression coefficients estimates would be inconsistent in that case. However, the fixed-effects estimators and random-effects estimators are not significantly different from one another. The author performed the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), which assumes that the model errors are homoscedastic and obtained the following results. Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic   chi2(3)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)      = 5.92  Prob>chi2 = 0.1155    
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The Prob>chi2 is 0.1155, which means that the null hypothesis that the two sets of parameter estimates are equal should not be rejected.  It suggests that the two methods (fixed-effects and random-effects) would yield consistent estimations. The author also tested whether firm-specific heterogeneity, measured by v, is sufficiently important that the random-effects is superior using Baltagi and Li’s (1990)12 test of the null hypothesis that 𝑣𝑣1 … 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀  are equal to zero, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test. The results of this test are shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random-effects 
        lnLEV[FIRMID,t] = Xb + v[FIRMID] + e[FIRMID,t]          Estimated results:  Var sd =sqrt(var) lnLEV 0.9824 0.9912 e 0.2530 0.5029 v 0.8072 0.8985  Test:   Var(v) = 0                              chibar2(01) =   501.19                           Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 ***  
*** significant at 1 per cent significance level  The null hypothesis that 𝑢𝑢1 … 𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀 are equal to zero is strongly rejected, with a p-value of <0.00001. The observed statistics of 501.19 is the realisation of a 𝜒𝜒2(1) variate under the null hypothesis. Accordingly, the random-effects estimation is more appropriate for the ownership data set than the fixed-effects estimation. 
Table 5-3:  
Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Foreign/Indigenous ownership H1aa − −    0.063 * Not Rejected Top five shareholding H1bb ? + 0.238 Indeterminate Institutional/non-institutional ownership H1cc − +     0.016 ** Rejected  Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level.  The ownership-financial structures hypotheses are based on a version of the traditional trade-off theory, the target adjustment model of financial structure, which postulates that firms adjust their leverage towards an optimal level. However,                                                         12 Baltagi, B. H., and Q. Li (1990), “A Lagrange multiplier test for the error component model with incomplete panels,” Econometric Reviews 9, pp. 103 – 107. 
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achieving the optimal financial structure level requires trade-offs between the benefits of increased debt level and the costs of such high debt level. The trade-offs depend on several variables, such as tax benefits of debt, risk of bankruptcy and agency costs, which are not fixed. The variables are random factors and the random-effects method would be more appropriate to examine empirical hypotheses (e.g. the ownership-financial structure hypotheses) based on the target adjustment model. When the random-effects coefficients and p-values are compared to the ownership-financial structures hypotheses, they are either rejected or not rejected as shown in Table 5-3.  
5.4 Main analysis and discussion In this section, the results of the estimation of the ownership-financial structure panel data models and test of the ownership hypotheses using the two chosen estimators (fixed-effects and random-effects) are analysed and discussed. In addition to the reasons explained in section 5.2.3, the two estimation methods were chosen because the ownership data set has limited time span and within the data, there were potential firm fixed-effects and endogenous regressors. Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 report the ownership-financial structure regressions for the 42 quoted companies within the sample over the period 2000 to 2011. Table 5-4 compares the F-test and Wald Chi-square test results of the fixed-effects and random-effects GLS estimations. From these results, the ownership-financial structure models specified for the tests appear to be fine. In the models specified for this research, firm factors, assumed fixed included: sources of finance; the quality of company leadership; leadership style, formal structure of the firm; organisational culture; firm image; firm’s mission or vison; company’s location; equipment and facilities; human resources; natural resources; patents; copy rights; trademarks; and customer base13. 
                                                         13 Random factors include: current processes (such as employees’ programs, software systems, and departmental hierarchies); relationship between and within departments (which impacts on effectiveness and efficiency); how well the employees work together; operational efficiency; financial resources; investment opportunities; the strength or value of employees (talents, motivation, attitude to work, and role of key staff). 
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Table 5-4: F/Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-financial structures model F or Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-financial structures model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011.   p-value Fixed-effects (Within)   F(5,41) =   5.35         0.001 *** Random-effects GLS              Wald chi2(5) = 11.88       0.037 ** 
 Note: ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
***  The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. Table 5-5 reports the relationship between financial structure and ownership structure revealed by the two estimation methods.  The methods use the t-tests (z-test for the random effects method) to analyse the relationship between financial structure and ownership structure. At 99% confidence interval, values of |t| (or |z|) > 2.576 represent statistically significant results; whilst at 95% confidence interval values |t| (or |z|) > 1.960 represent statistically significant results; and at 90% confidence interval |t| (or |z|) > 1.645 represents statistically significant results. 
Table 5-5: Estimation results for the ownership-financial structure model Combined estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 346 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX Fixed-effects (Within) -0.216 0.544 0.261 
-2.13 ** 0.27 2.57 ** Random-effects GLS -0.152 0.535 0.209 
-1.86 * 1.19 2.44 **  
Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
 As noted in section 2.2, the probable effect of separation of ownership from control on financial structure decisions of firms is less understood. This research has identified that ownership of companies in the East African emerging economies can be classified by residency, concentration of shareholding and level of institutional shareholding. By examining the three ownership structure variables: residency of 
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controlling shareholders, concentration of controlling shareholding (measured by proportion of shareholding owned by top five shareholders), and level of institutional shareholding, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between ownership structure and financial structure. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that residency of shareholders and the level of institutional shareholding are the two most significant ownership structure variables to influence financial structure (represented by leverage). The results in Table 5-5, show that residency is negatively correlated with leverage under both estimation techniques; whilst concentration and the level of institutional shareholding are positively correlated under both estimation techniques. The residency and institutional coefficients are statistically significant under both the fixed-effects (Within) and random-effects (GLS) estimations. The negative relationship between residency and leverage reinforces our knowledge on the negative correlation between dominant foreign shareholding in firms in emerging countries and firm leverage. It supports the findings of Ezeoha and Okafor (2010), who found that dominant foreign ownership, was associated with low leverage in firms in Nigeria. A probable explanation for the finding of the current research is that there are various incentive regimes, such as tax holidays, offered by the East African economies to encourage foreign investment. This reduces the attractiveness of debt as a tax shield for the dominant foreign shareholders. Another, explanation could be that the minimum amount of capital to be invested before a foreign investor can be granted the incentives means that there is adequate equity funding for companies with dominant foreign shareholders and less need for debt finance. Yet another probable explanation could be the high cost of debt14 in the emerging markets. The cost of debt in the three East African economies is relatively higher than the cost of equity in the developed economies; this would make it cheaper to use equity than debt to finance activities of companies with such dominant foreign shareholding.                                                         14 As discussed in section 3.6, from the World Bank, Official data, from 2000 to 2012, the lowest lending rate within the East African economies was 13% in Kenya in 2004 and the highest was 26% in Uganda in 2012. This can be compared with lowest and highest rates in the United Kingdom of 0.5% and 6% respectively; in the United States of 3% and 9% respectively; and in China of 5% and 7% respectively during the same period 2000 to 2012. 
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The finding on institutional shareholding contradicts current knowledge on the correlation between institutional shareholding and financial structure choice. Interestingly the positive correlation between level of institutional shareholding and leverage differs from the findings of Chaganti and Damanpour (1991); La Porta, 
et al. (1997; 2000); and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) that dominant institutional ownership tends to lower leverage. A probable explanation for this is that over the twelve-year period (2000 to 2011), in most (40 out of 47 or 85%) of the listed companies included in the sample, institutional shareholding15 was more than 50% of total shareholding. While in 43 out of the 47 (or 92% of the) quoted companies studied, institutional shareholding was more than 25% of total shareholding. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued about institutional shareholding activism, where institutional shareholding is large (more than 25%) the institutional shareholder effectively becomes insiders16. They can influence company management through engagement and dialogue. As insiders, they monitor management’s actions and their influences on managers are greater than if they were outsiders. Also by effectively becoming insiders the agency costs between managers and the institutional shareholders tend to reduce. Since they are in constant engagement and dialogue with the company management, the wishes of the institutional shareholders are often accommodated. The East African17 institutional shareholders either offer corporate loans (at rates that are significantly lower than offered by commercial banks) themselves, as is the case with the National Social Security Funds; or can guarantee foreign loans (at rates that are significantly lower than offered by commercial banks) for the companies they hold shares in. They are therefore able to use their insider influence to encourage managers to use cheaper debt finance whenever there is need to raise further finance, hence the positive correlation found in the data.                                                         15 For this research, institutional shareholding has been loosely defined, as shareholding by entities, rather than individuals, that invest on behalf of the entities’ members. 16 They have significant relationship with the company or company’s management through dialogue and engagement. 17 Two types of institutional shareholders can be identified in East Africa: the public pension funds (National Social Security Fund (NSSF) viz. NSSF Kenya, NSSF Tanzania and NSSF Uganda); and foreign listed companies. 
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This research also provides more insights and extends the research by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), which suggested a negative relationship between ownership concentration and leverage. Representing concentration by the proportion of shareholding held by the top five shareholders, the results in Table 5-6 indicate that under the fixed-effects and random-effects concentration is positively related with leverage. If high ownership concentration is treated as a possible antidote to the agency problem between ownership and control (as argued by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) we would expect concentration of ownership to be negatively correlated with leverage. In this respect, the research of the East African companies neither confirms nor contradicts the argument that concentration (measured by shareholding by the top five shareholders) is an antidote to the agency problem. The more surprising finding is that the correlation between ownership concentration and leverage seems to indicate that agency problem is less pronounced where controlling shareholding is vested in the top five shareholders. Regarding financial structure choice, the correlation between concentration of ownership in five shareholders and leverage shown by the fixed-effects and random-effects is fascinating.  It indicates that, regarding leverage, the objectives of the top five shareholders are closely aligned to those of the managers who prefer cheaper debt finance. However, the coefficient estimates of concentration of shareholding in the top five shareholders are not statistically significant under both estimation techniques.  
5.5 Cross country comparison This section uses the firm-level ownership panel data to explore the extent to which financial structure decisions are influenced by cross-country effects of the firm ownership structure. It also looks at the influences that countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors might have on the financial structure of quoted firms in the three East African economies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The author examined the association between countrywide factors (two macroeconomic factors: gross domestic product per capita and inflation, and two institutional factors: capital market development and banking sector development) and leverage of quoted companies. 
Chapter 5       Ownership & Financial Structure | 110  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
5.5.1 Conceptual issues Section 2.4 of chapter 2 discussed Cotei et al.’s (2011) arguments that: firms in countries where creditors and shareholders’ rights have less protection the financial markets are less developed; and firms in such countries use the equity market less to raise finance. It also highlighted the findings of Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996; 1999) that stock market development was negatively related to leverage. They found that where the financial markets were underdeveloped, firms tended to raise external finance through the banks. It also highlighted Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal’s (2008b) suggestion that differences in institutional frameworks and traditions influence financial structure choices. In addition, it noted Booth et al.’s (2001) arguments that in developing economies GDP growth rate and inflation rate are associated with leverage ratio; and findings of Frank and Goyal (2009) that inflation was positively associated with leverage. This section presents a cross-country comparison of the relationship between leverage and ownership structure in the East African quoted companies. It also establishes the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and leverage. This is significant for a couple of reasons: Firstly, not much is known about the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and leverage of listed companies in emerging economies. Secondly, the author obtained a quality data set in the context of countrywide factors for quoted firms in the three East African countries. In my panel (sample), there are data on the countries’ annual gross domestic product, annual consumer price indices, financial market development and stock market development. 
5.5.2 The sub-samples and pairwise test The analysis and discussion in section 5.4 show that for the East African firms, ownership structure can have significant influence on firms’ financial structure decisions. Splitting the main sample into two sub-samples, each sample was empirically tested using the fixed-effects and random effects methods. The results for the two samples and the combined sample were then compared. Due to the low level of development of the stock markets of Tanzania and Uganda the number of 
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listed firms in the two countries is small. Therefore, the results for Kenya are compared with those for Tanzania and Uganda combined. The author explored whether country effects influence firms’ financial structure choices in these countries, and whether there are econometric explanations for any difference identified. The findings show more statistically and economically significant country effects of ownership structure on the firms in Kenya compared to those in Tanzania and Uganda. To the author’s knowledge, there are no known previous works that have used comparable approach for the East African countries.  Table 5.6 presents the results of paired t-tests of whether (for leverage (LEV), residency (RES), concentration (TOP5) and the proportion of institutional shareholding (INEX)) the differences between the two sub-samples are significant. A series of paired t-tests were run on the sample of 47 quoted firms to determine whether there were statistically significant mean differences between the two groups. There is a difference in average leverage when the firms are listed in Kenya compared to Tanzanian/Ugandan listed firms. Firms in Tanzania and Uganda have lower average debt to equity ratio than Kenyan firms (96.66% ± 5.76%) as opposed to (130.47% ± 8.05%); a statistically insignificant decrease in leverage of 33.81%, with t(441) = 0.346, p > 0.635. In relation to the paired t-tests for residency, concentration and proportion of institutional shareholding: firms in Tanzania and Uganda had higher proportion of foreign to indigenous shareholding than Kenyan firms (2.47 ± 2.77) as opposed to (0.67 ± 1.13); a statistically significant increase in foreign shareholding of 1.80, with 
t(512) = 9.920, p < 0.00001. Similarly, ownership in firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more concentrated in top five shareholders than ownership in Kenyan firms (81.73% ± 9.17%) as opposed to (69.17% ± 15.34%); a statistically significant increase in ownership concentration of 12.56%, with t(512) = 7.293, p < 0.00001. In addition, firms in Tanzania and Uganda had higher proportion of institutional to non-institutional shareholding than Kenyan firms (12.77 ± 22.73) as opposed to (6.15 ± 14.40); a statistically significant increase in proportion of institutional shareholding of 6.62, with t(512) = 3.469, p < 0.0005. 
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Table 5-6: Two-sample t-tests of the leverage and ownership variables Means and standard deviations for the two groups (Kenya (KEN) and Tanzania/Uganda (TUG)) drawn from data from the 47 quoted East African companies covering the period 2000 and 2011. Ownership structures and leverage across 47 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 were used. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 443 to 514 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The means, standard deviations and the t statistics of the differences in mean for LEV, RES, TOP5 and INEX between the two groups are reported.  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
LEV    TUG 75 0.966559 5.760045 KEN 368 1.304671 8.052004 combined 443 1.247429 7.707413 diff  -0.33811      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.3459 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      441     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.3648         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7296          Pr(T > t) = 0.6352 
RES    TUG 85 2.469222 2.77412 KEN 429 0.670426 1.131399 combined 514 0.967892 1.666 diff  1.798796      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   9.9201 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
TOP5    TUG 85 81.72835 9.174622 KEN 429 69.16577 15.34059 combined 514 71.24324 15.22986 diff  12.56259      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   7.2925 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
INEX    TUG 85 12.77311 22.73184 KEN 429 6.154941 14.40489 combined 514 7.249385 16.24157 diff  6.618167      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.4689 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9997         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0006          Pr(T > t) = 0.0003  
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The higher level of average leverage in Kenyan firms compared to Tanzanian and Ugandan firms might be explained by the comparatively higher level of development of the capital market and the banking sector in Kenya18. Because of these, Kenyan firms should have easy access to credit (debt finance). In addition, on average, Kenyan firms are older than firms in Tanzania and Uganda are, and would have the collateral that credit providers require; and established relationships with credit providers. In contrast, the lower proportion of foreign shareholding, ownership concentration in the top five shareholders, and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding in Kenya compared to Tanzania and Uganda is attributable to a few explanations. Firstly, the Kenyan economy is more developed than Tanzanian and Ugandan economies19. With a more developed economy, the indigenous Kenyan population are wealthier20; therefore, should have more funds for investment than the Tanzanian and Ugandan population. Secondly, over the period studied, Uganda has been attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) than Kenya (e.g. World Bank indicators show that in 2011, Uganda’s FDI net inflow was US$ 894 million; whilst Kenya’s was only US$ 140 million). Thirdly, the lower level of development of the capital markets in Tanzania and Uganda implies that institutional investors in these countries have limited investment choices; and are compelled to invest more in each company than Kenyan institutional investors do. Furthermore, the institutional investors have limited competition from individuals, who are on average poorer in Tanzania and Uganda than in Kenya. 
5.5.3 Country comparison of fixed-effects and random-effects results Table 5.7 provides estimates of the ownership-financial structure model using panel data for the two sub-samples. The residency coefficients revealed a negative relationship between leverage and the proportion of foreign shareholders in both KEN and TUG sub-samples. The negative relationship is more pronounced in Kenya than in Tanzania and Uganda.                                                         18 Please refer to section 5.5.4 for the empirical tests of the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors on leverage. 19 According to the World Bank data, Kenyan GDP at market prices (constant 2010 US$) for 2011 was US$ 42.44 billion; whilst comparative figures for Uganda were US$ 33.89 billion and US$ 22.13 billion respectively. 20 Kenya’s GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) in 2011 was US$ 1,025 compared to those of Tanzania (US$ 741) and Uganda (US$ 646). 
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Table 5-7: 
 Comparative estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model for the two sub-samples KEN and TUG. Ownership structures and leverage across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding. The KEN sample consists of 281 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations; whilst the TUG sample consists of 65 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in parentheses) statistics.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX  KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG Fixed-effects (Within) -0.216 -0.106 0.621 -1.193 0.241 0.684 -1.64 -3.16 *** 1.28 -2.32 ** 2.37 ** 1.64 Random-effects GLS -0.161 -0.042 0.631 -1.258 0.209 0.743 
(-1.66 *) (-0.48) (1.42) (-1.63) (2.06 **) (2.44 **)  
Note: *  The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
*** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.  The estimates of the coefficients for the concentration variable TOP5 show inconsistent results for both KEN and TUG. Whilst there is a positive relationship between concentration and leverage in the KEN sub-sample, there is a negative relationship in the TUG sub-sample. However, the absolute values of the coefficients are consistently higher for the TUG sub-sample than the KEN sub-sample. Regarding the coefficients of the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding, both methods show a positive relationship with leverage. The positive relationship being more pronounced in Tanzania and Uganda than in Kenya. 
5.5.4 The influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors Country factors vary over time but not across firms and a time series data on gross domestic product per capita (GDPCA), consumer price indices (INF), banking sector development (BASEDE) and capital market development (CAPMADE) was collected from the World Bank database. A time series analysis of the data has been undertaken to identify differences or similarities in GDPCA, INF, BASEDE   and 
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CAPMADE across Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The aim is to seek explanations for the differences or similarities, and establish any link to the relationship between financial and ownership structure that the empirical tests revealed in Section 5.4. The first four columns of Table 5.8 report the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on firm leverage, residency of shareholders, concentration of shareholders, and proportion of institutional shareholders. The results in column 1 show that in Kenya leverage is inversely correlated to capital market development, growth in GDP per capita and banking sector development. This correlation is weakest for capital market development and strongest for banking sector development.   For the Kenyan firms, the more the capital market developed, the GDP per capita grew and the banking sector developed the lower the firms’ leverage. This is consistent with Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who found that where financial markets are underdeveloped, firms tended to raise external finance through the banks. It is also consistent with (Cotei et al., 2011) who found that firms operating in countries with less developed capital markets had limited options and used the equity markets to raise finance less. Conversely, firm leverage is positively correlated with inflation. However, only inflation and GDP per capita have statistically significant impact on leverage. As shown in chapter 2, Frank and Goyal’s (2009) findings, inflation seemed to significantly statistically and positively affect leverage in the Kenyan firms. The results in the next three columns show the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on the proportion of firm’s shareholders that are foreign, concentration of shareholders and proportion of institutional shareholders. The results suggest that in Kenya, banking sector development negatively influences the proportion of foreign shareholders, concentration of shareholders and the proportion of institutional shareholders.  This negative impact could be due to the more developed banking sector making it easier and cheaper for firms to raise finance through the banking sector, meaning less reliance on equity finance; and vice versa.  The impact of capital market development on residency, concentration and institutional ownership is positive. The impact of GDP per capita and inflation is inconsistent. 
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Table 5-8: Relationship between macroeconomics and institutional factors and the financial/ownership structure variables in 
Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda The table presents estimation results, i.e. regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the correlation between the country-wide (macroeconomic and institutional) factors and the financial / ownership structure variables. Results presented are for the two sub-samples Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding.            
 Kenya  Tanzania/Uganda  LEV RES TOP5 INEX  LEV RES TOP5 INEX GDPCA -0.0075 (-1.78) 0.0003 (0.53) -0.0164 (-2.10) -0.0082 (-1.12)  -0.0063 (-0.70) -0.0004 (-0.07) -0.0251 (-1.44) -0.0543 (-1.28) INF 0.1246 (1.75) 0.0042 (0.44) 0.0164 (0.13) -0.0168 (-0.14)  0.0376 (0.15) -0.0435 (-0.28) -0.2805 (-0.58) -0.9643 (-0.83) BASEDE -0.0419 (-0.34) -0.0020 (-0.14) -0.0059 (-0.03) -0.0198 (0.11)  0.1919 (0.36) -0.1553 (0.54) -1.0005 (-1.12) -3.2154 (-1.48) CAPMADE -0.0013 (-0.02) 0.0009 (0.14) 0.0556 (0.61) 0.0324 (0.38)  0.0830 (1.00) 0.0128 (0.24) -0.0285 (0.17) 0.1805 (0.44)           N 368 429 429 429  62 72 72 72 R-Square 0.0201 0.0037 0.0149 0.0044  0.0329 0.0067 0.1384 0.1222              
Chapter 5       Ownership & Financial Structure | 117  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
The results using the same specification for Tanzania/Uganda are reported in the last four columns of Table 5.8. For Tanzania/Uganda the first column that reports the impact of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on leverage is generally consistent with the Kenyan results. GDP per capita negatively impact on leverage, whilst inflation positively impact on leverage. However, the effect of banking sector or capital market development on leverage is positive unlike in the Kenyan results. Tanzanian and Ugandan firms seem to use more debt finance as both the capital market and banking sector developed. The results in the next three columns show the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors on the proportion of firm’s shareholders that are foreign, concentration of shareholders and proportion of institutional shareholders. The results suggest that in Tanzania/Uganda, the GDP per capita, inflation and banking sector development negatively impacts on the proportion of foreign shareholders, concentration of shareholders and the proportion of institutional shareholders.  Only the banking sector development’s result is consistent with the Kenyan results. The impact of capital market development on residency, concentration and institutional ownership is inconsistent. In this section, first, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more sensitive to changes in the ownership variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. Second, residency of shareholders has negative influence on leverage of both Kenyan and Tanzanian/Ugandan firms; however, leverage in Kenyan firms is more sensitive. Third, institutional shareholding has positive influences on leverage of firms in both Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda; though the Tanzanian/Ugandan firms’ leverage is more sensitive to changes in institutional shareholding than firms in Kenya. It is worth noting though that these findings are only indicative, as the coefficients in Table 5-8 are largely statistically not significant.   
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5.6 Summary This chapter investigated the argument that ownership structure influences a firm’s financial structure (leverage) because it determines the nature of agency relationship between the firm’s owners and managers. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a rich literature that argues that different ownership structures influences agency relationship differently. However, the influence of residency of shareholders, concentration of shareholding, and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding on leverage (measured by the debt ratio as discussed in Chapter 3) of firms in emerging economies of the East African countries had not been explicitly investigated. The fixed-effects and random-effects estimations were used to estimate the ownership-financial structure model. The empirical results show that, statistically, only two ownership variables (residency and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders) significantly influence leverage of a firm. Residency of a firm’s shareholders significantly negatively influences leverage; whilst the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding significantly positively influences leverage.  However, the findings on the concentration variables (proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders) are inconclusive. The coefficient estimate of the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders are not statistically significant under both methods used. 
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6 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance of 
Quoted Companies This chapter empirically examines the relationship between ownership structure and the performance of listed firms in East Africa. It aims to provide, through selective reference to some literature, a clearer understanding of the different findings on the connection between ownership structure and firm performance. It briefly reviews the empirical results of selected ownership structure studies and discusses the sometimes-conflicting conclusions about the connection between ownership structure and firm performance. The chapter compares new empirical evidence from the East African firms’ data with the conclusions of extant empirical studies. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the conceptual issues related to ownership structure. The second section presents the ownership-performance model, the theoretical framework on which it is based, and the methods selected to test the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The subject of the third section is the estimation of the ownership-performance model using the fixed effects and random effects methods.  The fourth section is devoted to the analysis and discussion of the results of the estimation using the two methods and is thus the heart of this chapter.  It outlines the findings and discusses the connections between ownership structure and firm performance, and linking it appropriately to the literature. The fifth section compares the results across the three East African countries; and the final section of the chapter summarises the findings on the relationship between ownership structure and the East African listed firms’ performance. It considers the factors, which determine the association between the two. 
6.1 Conceptual issues – ownership structure and performance To my knowledge few prior studies have looked at the relationship between firm ownership structure and its performance in emerging economies. Before discussing the ownership-performance model, a brief account of the theoretical basis from which it is derived is presented.   
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This chapter demonstrates that through agency relationship between owners and managers, ownership structure influences firm performance. The ownership-performance literature indicates that ownership structures are market-mediated. In addition, the literature on ownership structure (e.g. La Porta et al., 2000) indicates that in the USA and the UK family firms’ ownership are most common. The literature identifies family, managerial, foreign/indigenous, concentrated/dispersed, and institutional/individuals’ ownership types. However, in emerging economies, as Prasad, Green and Murinde (2006) observed, control within firms is mostly exercised through a dominant shareholder, usually family or business group. In the East Africa data, three aspects of ownership structure: residency of shareholders (indigenous or foreign); concentration (proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders); and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholdings were identified. Quoted companies in East Africa were not family founded (IPOs for these firms resulted from divestiture of public corporations), and dominant shareholders seem to be business groups or institutional shareholders. In addition, the quoted companies in East Africa have substantial shareholding by foreign shareholders. Furthermore, in the performance literature, return on assets as a measure of performance has been identified. Therefore, for the East African firms, focus is on the influence of foreign/indigenous, concentrated/dispersed, and institutional/non-institutional ownership types on firm performance. This chapter examines the three aspects of ownership structure; however, of the three, ownership-performance studies that examined the aspect of residency are lacking. Nonetheless, there is a view in the literature that although dispersed ownership might exacerbate agency problems, it has advantages that offsets such problems (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
6.2 The ownership-performance model This section restates, albeit, briefly the ownership-performance hypotheses explained in section 2.3.4. It also describes the ownership-performance model that represents the hypotheses. The model is the basis of the empirical design employed to examine the influence of ownership structure on the performance of firms in 
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emerging economies. However, before stating the ownership-performance model, this section discusses the variables that are evident in extant literature, which informed the development of the hypotheses that the model tests. It highlights the variables that have been included in the model and the ownership-performance hypotheses. It finally briefly discusses the methods chosen to estimate the ownership-performance model. 
6.2.1 Ownership-performance hypotheses This sub-section discusses the ownership-performance hypotheses tested in this chapter. It recapitulates the performance and ownership structure variables found in extant literature, before restating the hypotheses that were developed from them. As discussed in Chapter 2, measures of performance in literature include the Q ratio; rate of accounting profit e.g. return on assets; return on the stock market; net income; return on equity; and firm value. Somehow, all these measures are based on accounting profit, which is affected by different accounting practices; therefore, they all suffer from accounting artefact problems. Measures of ownership structure in literature21 include: the proportion of managerial shareholding; the proportion of institutional shareholding; the fraction of shareholding by five largest shareholders; family shareholding; control by partnership of individuals; less than 50% voting rights blockholding; intercorporate shareholding; and proportion of insider shareholding. The main issue in these measures is which of the measures is more likely to be representative of the ability of shareholders to control professional management? Measures of ownership structure needs to account for the complexity of interest represented by a given ownership structure. 
Performance and Ownership variables used in this research: For this research the measures that have been used for firm performance is the return on assets. Whilst the measures used for ownership structure include: the proportion of shares held by indigenous shareholders, the proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders, and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders. The variables that these measures represent together with their definition and the source of data for the respective variables are summarised in Table 6-1.                                                         21 These measures and the prior studies that have used them are discussed in section 2.3.1, and summarised in Table 2-3. 
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Table 6-1: Variables, definitions and source The table presents the variables that are used in the ownership-performance model in this chapter. Performance is represented by 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 =  𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 , residency by 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 =    𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷� , concentration by TOP5, and the proportion of institutional shareholding by 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋 =  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼� .    
Variable Definition Source PROF Firm’s performance as measured by return on assets Firm’s annual reports IND The proportion of shares held by indigenous shareholders Firm’s annual reports FOR The proportion of the firm’s shares held by foreign shareholders Firm’s annual reports TOP5 The proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders Firm’s annual reports INS The proportion of the firm’s shares owned by institutional investors Firm’s annual reports EXI The proportion of the firm’s shares owned by non-institutional investors Firm’s annual reports  In ownership-performance literature, market-mediated ownership structures should yield no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance. Ownership structure is determined, among other factors, by firm performance itself. A few studies (e.g. Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) took endogeneity of ownership structure into consideration in estimating the relationship between ownership structure and performance. However, in emerging economies where the capital markets are still underdeveloped, the degree to which firm performance determines ownership structure is debatable. 
Ownership structure and firm performance hypotheses: As discussed in section 2.3.4, the hypothesis developed for the relationship between ownership structure and performance is: 
H2: For firms in emerging economies, a firm’s performance is related to: the residency of the shareholders; the proportion of shareholding by top five shareholders and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders. This hypothesis is broken down into three lower-level hypotheses: H2a: The residency of shareholders is associated with performance. H2b: The proportion of shareholding held by top five shareholders has no association with performance. H2c: The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders is positively associated with leverage. 
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Ownership structure factors, such as, managerial ownership, family ownership, less than 50% voting rights, intercorporate shareholding, and proportion of insider shareholding22, were initially considered but dropped because necessary data was not available for the sampled firms. 
6.2.2 Ownership-performance model The model for the relationship between firm performance and various ownership combinations (the ownership-performance panel data model) was specified in Chapter 4 (Equation 4-8). The panel data of 47 quoted East African firms over 12 years of data (2000 to 2011) was then used to estimate the model. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +   𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (4-8) 
6.2.3 Choice of estimation methods The research used the static fixed-effects and random-effects methods to test the relationship between performance and various ownership structure types in the East African data. These methods show the effects of changes in ownership structure on performance better than the GMM methods explained in section 4.6. Use of the GMM methods tends to mask the long-run effects of ownership structure on performance since ownership structure changes continuously and slowly over a long period. The introduction of a lag to translate the ownership-financial structure model into a dynamic model to allow the use the GMM methods turned out to be intuitively meaningless. Nonetheless, to make the research robust, a dynamic ownership-performance model was formulated and the GMM estimations used to estimate it. For a detailed account of tests using the GMM methods, including the results obtained, please refer to Appendix 2. 
                                                        22 These were among the measures of ownership that were identifiable in relevant literature reviewd in section 2.3.1. 
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6.3 Ownership structure and firm performance estimations 
using fixed-effects and random-effects methods The data was from a 47-firm sample of firms from all sectors but financial institutions of the East African economy for which there were data on ownership and accounting variables for 2000 to 2011. Table 6-2 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the variables in the sample. Table 6-3 presents the results of estimating the ownership model based on Equation 4-8 using the fixed-effects and random-effects frameworks respectively. 
Table 6-2:  The variables are firm performance (PROF), ratio of foreign to indigenous shareholders (RES), ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (INEX), and ownership concentration (TOP5). Variable definitions and sources are provided in Table 6.3.  Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max lnPROF 402 -1.973 0.933 -5.687 0.335 lnRES 411 -0.980 1.834 -5.517 2.197 lnINEX 502 1.143 1.191 -1.946 4.605 lnTOP5 514 4.240 0.241 3.190 4.605  Table 6-3 shows that only the coefficients of the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders were statistically significant at 95% confidence level, under both fixed-effects and random-effects estimations. It indicates that as the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders (given that other variables in the ownership-performance model are held constant) increased, an East African firm’s performance decreased. No other coefficients were statistically significant at alpha level of 0.05.      
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Table 6-3: Fixed-effects and random-effects estimations’ results for the 
ownership-performance model Ownership structures and firm performance across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). TOP5 is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 346 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of fixed effects and random effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The Table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t (z) statistics.  lnPROF  Coef. Robust Std. Err.      FE Ϯ RE Ϯ Ϯ FE RE FE RE           t p>|t| z p>|z| lnRES    0.0312   0.0301 0.0366 0.0372  0.85 0.399 0.81 0.418 lnTOP5 -0.3204  -0.3523 0.1480 0.1519 -2.16 ** 0.036 -2.32 ** 0.020 lnINEX  0.0855   0.0785 0.0717 0.0685  1.19 0.239 1.15 0.252                   _cons -0.7667 -0.5776 0.6410 0.6645 -1.20 0.239 -0.87 0.385 sigma_u    0.8820   0.8853    sigma_e    0.4963   0.4963    rho    0.7595   0.7609 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
Note: ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level.    Ϯ  Fixed-effects   Ϯ Ϯ  Random-effects  As previously explained23 the fixed-effects estimation appears to be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters in Equation 4-8. With regard to the ownership-performance hypotheses, the variables are random factors and the random effects method would be more appropriate to examine empirical hypotheses based on the target adjustment model. Comparing the random-effects’ coefficients and p-values to the ownership hypotheses, leads to either rejection or non-rejection of the hypotheses as shown in Table 6-4.    
                                                        23 The fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods are explained in section 4.6. 
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Table 6-4: Random-effects test of the ownership-performance hypotheses 
Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Foreign/Indigenous ownership H2a − − 0.418 Not Rejected Top five shareholding H2b ? +      0.020 ** Not Rejected Institutional/non-institutional ownership H2c − − 0.252 Rejected 
 Note:  
  ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
6.4 Main analysis and discussion This section analyses, discusses the results of the estimation of the ownership-performance model, and tests the ownership-performance hypotheses. The fixed-effects and random-effects methods were chosen because the ownership-performance data set has limited time span and within the data there were potential firm fixed effects and endogenous regressors. Tables 6-5 and 6-6 report the standard ownership-performance regressions for the 42 quoted companies within the sample over the period 2000 to 2011. Table 6-5 compares the F-test and Wald Chi-square test results of the fixed-effects and random-effects GLS estimations. From these results, the ownership-performance models specified for the tests appear to be fine. In the models specified for this research, firm factors, assumed fixed included: sources of finance; the quality of company leadership; leadership style, formal structure of the firm; organisational culture; firm image; firm’s mission or vison; company’s location; equipment and facilities; human resources; natural resources; patents; copy rights; trademarks; and customer base24.    
                                                        24 Random factors include: current processes (such as employees’ programs, software systems, and departmental hierarchies); relationship between and within departments (which impacts on effectiveness and efficiency); how well the employees work together; operational efficiency; financial resources; investment opportunities; the strength or value of employees (talents, motivation, attitude to work, and role of key staff). 
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Table 6-5: F/Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-performance model F or Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-performance model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011.   p-value Fixed-effects (Within)   F(3,41) =   2.05    0.122 * Random-effects GLS              Wald chi2(3) = 6.32    0.097 * 
  Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.  Table 6-6 reports the relationship between performance and ownership structure revealed by the two estimation methods. The t-tests (z-test for the random-effects method) were used to analyse the relationship between performance and ownership structure. At 99% confidence interval, values of |t| (or |z|) > 2.576 represent statistically significant results; whilst at 95% confidence interval values |t| (or |z|) > 1.960 represent statistically significant results; and at 90% confidence interval |t| (or |z|) > 1.645 represents statistically significant results. 
Table 6-6: Estimation results for the ownership-performance model using 
fixed-effects and random-effects models Combined estimation results for the ownership-performance model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two estimation methods.   Ownership structures and firm profitability across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 346 profitability and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX Fixed-effects (Within) 0.032 -0.320 0.086 0.85 -2.16 ** 1.19 Random-effects GLS 0.030 -0.352 0.079 
0.81 -2.32 ** 1.15  
Note:  
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
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As noted in section 2.3, the probable effect of separation of ownership from control on performance of firms is less understood. By examining the three ownership control variables: residency of controlling shareholders, concentration of controlling shareholding (measured by proportion of shareholding owned by top five shareholders), and level of institutional shareholding, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between ownership structure and firm performance. Three classifications of ownership of companies in the East African emerging economies, i.e. according to residency, concentration of shareholding and level of institutional shareholding exist. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders is the only significant ownership control variables to influence performance. The negative relationship between the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders and performance reinforces our knowledge on the negative correlation between largest shareholding in firms in emerging countries and firm performance.  It is similar to the findings of Maury and Pajuste (2005), who found that higher proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders, was associated with decreased performance in firms in Germany. The test incorporating lag performance variable (Appendix 2) shows a strong correlation between past performance and current performance. It can be argued that firms prefer to raise finance from retained earnings, then debt, and finally issue of new equity.  This hierarchy of financing choices, which is due to the adverse selection costs associated with new issue of equity given information asymmetry, is what the pecking order predicts. Thus, more past profits would probably lead to reduced costs in the current period, hence higher profits.  This research also provides more insights and extends the research by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), which suggested that since ownership structure is endogenous, estimation results should show no significant relationship between ownership structure variables and firm performance. Taking the ownership structure variables (residency, concentration of ownership in the top five shareholders and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders), only the concentration variable is significantly correlated with performance. 
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6.5 Cross country comparison This section uses the firm-level ownership panel data to explore the extent to which performance are influenced by cross-country effects of the firm ownership structure. It also looks at the influences that countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors might have on the performance of quoted firms in the three East African economies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It examines the association between countrywide factors (two macroeconomic factors: gross domestic product per capita and inflation, and two institutional factors: capital market development and banking sector development) and performance of quoted companies. 
6.5.1 Conceptual issues Section 2.3 of chapter 2 discussed Demsetz’s (1983) arguments that: shareholding might become more dispersed either when shareholders of private companies list on the stock market or when shareholders in quoted companies agree to a new ancillary distribution of shares; and subsequent trading of shares reflect potential and existing shareholders’ desire to alter their ownership stakes, which would lead to changes in the ownership structure. In extant ownership-performance literature, there is a useful summary, found in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), which focused on the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership structure. In addition, the findings of Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) show that disperse ownership and non-owner manager structure promoted firm performance. Similarly, Andres’ (2008) findings show that family-owned firms, where the founding family is active in the management of the firm, performed better than firms with other types of ownership. Furthermore, Maury’s (2006) findings show that active family control is positively associated with higher profitability; and the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that performance of family-owned firms where family members served as CEOs was better than performance of firms with outside CEOs. The author contrasted these findings with those of Gorriz and Fumas (1996) that, although family controlled firms have higher productivity, such efficiency did not translate into higher profitability than in non-family controlled firms. He noted Mudambi and Nicosia’s (1998) arguments that increased ownership 
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concentration inversely influenced performance; whilst control by large shareholding groups was positively correlated with performance. He contrasted this with Demsetz and Lehn (1985) findings that ownership concentration had no significant relationship with accounting profit rate. He also compared these findings to Kapopoulos and Lazaretou’s (2007) findings that concentrated ownership was positively related to firm performance measured by profitability; and the findings of Maury and Pajuste (2005) that multiple blockholding positively affects firm value. Furthermore, the author showed that Han and Suk (1998) found that, in US firms, institutional ownership had positive relationship with firm performance. He compared this finding to Craswell, Taylor and Saywell’s (1997) that, in Australian listed companies, institutional ownership was not an important determinant of firm performance. He also highlighted that Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) found that, in Japanese firms, intercorporate shareholding had a negative impact on the performance of firms. He concluded that empirical studies highlighted a number of unresolved issues with regard to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. This section presents a cross-country comparison of the relationship between performance and ownership structure in the East African quoted companies. It also establishes the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and performance. This is significant for a couple of reasons: Firstly, not much is known about the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and performance of listed companies in emerging economies. Secondly, a quality data set in the context of countrywide factors was obtained for quoted and private firms in the three East African countries. In the panel of data (sample) there are data on the countries’ annual gross domestic product, annual consumer price indices, financial market development and stock market development. 
6.5.2 The sub-samples and pairwise test The analysis and discussion in section 6.4 show that for the East African firms, ownership structure can have significant influence on firms’ performance. To find out whether country of incorporation of a firm lead to a difference in performance 
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and ownership structures, a series of two sample t-tests were undertaken. Splitting the main sample into two sub-samples, the author empirically tested each sample using the fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods. He then compared the results for the two samples and the combined sample. Due to the low level of development of the stock markets of Tanzania and Uganda the number of listed firms in the two countries is small. Therefore, the results for Kenya are compared with those for Tanzania and Uganda. The research explored whether country-effects influence firms’ financial structure choices in these countries, and whether there are econometric explanations for any difference identified. The findings show more statistically and economically significant country-effects of ownership structure on the firms in Kenya compared to those in the Tanzania and Uganda. To the author’s knowledge, there are no known previous works that have used comparable approach for the East African countries. Table 6.7 presents the results of paired t-tests of whether (for firm performance (PROF), residency (RES), concentration (TOP5) and the proportion of institutional shareholding (INEX)) the differences between the two samples are significant. A series of paired t-tests on the sample of 47 quoted firms were conducted to determine whether there was a statistically significant mean difference between the means of the performance and ownership variables when the firms are listed in Kenya compared to Tanzanian/Ugandan listed firms. On average, firms in Tanzania and Uganda performed better than Kenyan firms (return on assets of 21.37% ± 11.82%) as opposed to (15.90% ± 23.15%); a statistically significant increase in performance of 5.47%, with t(442) = 1.993, p < 0.0235, d = 442. The results for the paired t-tests for residency, concentration and proportion of institutional shareholding were discussed in section 5.5.2. The higher level of average performance in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms compared to Kenyan firms might be explained by the comparatively higher level of economic growth in Tanzania and Uganda compared to Kenya25 over the study period26. 
                                                        25 As discussed in Chapter 3, the World Bank indicators, shows that from 2000 to 2011, the average annual GDP growth rate for Tanzania was 6.61% and Uganda 7.22% but only 4.19% for Kenya. 26 Please refer to section 5.6.4 for the empirical tests of the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors on performance. 
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 Table 6-7: Two-sample t-tests of the performance and ownership variables Means and standard deviations for the two groups (Kenya (KEN) and Tanzania/Uganda (TUG)) drawn from data from the 47 quoted East African companies covering the period 2000 and 2011. Ownership structures and firm profitability across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 444 to 514 profitability and ownership structure firm-year observations. The means, standard deviations and the 
t statistics of the differences in mean for PROF, RES, TOP5 and INEX between the two groups are reported.  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
PROF    TUG 75 0.213661 0.118228 KEN 369 0.158937 0.231546 combined 444 0.168181 0.217469 diff  0.054724      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.9934 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      442     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9766         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0468          Pr(T > t) = 0.0234 
RES    TUG 85 2.469222 2.77412 KEN 429 0.670426 1.131399 combined 514 0.967892 1.666 diff  1.798796      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   9.9201 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
TOP5    TUG 85 81.72835 9.174622 KEN 429 69.16577 15.34059 combined 514 71.24324 15.22986 diff  12.56259      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   7.2925 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
INEX    TUG 85 12.77311 22.73184 KEN 429 6.154941 14.40489 combined 514 7.249385 16.24157 diff  6.618167      diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   3.4689 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      512     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9997         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0006          Pr(T > t) = 0.0003  
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Average growth in household consumption expenditure over the period were higher in Tanzania (6.22%) and Uganda (6.38%) compared to Kenya (3.98%). These could have translated to the better performance of Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. The study period coincided with the period when market capitalism economic model became more stable in the two transition economies of Tanzania and Uganda27. 
6.5.3 Country comparison of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations results Table 6.8 provides estimates of the ownership-performance model using panel data for the two sub-samples. Of the three ownership structure coefficients, only the institutional/non-institutional’s coefficients show a consistently positive relationship for KEN and negative relationship for TUG under the two estimation methods. The negative relationship in Tanzania and Uganda is more pronounced than the positive relationship in Kenya. The results for the residency and concentration variables were not consistent across both estimations techniques. 
Table 6-8: Comparative estimation results for the ownership-performance 
model – KEN vs TUG Comparative estimation results for the ownership-performance model for the two sub-samples KEN and TUG. Ownership structures and performance across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding. The KEN sample consists of 281 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations; whilst the TUG sample consists of 65 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in parentheses) statistics.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX  KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG Fixed-effects (Within) 0.058 -0.127 -0.339 0.740 0.090 -0.175 
1.77 * -1.93 * -2.31 ** 0.74 1.25 -0.63 Random-effects GLS 0.020 0.095 -0.387 -0.939 0.089 -0.289 (0.46) (1.21) (-2.54 **) (-1.19) (1.29) (-1.28)  
Note: *  The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level.                                                         27 As discussed the in Chapter 3, since independence in 1963 Kenya adopted a mixed economic system up to early 1990s when it changed to a capitalist economic model.  The Kenyan economy has been the most stable of the three east African economies. However, Tanzania adopted a socialist economic model from independence in 1964 to the late 1980s and then a mixed economic system up to late 1990s and then market capitalism. In contrast, Uganda adopted a mixed economic system from independence in 1962 to early 1970s followed by state socialism economic system (coupled with political and economic instability) up to early 1980s; followed by a mixed economic system up to early 1990s and then market capitalism thereafter. 
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 The direction of the relationship between residency and performance is indeterminate under the different estimation methods. Under both the fixed-effects and random effects methods, there is a positive relationship within the KEN sub-sample. However, within the TUG sub-sample there is a negative relationship under the fixed-effects methods and positive under the random-effects method. Overall, the coefficients for the residency variable (RES) are, in absolute terms, consistently higher for Tanzania and Uganda than for Kenya. In relation to the effect of ownership concentration on performance, the direction of the relationship between them is indeterminate under the different estimation methods. However, the fixed-effects and random-effects methods show a positive and negative relationship respectively within the TUG subsample; whilst both methods show a negative relationship within the KEN sub-sample. Overall, the absolute values of the coefficients are consistently higher for the TUG sub-sample than the KEN sub-sample.  
6.5.4 The influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors Country factors vary over time but not across firms and a time series data on gross domestic product per capita (GDPCA), consumer price indices (INF), banking sector development (BASEDE) and capital market development (CAPMADE) was collected from the World Bank database. In this sub-section, a time series analysis of the data to identify differences or similarities in GDPCA, INF, BASEDE and CAPMADE across Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is conducted. The aim is to seek explanations for the differences or similarities, and establish any link to the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure revealed by the empirical tests in Section 6.4.  The first four columns of Table 6.9 report the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on firm performance, the residency of shareholders, the concentration of shareholders, and the proportion of institutional shareholders in Kenya. The results in column 1 show that in Kenya firm performance is positively correlated to growth in GDP per capita and inflation. For the Kenyan firms, an increase in growth in GDP per capita and inflation is associated with an increase in firms’ performance. 
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Table 6-9: Relationship between macroeconomics and institutional factors and the ownership-performance variables in Kenya 
and Tanzania/Uganda The table presents estimation results, i.e. regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the correlation between the country-wide (macroeconomic and institutional) factors and the ownership-performance variables. Results presented are for the two sub-samples Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding.            
 Kenya  Tanzania/Uganda  PROF RES TOP5 INEX  PROF RES TOP5 INEX GDPCA 0.0001 (0.78) 0.0003 (0.53) -0.0164 (-2.10) -0.0082 (-1.12)   0.0004 (1.66) -0.0004 (-0.07) -0.0251 (-1.44) -0.0543 (-1.28) INF 0.0011 (0.55) 0.0042 (0.44) 0.0164 (0.13) -0.0168 (-0.14)  0.0039 (0.60) -0.0435 (-0.28) -0.2805 (-0.58) -0.9643 (-0.83) BASEDE -0.0018 (-0.53) -0.0020 (-0.14) -0.0059 (-0.03) -0.0198 (0.11)  0.0051 (0.38) -0.1553 (0.54) -1.0005 (-1.12) -3.2154 (-1.48) CAPMADE -0.0004 (-0.28) 0.0009 (0.14) 0.0556 (0.61) 0.0324 (0.38)   -0.0041 (-1.89) 0.0128 (0.24) -0.0285 (0.17) 0.1805 (0.44)           N 369 429 429 429  62 72 72 72 R-Square 0.0004 0.0037 0.0149 0.0044  0.1129 0.0067 0.1384 0.1222              
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Conversely, firm performance is negatively correlated with banking sector and capital market development; increase in banking sector development and capital market development, is associated with a decrease in firm performance. However, these associations are not statistically significant.  The results in the next three columns show the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on the proportion of firm’s shareholders that are foreign, concentration of shareholders and proportion of institutional shareholders. These results are similar those in Table 5.8 and have been discussed in Section 5.5.4.  The results using the same specification for Tanzania/Uganda are reported in the last four columns of Table 6.9. For Tanzania/Uganda the first column that reports the impact of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on performance is generally consistent with the Kenyan results. GDP per capita and inflation positively impact on performance, whilst capital market development negatively impacts on leverage. However, the effect of banking sector development on leverage is positive unlike in the Kenyan results. Tanzanian and Ugandan firms seem to perform better as the banking sector developed. The results in the next three columns show the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors on the proportion of firm’s shareholders that are foreign, concentration of shareholders and proportion of institutional shareholders. Again, these results are similar those in Table 5-8 and have been discussed in Section 5.5.4. The analysis in this section shows firstly, that performance of firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more sensitive to changes in the ownership variables than performance of firms in Kenya. Secondly, institutional shareholding has positive influence on performance of firms in Kenya but negative influence on performance of firms in Tanzania/Uganda; though the Tanzanian/Ugandan firms’ leverage is more sensitive to changes in institutional shareholding than firms in Kenya. Thirdly, foreign residency and concentration of shareholders have indeterminate influences on performance of Kenyan firms and Tanzanian/Ugandan firms. However, performance in Kenyan firms is less sensitive. It is worth noting, though that these findings are only indicative, as the coefficients in Table 6-9 are largely statistically not significant. 
Chapter 6     Ownership Structure & Performance | 137  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
6.6 Summary This research has examined three aspects of ownership structure of companies in the East African emerging economies:  residency, concentration of shareholding in top five shareholders and level of institutional shareholding. My findings support the view that ownership structure of a firm is a consequence of the interaction of many factors. The ownership structures of firms differ across firms depending on the circumstances facing firms, e.g. in relation to the level of development of the market in which the firms operate, regulations, and the nature of the economic environment in which they operate. This supports the findings of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). The empirical results show that, statistically, the proportion of shareholding by the five largest shareholders negatively and significantly influences performance of a firm if in the model design ownership is treated as exogenous28. This provides evidence that for firms operating in emerging economies of East Africa ownership structure is exogenous; unlike Demsetz and Villalonga’s (2001) findings. This research is of interest for two reasons: Firstly, while much ownership-performance research has focussed on managerial ownership and family ownership, very little is known about the influence of the relationship between ownership variables of residency, concentration and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders and firm performance. Secondly, ownership-performance research in emerging economies is lacking and the East African economies offer quality data set in the context of ownership structure and performance of quoted companies that could be used to empirically examine the relationship between ownership structure and performance in emerging economies. By examining the three ownership control variables viz. residency, concentration of shareholding in top five shareholders and level of institutional shareholding, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between ownership structure and firm performance. This research offers an extension to the ownership                                                         28 However, when ownership structure is treated as endogenous (Appendix 2), the results of GMM estimation methods indicate that statistically, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is not statistically significantly. 
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structure knowledge, which is generally ignored in ownership-performance literature, by explicitly looking at the influence of residency, concentration of shareholding in top five shareholders and level of institutional shareholding on performance of firms in emerging economies.  
 139 
7 Firm-specific Influences on Financial Structure 
 This chapter focuses on the correlation between firm-specific factors and the financial structure of quoted firms in the three East African countries. The chapter empirically examines the relationship between eight internal firm-specific factors (age, size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) and firm leverage. The findings on the relationship between growth opportunities and profitability and financial structure confirm findings of prior empirical studies. However, the influence of asset structure, effective tax charge, firm age and product uniqueness on leverage contradicts the findings of much previous empirical research. Chapter 2 highlighted that one group of factors, recognised in literature, to influence firm financial structure choice was firm-specific factors. As discussed in section 2.4, prior studies of both developed and developing economies identified the eight factors as determinants of financial structure choice. This research is of interest for the following reasons: First, although much research has focused on the relationship between firm-specific factors and financial structure choice, these researches have mainly used data from developed economies; very few studies have used data from developing economies. Second, the East African economies offer quality data set on the internal firm-specific factors that could be used to empirically examine the relationship between the eight firm-specific factors and firms’ financial structure choice. In the panel data (sample) used for this study there are data for age, size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunity, product uniqueness and tax payment by the firms studied. Panel data and dynamic panel data models of firm-specific factors were specified to model 47 quoted firms over 12 years (2000 to 2011) of data available. Third, the findings of prior studies on the eight firm-specific factors are inconclusive as to the nature of influences of some of the factors on firms’ financial structure choice. This research should therefore provide valuable insights into the nature of influence of the internal firm-specific factors. 
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This research offers an extension to the financial structure knowledge, an area, that has been exhaustively researched yet evidence available is still inconclusive, by looking at the influence of the internal firm-specific factors in the context of the emerging economies of the three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It provides a cross-country comparison between Kenya and Tanzania and Uganda combined. It also highlights the econometric simultaneity in the dynamic firm-specific factors’ model by comparing the results of three GMM estimators. The findings of the two-step system GMM estimations show that for the East African economies, six firm-specific factors (age, asset tangibility, profitability, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) are the most significant in influencing firms’ leverage choices. The influences of the other two factors (size and earnings and cash flows volatility) on leverage are not statistically significant. This chapter discusses conceptual issues in section 7.1. Then section 7.2 presents the hypotheses, the internal firm-specific factors’ model specified for empirical examination, and the methods selected to test the relationship between firms’ leverage and firm-specific factors. Section 7.3 presents the results of the GMM (the one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM) estimation methods. Section 7.4 discusses and analyses the findings from all the estimation methods; whilst, section 7.5 presents a cross-country analysis; and section 7.6 concludes the chapter. 
7.1 Conceptual issues – internal firm-specific factors The internal firm-specific factors and financial structure model, is based on theoretical frameworks found in extant literature; and this section briefly outline the conceptual basis from which the model was derived. To the author’s knowledge, few prior studies have looked at the relationship between firm firm-specific factors and financial structure in emerging economies. This chapter demonstrates that through the four strands of financial structure theories29, firm-specific factors                                                         29 The four strands of financial structure theories, include: theories founded on the premise of tax shields (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973); agency cost theories (Jessen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986); theories founded on the premise of asymmetric information, e.g. pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; 2001); and transaction costs theories (Williamson, 1985; 1987). 
Chapter 7       Internal Firm-specific Factors | 141  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
influence firms’ leverage (financial structure choice). There are views in the literature that firm-specific factors variedly influence firms’ financial structure choice. Literature identifies firm’s age, firm’s size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge as firm-specific factors. These firm-specific factors were present in the East African data. The literature on firm-specific factors indicates that a firm maintains a target capital structure that balances the costs30 and benefits31 of debt and equity. In emerging economies, there are other significant influences found within various incentive regimes, e.g. tax breaks, which might render redundant some of the costs and the benefits of debt and equity of some of the firm-specific factors. The chapter examines the eight firm-specific factors within the trade-off and pecking order theoretical framework. This treatment determined the research design and the empirical techniques employed. For the East African firms, focus is on the influence of firm’s age, firm’s size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge on financial structure choice. Quoted companies in East Africa mainly resulted from divestiture of failing public corporations, and most of them benefited from various incentives regimes that were available to foreign investors. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, most of the quoted companies in East Africa have substantial shareholding by foreign shareholders. 
7.2 Internal firm-specific factors’ hypotheses and model This section restates the internal firm-specific factors’ hypotheses stated and explained in section 2.4.4. It also describes the model specified to represent the hypotheses. The firm-specific factors and financial structure model is the basis of the empirical design employed to examine the influence of firm-specific factors on financial structure choice of firms in the East African emerging economies.  
                                                        30 The costs include financial distress costs (Modigliani and Miller, 1963); agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1988; 1990; Hart and Moore, 1994); and signalling costs (Ross, 1977). 31 The benefits include tax benefits of debt and the benefits of signalling with financial structure (Ross, 1977). 
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7.2.1 Internal firm-specific factors’ hypotheses As discussed in section 2.4.4, the hypothesis developed for the relationship between firm-specific factors and financial structure is: 
H3: For quoted firms in emerging economies, a firm’s financial structure is positively related to: 
firm size, asset structure, growth opportunities and effective tax charges; but negatively 
associated with, firm age, firm performance, earnings and cash flow volatility, and 
product uniqueness. The main research hypothesis has been broken down into eight lower-level hypotheses: 
H3a: Firm age is negatively associated with leverage. H3b: Firm size is positively associated with leverage. H3c: Asset structure is positively associated with leverage. H3d: Firm performance is negatively associated with leverage. H3e: Earnings and cash flow volatility is negatively associated with leverage. H3f: Growth opportunity is positively associated with leverage. H3g: Product uniqueness is negatively associated with leverage. H3h: Effective tax charges are positively associated with leverage. 
7.2.2 The internal firm-specific factors’ model The model for the relationship between financial structure and firm-specific factors (age of firm, size of firm, asset tangibility, volatility of earnings and cash flow, growth opportunity, product uniqueness and effective tax rate) was specified in Chapter 4 (Equation 4-9).   To allow for the impact of firm-specific factors on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , re-specified versions of Equation 4-9 and included a time lag in the model were estimated. The original data was logarithmically transformed to address the slightly skewed distribution identified during the diagnostic tests32. The purpose of the transformation is to obtain residuals that are approximately symmetrically distributed about zero. The spread of the residuals changes systematically with the values of the dependent                                                         32 The regression diagnostics are presented in section 4-5. 
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variable heteroscedasticity, and the transformation removes the heteroscedasticity to achieve approximate homoscedasticity. The regression diagnostics suggest that there was no error in data entry, and that fixed-effects, random-effects and GMM estimations would be consistent and effective. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                            (4-9) Equation 4-9 shows that for East African firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage (debt ratio) at time t) is a function of the firm’s age (AGE), size (SIZE), asset structure (ASTAN), performance (PROF), earning and cash flow volatility (EARCF), growth opportunities (GRO), product uniqueness (PDT), effective tax charge (TAX), and random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2.  The definitions of all the variables used in this chapter are provided in Table 4-1.  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, 
𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are the estimators of the explanatory variables, and of interest are the signs of these estimators. The quoted firms’ panel is unbalanced. Most of the missing observations are towards the beginning of the period with the end of the period with the more complete observations. This is partly because some firms in the sample were listed on the stock exchanges later than the others. Summary statistics for the quoted firms’ panel are presented in Table 4-2.   For the internal firm-specific and financial structure variables, the number of observations varied from 441 to 563, and section 7.3 discusses the results of the GMM estimation. 
7.2.3 Choice of estimation methods Dynamic GMM methods were used to test the relationship between firm leverage and the various firm-specific factors in the East African data. These methods show the effects of changes in the firm-specific factors on firm leverage better than the fixed-effects and random-effects methods explained in section 4.6. The GMM 
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(Arellano-Bond33 and Arellano-Bover34 GMM estimators) methods provide consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of the model parameters. Asymptotic optimality is a key advantage of GMM. The GMM estimation framework is more robust than the fixed-effects and random-effects methods. It computes and provides more consistent and reliable estimates of the model parameters. The GMM estimators offer features, e.g. Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected standard errors to account for the bias in the traditional two-step GMM standard errors, in dynamic panel-data models. The introduction of a lag to translate the firm-specific factors’ model into a dynamic model to allow the use the GMM methods was intuitively reasonable. Nonetheless, to make the research robust, the author also conducted the fixed-effects and random-effects estimations based on the original model. For a detailed account of tests using the fixed-effects and random-effects estimation, including the results obtained, please refer to Appendix 3. A target adjustment financial structure model fitted to time-series firm-specific factors’ data would result into a distributed-lag relationship. A single lag in the dependent variable (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is therefore introduced into the firm-specific factors’ model (Equation 7-1). The single lag structure in this model is based on the dynamism of the target adjustment theory on which the firm-specific factors’ model is based. Managers’ leverage decision is expected to be influenced by the gearing level at the time the decision is being made, i.e. the underlying leverage, as well as the internal firm-specific factors’ variables. Whilst, the current gearing level would have, itself, been determined by the conditions of firm-specific variables during the period the gearing level was established. The presence of adjustment costs of high leverage in the form of risk of bankruptcy and agency costs would prevent firms from jumping at once to an optimal financial structure. It is assumed that at current leverage level, the firm attempt to adjust instantaneously to optimal leverage level by acquiring more debt or reducing debt or increasing equity to incorporate the influence of the different firm-specific variables. The lag distribution should be empirically and                                                         33 Arellano, M. & Bond, S. 1991, "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations", The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 277-297.  34 Arellano, M. & Bover, O. 1995, "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-components Models", Journal of Econometrics, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 29-51. 
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statistically stable and regular with respect to variations in the firm-specific factors’ data; it represents empirical regularities, which the target adjustment financial structure theory accounts for. Dynamic optimisation model is the basis for dynamic economic theory and a dynamic firm-specific factors’ model to which the GMM estimation framework was applied was specified. 
7.3 Firm financial structure and firm-specific factors – GMM 
estimations This section presents the results of the GMM estimations. It applies the Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimators (one-step system, two-step difference, and two-step system) to test the dynamic firm-specific factors’ model based on Equation 7-1. A single lagged leverage variable is introduced into Equation 4-9 and it becomes: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =     𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   +  𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖         (7-1) Equation 7-1 shows that for the East African firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage, as measured by the debt ratio, at time t) is a function of firm’s leverage at time t-1 (lagged leverage); the age of the firm (AGE); the firm’s size (SIZE); the tangibility of the assets of the firm (ASTAN); the performance – measured by profitability – of the firm (PROF); the volatility of earnings and cash flows of the firm (ECFV); growth opportunities available to the firm (GRO); the uniqueness of the firm’s products (PDT); the firm’s effective tax rate (TAX); the firm-specific error component (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖); and the idiosyncratic error component (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) of the random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2. The parameter 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 quantifies the degree to which leverage in period t depends on its value in the previous period, and therefore 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 is non-negative. The value of 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 is also strictly less than one, signifying that the dynamics on this model are stable. It is assumed that the dynamic adjustment process also applies to periods previous to the observed sample.  The parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , and 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 quantify the impact of the firm-specific factors: age, size, assets’ tangibility, performance, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge respectively, on a firm’s financial structure. 
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The error components 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 are assumed to be independent of one another for all values of i and t, including for the periods before the observed sample.  In other words, it is assumed that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is serially uncorrelated, non-autocorrelation that has been induced by including the lag in the model. Once one or more lags are included in a model, the model becomes a dynamic model and dynamic estimation framework, such as the GMM framework, might be used to estimate the model. The remainder of this section presents the results of the GMM estimations. The Arellano-Bond (ibid.) estimators (one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM) were used to estimate the dynamic ownership structure model based on Equation 7-1; and the results of the obtained compared. 
Table 7-1: One-step System GMM Estimation of the Firm-specific Model Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 346 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The table reports p-values of the one-step system GMM estimations for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms. It also reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t-statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnLEVt-1   0.6906  0.1231           5.61 *** 0.000 lnAGE   0.9055 0.0585   1.63 0.110 SIZE   0.0744 0.0307         2.52 ** 0.016 lnASTAN -0.1744 0.1385 -1.26 0.215 lnPROF -0.2135 0.0624         -3.42 *** 0.001 lnECFV   0.0959 0.0545      1.76 * 0.086 lnGRO   0.1369 0.0338          4.05 *** 0.000 lnPDT   0.0574 0.0229        2.51 ** 0.016 lnTAX   0.0084 0.0209   0.04 0.689 _cons -1.5110 0.6464       -2.34 ** 0.024 
              Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level.   *** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.51  Pr > z =  0.000 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.15  Pr > z =  0.249 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  29.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.001   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  10.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.402   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
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7.3.1 One-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimations First, the one-step system GMM dynamic panel–data estimation is applied to estimate Equation 7-1. The results are shown in Table 7-1. The coefficient of the lagged leverage shows that, during the period researched, for East African firms, higher leverage level in the previous year is associated with higher leverage in the current year. The results also show a positive relationship between the age of a firm, firm’s size, the volatility of a firm’s earnings and cash flows, the growth opportunities available to a firm, the uniqueness of a firm’s product, the effective tax charge to a firm and firm’s leverage. However, the relationship between a firm’s tangible assets and profitability and its leverage is negative. Yet, only the coefficients of lagged leverage, size, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness were statistically significant at alpha level of 0.10 (i.e. 90% confidence level). The remaining coefficients (age, asset tangibility, and effective tax charge) were not statistically significant at all three alpha levels. Coefficients were computed using one-step system GMM to incorporate long-run effects when 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 and the results are included in Table 7-2. Comparing these results to those obtained using the fixed-effects and random-effects methods35: the coefficients for all the variables (age, size, assets’ tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness and the effective tax charge) each exceed the corresponding coefficient computed under the fixed-effects and random-effects methods. Overall, the signs of the coefficients are identical; however, only the coefficients of age and product uniqueness are not statistically significant under 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha levels. 
7.3.2 Two-step difference and two-step system GMM estimations Next, the Arellano–Bond (ibid.) two-step GMM estimator was applied to estimate Equation 7-1; however, since the two-step estimation produces biased standard errors, the two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data estimation, which yields robust                                                         35 The results of the fixed effects and random effects estimations are reported in Appendix 3, Table AP3-1. 
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standard errors was used instead. In addition the two-step system GMM estimation was applied to estimate Equation 7-1. Tables 7-3 and 7-4 report the results, of the two-step difference estimation; whilst Table 7-5 reports results of the two-step system estimation. 
Table 7-2: One-step system GMM estimates of the internal firm-specific factors’ 
model (incorporating the long-term effects of leverage) The p-values of one-step system GMM estimations, when 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1, for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, ECFV, GRO, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnAGE   0.0728 0.1054   0.69 0.493 SIZE   0.2163 0.0555         3.90 *** 0.000 lnASTAN -0.6097 0.1792        -3.40 *** 0.001 lnPROF -0.5033 0.1076        -4.68 *** 0.000 lnECFV   0.2064 0.1058      1.95 * 0.058 lnGRO   0.1924 0.0430          4.47 *** 0.000 lnPDT   0.0492 0.0856   0.57 0.569 lnTAX  -0.0433 0.0227   -1.91 * 0.063 _cons -4.4081 1.0864       -4.06 *** 0.000 
               Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level.   *** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
Two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data results:  When Equation 7-1 was estimated using the two step GMM estimation, the coefficient of the lagged leverage reported in Table 7-3 showed a positive relationship between the East African firms’ leverage level in the previous year and current year’s leverage. However, Table 7-3 shows a negative relationship between the age of a firm, a firm’s profitability, a firm’s effective tax rate and firm’s leverage. In contrast, there is a positive relationship between the size of a firm, the tangibility of a firm’s assets, the growth opportunities available to a firm, the uniqueness of a firm’s products, and firm’s leverage. The variable ECFV was dropped because of collinearity. 
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All the coefficients, except for asset tangibility and effective tax charge, were statistically significant at 0.10 alpha levels. Moreover, applying two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data estimation to the firm-specific factors’ model yields proper diagnostics. 
Table 7-3: Two-step difference GMM estimation of the internal firm-specific 
factors’ model Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 43 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, i.e. the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 253 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The table reports p-values of two-step difference GMM estimations for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms. It also reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t-statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnLEVt-1    0.6443 0.1709          3.77 *** 0.001 lnAGE  -1.8387 0.7108        -2.59 *** 0.013 SIZE   0.5666 0.1453         3.90 *** 0.000 lnASTAN   0.1220 0.2975 0.41 0.684 lnPROF -0.2161 0.0540        -4.00 *** 0.000 lnGRO   0.0997 0.0381        2.61 *** 0.012 lnPDT   0.1651 0.0854    1.93 * 0.060 lnTAX  -0.0251 0.0301 -0.83 0.409 
               Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level.   *** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.74  Pr > z =  0.006 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.08  Pr > z =  0.281 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  20.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.013   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =   4.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.847   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)    In addition to the initial two-step difference estimation of the firm-specific factors’ model, the estimation was repeated excluding the variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 to exclude the long-term effect of LEV. Table 7-4 shows that, if long-term effect of LEV is incorporated, the relationship between the age of a firm, the tangibility of a firm’s assets, a firm’s profitability, a firm’s effective tax charge, and firm’s leverage is still 
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negative. In comparison, the relationship between the size of a firm, the growth opportunities available to a firm, the uniqueness of a firm’s products, and firm’s leverage is positive. Again, the variable ECFV was dropped because of collinearity. 
Table 7-4: Two-step difference GMM estimation of the internal firm-specific 
factors’ model (incorporating long-term effects of leverage) The table reports p-values of two-step difference GMM estimations, when 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1,  for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms. It also reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t-statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnAGE  -0.2517 0.9118 -0.28 0.784 SIZE   0.5545 0.2012         2.76 *** 0.009 lnASTAN -0.1472 0.2447 -0.60 0.551 lnPROF -0.1787 0.0648        -2.76 *** 0.009 lnGRO   0.0729 0.0337        2.17 ** 0.036 lnPDT   0.0367 0.0638   0.58 0.568 lnTAX  -0.0376 0.0170       -2.22 ** 0.032 
               Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level.   *** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =   0.47  Pr > z =  0.639 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.58  Pr > z =  0.559 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   = 102.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.000   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  15.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.172   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)    However, only the coefficients for size, profitability, growth opportunities and effective tax charge were statistically significant at 0.10 alpha level. Again, applying two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data estimation to the firm-specific factors’ model yields proper diagnostics but overturns just the random-effects results for products’ uniqueness. In both estimations, the diagnostics are fine; the Sargan/Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions; and the tests for serial correlation find no serial correlation for both first order and second order. 
Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation results: Two-step system GMM estimation introduces more instruments, which should improve the efficiency of the estimation. It builds a system of two equations (the original equation as well as a transformed one). It also makes the Windmeijer (2005) finite-
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sample correction to the reported standard errors, without which those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased; and it introduces finer control over the instrument matrix. In addition, it offers automatic difference-in-Sargan/Hansen test for the validity of instrument subsets; offers support for observation weights; and allows the forward orthogonal deviations transformation (an alternative to differencing proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)) that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. The results of the two-step system GMM estimation are presented in Table 7-5. 
Table 7-5: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation of the 
internal firm-specific factors’ model Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 313 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The table reports p-values of the two-step system GMM estimations for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms. It also reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t-statistics.   lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnLEVt-1   0.5752 0.1353           4.25 *** 0.000 lnAGE   0.0766 0.0610   1.26 0.216 SIZE   0.0921 0.0350           2.63 *** 0.012 lnASTAN -0.2623 0.1194       -2.20 ** 0.033 lnPROF -0.2429 0.0633         -3.84 *** 0.000 lnECFV   0.0921 0.0527      1.75 * 0.087 lnGRO   0.1531 0.0311          4.92 *** 0.000 lnPDT   0.0538 0.0278      1.94 * 0.060 lnTAX -0.0231 0.0186 -1.24 0.222 _cons -1.7769 0.7985       -2.23 ** 0.031 
               Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level.   *** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level.  Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.99  Pr > z =  0.003 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.19  Pr > z =  0.235   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  29.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.001   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  10.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.402   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
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The coefficient of the lagged leverage shows a positive relationship with current year’s leverage. The results also show a postive relationship between the age of a firm, the size of a firm, the volatility of a firm’s earnings and cash flows, the growth opportunities available to a firm, the uniqueness of a firm’s products, and the firm’s leverage. However, there is a negative relationship between the tangibility of a firm’s assets, the profitability of a firm, the effective tax charge to a firm, and the firm’s leverage. Under the two-step system estimation, all the coefficients, except for age and effective tax charge, were statistically significant.  Overall, applying system GMM to the firm-specific factors’ model yields proper diagnostics. The Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions (at 95% level) and the tests for serial correlation finding no serial correlation for both first order and second order.  Section 7.4 compares, discusses and analyses the results of the GMM (one-step system, two-step difference, and two-step system) estimations of the dynamic firm-specific factors’ model. 
7.4 Main analysis and discussion In this section, the results of the estimation of the firm-specific factors’ model and test of the internal firm-specific factors’ hypotheses using the GMM estimators are analysed, compared and discussed. Researchers frequently use the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimators. Both estimators are designed for panel data with few periods and many individuals (for this research there is small time periods (12 years) and large number of observations (47 quoted companies); with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (i.e. correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error) and with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. The three GMM estimation methods used (one-step system, two-step difference and two-step system GMM) were chosen because the internal firm-specific data set has limited time span and within the data, there were potentially endogenous regressors, especially the lagged leverage variable.  
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Table 7-6: F statistics for the firm-specific factors’ model 
F statistics for the firm-specific factors’ model for the 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011.   p-value One-step system GMM F(8,43) = 86.72 0.000 *** Two-step difference GMM F(7,42) = 9.92 0.000 *** Two-step system GMM F(8,43) = 63.94 0.000 ***  Note:  
*** The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. 
Table 7-7: GMM estimations results for the firm-specific factors’ models Combined estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model for the 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the three estimation methods. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 346 leverage and firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t statistics of the GMM estimations for LEVt-1, AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnLEV(t-1) lnAGE SIZE lnASTAN lnPROF lnECFV lnGRO lnPDT lnTAX One-step system GMM  0.691 0.095 0.077 -0.174 -0.214 0.096 0.137 0.057 0.008  5.61*** 1.63* 2.52** -1.26 -3.42*** 1.76* 4.05*** 2.51** 0.40 Two-step difference GMM 0.644 -1.839 0.567 0.122 -0.216 - 0.100 0.165 -0.025 3.77*** -2.59*** 3.90*** 0.41 -4.00*** - 2.61*** 1.93* -0.83 Two-step system GMM  0.575 0.077 0.092 -0.262 -0.243 0.092 0.153 0.054 -0.023 4.25*** 1.26 2.63*** -2.20** -3.84*** 1.75* 4.92*** 1.94* -1.24 
 
Note: *  The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
*** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level. 
 
 
7.4.1 Baseline Results Table 7-6 and Table 7-7 report the dynamic firm-specific factors’ regressions for the 44 quoted companies within the sample over the period 2000 to 2011. Table 7-6 compares the F-test results of the one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM and two-step system GMM estimations. From these results, the firm-specific factors’ model specified for the tests appear to be fine. 
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Table 7-7 reports the relationship between financial structure and internal firm-specific factors revealed by the three GMM estimation methods.  The t-tests examine the relationship between financial structure and internal firm-specific factors. At 99% confidence interval, values of |t| > 2.576 represent statistically significant results; whilst at 95% confidence interval values |t| > 1.960 represent statistically significant results; and at 90% confidence interval |t| > 1.645 represents statistically significant results.  As noted in section 2.4, the probable effect of the eight internal firm-specific factors, examined in this research, on financial structure decisions of firms is less understood. By examining the eight variables (AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX) across the East African quoted firms, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between internal firm-specific factors and financial structure. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that the performance of a firm (measured by profitability) and the growth opportunities available to the East African quoted companies are the two most significant internal firm-specific factors’ variables to influence leverage. The results in Table 7-7, show that profitability is negatively correlated with leverage under all three estimation techniques; whilst the growth opportunities is positively correlated with leverage under all three estimation techniques. In the East African data, under all three estimation methods, an increase in profitability led to a statistically significant (at 99% confidence level) decrease in leverage; whilst an increase in growth opportunities led to a statistically significant (at 99% confidence level) increase in leverage. Similarly, firm leverage in the periods prior to the current period, positively and significantly (at 99% confidence level), influences the financial structure decisions of the East African quoted firms.  Table 7-7 also shows that firm’s size and product uniqueness, statistically significantly (at 90% confidence level), positively influence leverage under all the estimation techniques. Likewise, the volatility of earnings and cash flows positively, at 90% confidence level, influences leverage (but only under the one-step system GMM and two-step system GMM). On the contrary, the influence of firm’s age, tangibility of a firm’s assets, and effective tax charge are indeterminate. The signs of 
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the coefficients for each of these variables were different under all the three estimation techniques.  The introduction of a lag in the firm-specific factors’ model seems not to change the effect of the internal firm-specific factors on financial structure decision. The evidence from the dynamic (GMM) estimation methods is, overall, more consistent and stronger than that under the static methods (included in Appendix 3 for the interested reader). The negative relationship between profitability and leverage reinforces our knowledge on the influence of firm performance (profitability) on firms’ financial structure decisions in emerging economies. It supports the predictions of the pecking order theory36, and the quoted firms in the East African economies seem to use internally generated funds first before looking outwards for financing. It is similar to the findings of Ngugi (2008), who found that Kenyan firms follow the trade off and pecking order theories. It also supports the findings of Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) and Booth et al. (2001). A probable explanation for the finding of the current research could be the high cost of debt37 in the emerging markets. The cost of debt in the three East African economies is relatively higher than the cost of equity in the developed economies; this would make it cheaper to use equity (retained earnings) than debt to finance activities of companies that are more profitable. Similarly, the positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage supports the version of pecking order theory that suggests a positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunity. Debt would grow when investment exceeds retained earnings and fall when investment is less than retained earnings. The finding, however, contradicts the negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage observed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008), and Prasad, Green and Murinde                                                         36 The pecking order theory was discussed in section 2.1.  37 As discussed in Chapter 3, from the World Bank Official data, from 2000 to 2012, the lowest lending rate within the East African economies was 13% in Kenya in 2004 and the highest was 26% in Uganda in 2012. This can be compared with lowest and highest rates in the United Kingdom of 0.5% and 6% respectively; in the United States of 3% and 9% respectively; and in China of 5% and 7% respectively during the same period 2000 to 2012. 
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(2009).  Equally, the positive relationship between the volatility of earnings and cash flows and leverage provides further insights to the findings of Diamond (1991a; 1991b), who noted that theoretical models envisaging an association between cash flow and maturity structure is complex and probably varied. Meanwhile, the positive relationship between product uniqueness and leverage contradicts Titman and Wessels’ (1988) observation that firms, which produce unique products, are likely to be less leveraged. It sheds more light on the findings of Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b), who identified product uniqueness as one of the key factors influencing capital structure choice of Indian firms. All these findings support the predictions of pecking order theory.  In contrast, the positive relationship between the firm’s size and leverage is consistent with trade-off theory that there is an inverse relationship between firm size and the likelihood of bankruptcy, and consequently a positive relationship between firm size and leverage.   It supports the findings of Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b), who identified that firm size was positively related to leverage ratio across the G5 countries. It also provides more insights to the findings of Booth 
et al. (2001) and Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b), who found that in developing economies firm size was one of the factors that affected financial structure decisions. Furthermore, the negative relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage contradicts the findings of Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008b) who found a positive relationship between leverage ratio and tangibility of assets within firms in the G5 countries. It nevertheless, provides further insights to the findings of Booth 
et al. (2001) and Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b), who found that in developing economies, tangibility of assets affects financial structure decisions. This finding is also consistent with the trade-off theories. In addition, the findings on effective tax charge provide more insights to the current knowledge on the correlation between effective tax charge and financial structure choice. Interestingly the negative correlation between effective tax charge and leverage supports Ngugi (2008), who found that use of debt by Kenyan firms was influenced by the size of the non-debt tax shields and the effect of tax exhaustion. A probable explanation for the negative relationship is that because most of the East 
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African listed companies resulted from divestiture of failing government parastatals, the companies had huge losses, which renders debt tax shield ineffective. The findings in relation to firm’s age were indefinite.  
7.4.2 Results of test of firm-specific factors’ hypotheses revealed by the two-step 
system GMM estimation Table 7-8 summarises the results of tests of the firm-specific factors’ hypotheses revealed by the two-step system GMM estimators. The tests show that firm size has a positive and statistically significant influence on East African firms’ leverage. With a p-value of 0.012, hypothesis H3b is not rejected at 1% significance level. The tests also indicate that the hypothesis (H3d) on the influence of firms’ performance (profitability) should not be rejected. Performance has a negative and statistically significant influence on the East African firms’ leverage, at 5% significance level.  Similarly, hypothesis (H3f) should not be rejected; there is a statistically significant, at 1% significance level (p-value of 0.001), and positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. However, the tests show that hypothesis H3c should be rejected at 5% significance level. There is a negative and statistically significant (p-value 0f 0.033) relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage. Likewise, hypotheses H3e and H3g should also be rejected at 10% significance level. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between leverage and volatility of earnings and cash flows and uniqueness of products, with p-values of 0.087 and 0.060 respectively. Although there is an indication that there is a positive relationship between firm’s age and East African firms’ leverage, this positive relationship is not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.216. Therefore, the result of the test of hypothesis H3a is indeterminate. Finally, since the p-value for the relationship between the effective tax charge and leverage is 0.222, the weak negative relationship with leverage is not statistically significant.  Accordingly, the result of the test for hypothesis H3h is also indeterminate. Unlike for the ownership model, the dynamic firm-specific model seems to be affected by the long-run effect of firm-specific factors; effects that are picked up in a dynamic analysis with LEV. 
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Table 7-8: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data test of the firm-specific 
factors’ model Two-step system GMM estimation results for firm-specific factors’ model for the 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two-step system GMM estimation. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 346 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The hypotheses tested, hypothesised signs, and signs of coefficients in the results are reported. In addition, p-values of the coefficients under two-step system GMM estimation for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported.  Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Firm’s age (lnAGE) H3a – + 0.216 Indeterminate Firm’s size (SIZE) H3b + + 0.012 Not rejected Asset tangibility (lnASTAN) H3c + – 0.033 Rejected Firm’s performance (lnPROF) H3d – – 0.000 Not rejected Earnings and cash flows volatility (lnECFV) H3e – + 0.087 Rejected Growth opportunities (lnGRO) H3f + + 0.000 Not rejected Product uniqueness (lnPDT) H3g – + 0.060 Rejected Effective tax charge (lnTAX) H1h + – 0.222 Indeterminate   
7.5 Cross-country comparison This section uses the firm-level panel data on internal firm-specific factors to explore the extent to which cross-country effects of the internal firm-specific factors influence firms’ financial structure decisions.  It also looks at the influences that countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors might have on the financial structure of quoted firms in the three East African economies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The section examines the association between countrywide factors (two macroeconomic factors: gross domestic product per capita and inflation, and two institutional factors: capital market development and banking sector development) and leverage of quoted companies. 
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The analysis and discussion in section 7.4 show that for the East African firms, firm-specific factors can have significant influence on firms’ financial structure decisions. The author employed estimation procedures that use interaction dummies and find evidence of statistically and economically significant country effects of firm-specific factors on the firms in Kenya compared to those in the other two East African countries (Tanzania and Uganda). To the author’s knowledge, there are no known previous works, which have used comparable approach for the East African countries. This research uses listed firms’ data from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; however, due to the level of development of the stock markets of Tanzania and Uganda the number of listed firms in the two countries is small. Therefore, the results for Kenya (KEN) were compared with those for Tanzania and Uganda combined (TUG). This section explores whether country effects influence firms’ financial structure choices in these countries, and whether there are econometric explanations for any difference identified. 
7.5.1 Conceptual issues Section 2.4 of chapter 2 discussed Cotei et al.’s (2011) arguments that: firms in countries where creditors and shareholders’ rights have less protection the financial markets are less developed; and firms in such countries use the equity market less to raise finance. Also highlighted were the findings of Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996; 1999) that stock market development was negatively related to leverage. They found that, where the financial markets were underdeveloped, firms tended to raise external finance through the banks. Chapter 2 also highlighted Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal’s (2008b) suggestion that differences in institutional frameworks and traditions influence financial structure choices. In addition, it noted Booth et al.’s (2001) arguments that in developing economies GDP growth rate and inflation rate are associated with leverage ratio; and findings of Frank and Goyal (2009) that inflation was positively associated with leverage. This section presents a cross-country comparison of the relationship between leverage and internal firm-specific factors in the East African quoted companies. It also establishes the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and leverage. This is significant for a couple of reasons: Firstly, 
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not much is known about the association between countrywide macroeconomic and institutional factors and leverage of listed companies in emerging economies. Secondly, this research obtained a quality data set in the context of countrywide factors for quoted firms in the three East African countries. In my panel of data (sample), there are data on the countries’ annual gross domestic product, annual consumer price indices, financial market development and stock market development. 
7.5.2 The sub-samples and pairwise test Splitting the main sample into two sub-samples (KEN and TUG), each sample was empirically tested using the three GMM estimation methods. Then compared the results for the two samples and the combined sample. The findings show a more statistically and economically significant country effects of internal firm-specific factors on the firms in Kenya compared to those in the Tanzania and Uganda. Table 7-9 presents the results of paired t-tests of whether (for leverage (LEV), firm’s age (AGE), firm size (SIZE), tangibility of a firm’s assets (ASTAN), firm performance (PROF), volatility of earnings and cash flows (ECFV), growth opportunities (GRO), product uniqueness (PDT), and effective tax charge (TAX)) the differences between the two sub-samples are significant. A series of paired t-tests on the sample of 47 quoted firms were undertaken to determine whether there were statistically significant mean differences between the two groups. There is a difference in average leverage when the firms are listed in Kenya compared to Tanzanian/Ugandan listed firms. Firms in Tanzania and Uganda have lower debt to equity ratio than Kenyan firms; a statistically insignificant decrease in leverage. The paired t-tests for firm’s age, firm size, assets’ tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge revealed the following. Firms in Tanzania and Uganda were on average younger than Kenyan firms; a statistically significant increase in average age of 15.04 years. Similarly, firms in Tanzania and Uganda were on average slightly smaller than ownership in Kenyan firms; a statistically significant increase in size. 
Chapter 7       Internal Firm-specific Factors | 161  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Table 7-9: Two-sample t-tests of the leverage and internal firm-specific factors Means and standard deviations for the two groups (Kenya (KEN) and Tanzania/Uganda (TUG)) drawn from data from the 47 quoted East African companies covering the period 2000 and 2011. Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 47 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 were used. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is measured by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 441 to 563 leverage and internal firm-specific factors firm-year observations. In this table, the means, standard deviations and the t statistics of the differences in mean for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, ECFV, GRO, PDT and TAX between the two groups are reported.  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
LEV    TUG 75 0.966559 5.760045 KEN 368 1.304671 8.052004 Combined 443 1.247429 7.707413 Diff  -0.33811      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =  -0.3459 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      441     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.3648         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7296          Pr(T > t) = 0.6352 
AGE    TUG 107 34.06542 21.32598 KEN 455 49.10110 26.02961 combined 562 46.23843 25.86803 diff  -15.03570      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   -5.5518 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      560     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
SIZE    TUG 75 17.37965 1.247432 KEN 368 17.83577 1.674104 combined 443 17.75855 1.617687 diff  -0.45612      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   -2.2356 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      441     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.0129         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0259          Pr(T > t) = 0.9871 
ASTAN    TUG 75 0.550755 0.202295 KEN 368 0.565018 0.230165 combined 443 0.562603 0.225537 diff  -0.014263      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   -0.4987 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      441     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.3091         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6182          Pr(T > t) = 0.6909  
 
Chapter 7       Internal Firm-specific Factors | 162  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Table 7-9 cont… 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
PROF    TUG 75 0.213661 0.118228 KEN 369 0.158937 0.231545 combined 444 0.168181 0.217469 diff  0.054724      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   1.9934 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      442     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9766         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0468          Pr(T > t) = 0.0234 
ECFV    TUG 107 0.049430 0.027830 KEN 455 0.092598 0.088802 combined 562 0.084380 0.082558 diff  -0.043168      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   -4.9684 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      560     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
GRO    TUG 75 0.131122 0.111544 KEN 368 0.089987 0.239809 combined 443 0.096951 0.223767 diff  0.041136      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   1.4529 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      441     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9265         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1470          Pr(T > t) = 0.0735 
PDT    TUG 75 0.053784 0.048843 KEN 369 0.055521 0.080925 combined 444 0.055228 0.076414 diff  -0.001737      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   -0.1793 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      442     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.4289         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8578          Pr(T > t) = 0.5711 
TAX    TUG 75 20.14301 13.83896 KEN 366 15.48875 21.95520 combined 441 16.28029 20.86002 diff  4.654265      diff = mean(TUG) - mean(KEN)                                      t =   1.7645 Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      439     Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                  Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9608         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0783          Pr(T > t) = 0.0392  
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In contrast, tangibility of assets of quoted firms in Tanzania and Uganda were similar to that of assets of Kenyan firms (a ratio of net property plant and equipment to total assets); though, this was not statistically significant. Furthermore, as discussed in section 6.5.2, firms in Tanzania and Uganda performed better than Kenyan firms; a statistically significant increase in performance of 5.47%.  In addition, earnings and cash flows of quoted firms in Tanzania and Uganda were less volatile than for firms in Kenya; a statistically significant increase in volatility. Similarly, there were more growth opportunities in firms in Tanzania and Uganda than in Kenyan firms; yet this difference of 4.11% was not statistically significant.  However, the level of uniqueness of products of quoted firms in Tanzania and Uganda were similar to those of firms in Kenya; a similarity that was not statistically significant. On the contrary, the effective tax charge of firms in Tanzania and Uganda was higher than of Kenyan firms; a statistically significant increase in performance of 4.65%. The higher level of average leverage in Kenyan firms compared to Tanzanian and Ugandan firms might be explained by the comparatively higher level of development of the capital market and the banking sector in Kenya38. Because of this, Kenyan firms should have easy access to credit; also, on average, Kenyan firms are, more than 15 years older and slightly larger than firms in Tanzania and Uganda are, and would have the collateral that credit providers require, as well as established relationships with credit providers. Moreover, the higher average leverage (130%) in Kenyan firms might be linked to the more volatile earnings and cash flows of Kenyan firms.  Section 6.5.2, discussed probable explanations for the higher level of average performance in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms compared to Kenyan firms. However, a likely explanation for the better growth opportunities in Tanzania and Uganda compared to Kenya might be as follows. Since independence in 1963, Kenya has had a sustained period of political and economic stability compared to Uganda. Even though Tanzania also experienced relative political stability since its independence in 1964, as discussed in section 6.5.2, the economic model that Tanzania adopted                                                         38 Please refer to section 5.5.4 for the empirical tests of the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors on leverage. 
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after independence did not lead to economic growth nor attract investors. The study period coincided with the period when market capitalism economic model became more stable in the two transition economies of Tanzania and Uganda39. 
Table 7-10: Comparative estimation results for the internal firm-specific 
factors’ model – KEN vs TUG Comparative estimation results for the firm-specific factors’ model for the two sub-samples KEN and TUG. Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is measured by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The KEN sample consists of 281 leverage and firm-specific factors firm-year observations; whilst the TUG sample consists of 65 leverage and firm-specific factors firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t statistics of the GMM estimations for LEVt-1, AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, ECFV, GRO, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in parentheses) statistics.   lnLEV(t-1) lnAGE SIZE lnASTAN lnPROF  KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG One-step system GMM  0.633  0.991 0.080 -0.082 0.103 0.043 -0.220 -0.070 -0.240 -0.191 4.85***  6.4*** 1.42 -0.22 3.55*** 0.85 -1.48 -0.28 -3.40*** -0.89 Two-step difference GMM 0.671 -8.209 -1.859 -40.882 0.508 7.670 -0.095 22.010 -0.191 -1.303 6.84*** -0.92 -2.97*** -1.01 5.04*** 1.09 -0.40 0.94 -4.02*** -1.20 Two-step system GMM  0.565 0.833 0.032 -0.999 0.113 0.376 -0.286 - -0.239 -0.499 4.16*** 0.86 0.60 -0.43 3.71*** 0.94 -2.22** - -3.56*** -2.03**  
 lnECFV lnGRO lnPDT lnTAX  KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG KEN TUG One-step system GMM 0.118 0.130 0.120 0.259 0.052 0.011 0.009 -0.025 2.06** 0.48 3.44*** 3.37*** 1.97* 0.10 0.38 -0.81 Two-step difference GMM - - 0.060 -3.596 0.200 0.145 0.001 1.047 - - 1.83* -0.93 2.98*** 0.48 0.01 0.86 Two-step system GMM 0.097 -0.138 0.118 0.637 0.058 -0.675 -0.021 -0.060 1.76* -0.48 4.37*** 0.87 2.07** -0.56 -0.94 -0.64  
Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
*** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.                                                         39 As discussed in Chapter 3, since independence in 1963 Kenya adopted a mixed economic system up to early 1990s when it changed to a capitalist economic model.  The Kenyan economy has been the most stable of the three east African economies. However, Tanzania adopted a socialist economic model from independence in 1964 to the late 1980s and then a mixed economic system up to late 1990s and then market capitalism. In contrast, Uganda adopted a mixed economic system from independence in 1962 to early 1970s followed by state socialism economic system (coupled with political and economic instability) up to early 1980s; followed by a mixed economic system up to early 1990s and then market capitalism thereafter. 
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Furthermore, the average effective tax rates of firms in the two sub-samples are lower than the statutory tax rates. The effective tax rate of firms in Kenya is, on average, comparatively lower than for Tanzanian and Ugandan firms, this might be due to; firstly, Kenyan firms being more efficient in using tax preferences (loopholes in tax laws and tax incentives available to them). In the East African region, the respective governments deliberately40 offered tax preferences that were more generous than the economic costs of generating income in these countries.  Secondly, Kenyan firms, being more established (older and larger) than Tanzanian and Ugandan firms, could be better at shifting profits out of the region through transfer pricing and tax-efficient financing structure41.   
7.5.3 Country comparison of the GMM estimations results Table 7.10 provides estimates of the firm-specific factors and financial structure model using panel data for the two sub-samples. The lnLEV(t-1) coefficients for the TUG sample are consistently higher than for the KEN sample under the three GMM methods. This indicates that the current level of leverage of quoted firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more dependent on previous period’s leverage than quoted firms in Kenya. This implies a slower adjustment to the target leverage in Tanzania and Uganda than in Kenya. The estimates of the coefficients for the effective tax charge show consistent results for both KEN and TUG, and yet the direction of the relationship between effective tax charge and leverage is indeterminate under the different estimation methods. Nonetheless, the absolute values of the coefficients are consistently higher for the TUG sub-sample than the KEN sub-sample. However, no consistent pattern has emerged regarding the coefficients for age, size, tangibility of assets, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness under the estimation methods used. These results are not consistent under all the estimation techniques. 
                                                        40 The East African governments offered various tax incentives (conditional tax preferences) to foreign investors to attract foreign direct investment that the countries needed to boost economic growth. 41 Table 7-10 shows that average leverage in Kenyan firms is 34% higher than leverage in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. 
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7.5.4 The influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors Country factors vary over time but not across firms and a time series data on gross domestic product per capita (GDPCA), consumer price indices (INF), banking sector development (BASEDE) and capital market development (CAPMADE) was collected from the World Bank database. This sub-section, conducts time series analysis of the data to identify differences or similarities in GDPCA, INF, BASEDE   and CAPMADE across Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The aim is to seek explanations for the differences or similarities, and establish any link to the relationship between financial structure and internal firm-specific factors that the empirical tests revealed in Section 7.4. The nine columns in the upper part of Table 7-11 report the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on firm leverage, age of the firm, size of the firm, tangibility of the firm’s assets, performance (profitability) of the firm, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and effective tax charge. The results in column 1 show that in Kenya leverage is inversely correlated to capital market development, growth in GDP per capita and banking sector development. The coefficient, vary from 0.001 (for capital market development) to 0.040 (banking sector development).   This suggests that for the Kenyan firms, a 0.1% or 0.8% or 4% increase in capital market development, growth in GDP per capita and banking sector development respectively leads to a 1% decrease in firms’ leverage. This is consistent with Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who found that where financial markets are underdeveloped, external finance tend to be raised through the banks. It is also consistent with (Cotei et al., 2011) who found that firms operating in countries with less developed capital markets have limited options and used the equity markets to raise finance less. Conversely, firm leverage is positively correlated with inflation; and with a coefficient of 0.125, it suggests that for a 12.5% increase in inflation, leverage increases by 1%. However, only inflation and GDP per capita have statistically significant impact on leverage. Inflation significantly statistically and positively affects leverage in Kenya, consistent with Frank and Goyal (2009). 
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Table 7-11: Relationship between macroeconomics and institutional factors and the internal firm-specific factors in Kenya and 
Tanzania/Uganda The table presents estimation results, i.e. regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the correlation between the country-wide (macroeconomic and institutional) factors and the internal firm-specific factors. Results presented are for the two sub-samples Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda across 33 quoted Kenyan (KEN) companies and nine quoted Tanzanian/Ugandan (TUG) companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is measured by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit.            
Kenya    LEV AGE SIZE ASTAN PROF ECFV GRO PDT TAX GDPCA -0.0075 (-1.78) 0.0218 (1.66) 0.0027 (3.05) 0.0001 (0.40) 0.0001 (0.78) -0.0001 (-0.10) -0.0001 (-0.23) 0.0001 (0.62) 0.0127 (1.11) INF 0.1246 (1.75) 0.0111 (0.05) 0.0012 (0.08) -0.0168 (-0.14) 0.0011 (0.55) -0.0001 (-0.03) 0.0003 (0.15) -0.0001 (-0.11) 0.2967 (1.54) BASEDE -0.0419 (-0.34) -0.0273 (-0.09) -0.0123 (-0.49) -0.0009 (-0.44) -0.0018 (-0.53) 0.0001 (0.04) 0.0012 (0.32) -0.0009 (-0.75) -1.0158 (-3.18) CAPMADE -0.0013 (-0.02) 0.0044 (0.03) -0.0141 (-1.26) -0.0011 (-0.68) -0.0004 (-0.28) 0.0001 (0.08) -0.0016 (-0.98) -0.0001 (-0.21) -0.1980 (-1.36)           N 368 455 368 368 369 455 368 369 366 R-Square 0.0201 0.0159 0.0290 0.0023 0.0040 0.0000 0.0100 0.0031 0.0322            
          
Tanzania/Uganda    LEV AGE SIZE ASTAN PROF ECFV GRO PDT TAX GDPCA -0.0063 (-0.70) 0.0009 (0.02) 0.0052 (2.18) 0.0003 (0.74) -0.0004 (-1.66) -0.0001 (-0.91) -0.0001 (-0.06) -0.0002 (-1.91) 0.0050 (0.18) INF 0.0376 (0.15) -0.3946 (-0.37) 0.0247 (0.37) -0.0019 (-0.16) 0.0039 (0.60) -0.0004 (-0.31) 0.0080 (1.45) 0.0021 (0.77) 0.5416 (0.72) BASEDE 0.1919 (0.36) -2.4043 (-1.20) 0.0256 (0.18) -0.0070 (-0.28) 0.0051 (0.38) -0.0021 (-0.80) 0.0046 (0.39) 0.0154 (2.71) -1.6269 (-1.02) CAPMADE 0.0830 (1.00) 0.5986 (1.61) -0.0182 (-0.82) -0.0001 (-0.02) -0.0041 (-1.89) 0.0007 (1.53) -0.0025 (-1.35) 0.0003 (0.30) -0.6951 (-2.74)           N 62 89 62 62 62 89 62 62 62 R-Square 0.0329 0.0647 0.1411 0.0124 0.1129 0.0525 0.0467 0.1320 0.1652 
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The results in the last seven42 columns show the impact of macroeconomic (GDPCA and INF) and institutional (BASEDE and CAPMADE) factors on the size of the firm, tangibility of the firm’s assets, performance (profitability) of the firm, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and effective tax charge. Table 7-12 shows that in Kenyan firms there is a positive relationship between growth of GDP per capita and firm’s size, tangibility of assets, performance, product uniqueness and effective tax rate; and yet the only statistically significant relationship is with the size of the firm. Growth in GDP per capita has a negative relationship with volatility of earnings and cash flows and growth opportunities; though, this relationship is not statistically significant. Moreover, the results also suggest that in Kenya, inflation rate has a positive relationship with firm’s size, growth opportunities, and effective tax rate; but none of the coefficients is statistically significant relationship. Capital market development has a negative relationship with the size of the firm, tangibility of assets, performance, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax rate; but none of the coefficients is statistically significant. In addition, the results suggest that in Kenya, banking sector development has a negative relationship with firm’s size, tangibility of assets, performance, product uniqueness and effective tax rate; and yet the only statistically significant relationship is with the effective tax rate. Banking sector development has a positive relationship with volatility of earnings and cash flows and growth opportunities; though, this relationship is not statistically significant.  The last nine columns in the lower half of Table 7-11, using the same specification, show the results for Tanzania and Uganda. For Tanzania/Uganda, the first column that reports the impact of the macroeconomic and institutional factors on leverage is generally consistent with the Kenyan results. Growth in GDP per capita has a negative impact on leverage; whilst inflation positively impact on leverage. However, the effect of banking sector or capital market development on leverage is positive unlike in the Kenyan results. Tanzanian and Ugandan firms seemed to use more debt finance as both the capital market and banking sector developed.                                                         42 Intuitively, any statistical relationship between the firm’s age and the macroeconomic and institutional factors would be meaningless. 
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The results in the last seven columns show the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors on the size of the firm, tangibility of the firm’s assets, performance (profitability) of the firm, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and effective tax charge. The results suggest that in Tanzania/Uganda, the GDP per capita has negative relationship with performance, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities and product uniqueness; though, only the coefficients of performance and product uniqueness are statistically significant. In contrast, Tanzanian and Ugandan firms have a positive relationship between growth of GDP per capita and firm’s size, tangibility of assets, and effective tax rate; and yet the only statistically significant relationship is with the size of the firm. The relationship between growth in GDP per capita and performance and product uniqueness is divergent to the relationship in the Kenyan sub-sample. The relationship between inflation and the seven factors are overall similar to those found in the Kenyan firms except the relationship between inflation and product uniqueness; however, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. In contrast, the relationship between banking sector development and each of the seven factors is, overall, divergent to those in the Kenyan sub-sample, except the relationship between banking sector development and tangibility of assets and growth opportunities, which are similar to those in the Kenyan sub-sample. Yet only the coefficient for product uniqueness is statistically significant. Furthermore, the relationship between capital market development and the seven factors are overall similar to those found in the Kenyan firms except the relationship between capital market development and product uniqueness; however, only the coefficients for performance and effective tax charge are statistically significant. The findings in this section lead to the following conclusions: First, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were less sensitive to changes in firm size, assets’ tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, and growth opportunities variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. In other words, the influence of these firm-specific factors on leverage seemed to be more pronounced 
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in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. Second, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were more sensitive to changes in the firm age, uniqueness of products, and effective tax rate variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. The influence of these firm-specific factors on leverage seemed to be less pronounced in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. Third, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities and effective tax charge have opposite influences on leverage of firms in Kenya compared to those in Tanzania and Uganda. Whilst an increase in volatility of earnings and cash flows and growth opportunities led to an increase in leverage in the Kenyan firms, an increase in each of the two variables led to a decrease in leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda. Similarly, even though an increase in effective tax charge led to a decrease in leverage in Kenyan firms, an increase in effective tax charge led to an increase in leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda. Macroeconomic and institutional context of the East African appear to explain some of the observed differences. 
7.6 Summary This chapter examined arguments that various internal firm-specific factors (age, size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flows volatility, growth opportunity, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) influence a firm’s financial structure (leverage). As discussed in Chapter 2, there is rich literature that argues that each internal firm-specific factor influences agency relationship differently. However, the influence of these factors on leverage (measured by the debt ratio as discussed in Chapter 4) of firms in emerging economies of the East African countries has not been comprehensively investigated. The author estimated the dynamic firm-specific factors’ model using the GMM estimation framework using one-step system, two-step difference and two-step system GMM estimations. The empirical results of the two-step system GMM estimation show that, statistically, six firm-specific factors (size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flows volatility, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness) significantly influence leverage of East African firms. The results, of all the three estimation methods (one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM and two-step 
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system GMM) used; indicate that, statistically (at 1% significant level), profitability significantly and negatively influences leverage. An increase in the profitability would lead to a decrease in leverage, which is in line with the pecking order theory argument in literature. Higher profits mean that there are more internally generated cash available to finance a firm’s operations and investments. What this finding indicates is that, under the two-step system GMM estimation, profitability is the second most significant factor, after asset tangibility, which influences leverage. The two-step system GMM estimation also shows that asset structure (tangibility) and effective tax charge negatively influence firm leverage. Asset structure (tangibility) is the most influential factor with a coefficient of 0.2623 and p-value of 0.033. In contrast, the two-step system GMM estimation shows that, the size of the firm, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness significantly positively influence leverage of East African firms. An increase in each of these would lead to an increase in leverage. Unlike the indeterminate influence of volatility of earnings and cash flows in literature, the results of this research show a statistically significant positive relationship. However, the data available could not allow the relationship between volatility of earnings and cash flows and long-term and short-term borrowing (Diamond, 1991a; 1991b) to be established. The findings on the relationship between three factors (asset structure, effective tax charge and earnings and cash flow volatility) and East African firms’ leverage are interesting. These findings are contrary to the findings of earlier research. Although tangible assets are known to provide the collateral that would be required for acquisition of debt, the finding shows that the East African listed firms with more tangible assets have relatively lower leverage. A probable explanation for this could be that since most of these listed firms are majority owned by foreign investors, they have access to other sources of income than debt to finance their operations and investments. Another explanation could be that because most of these companies assumed their listed status after privatisation and divestiture of state-owned parastatals, they already had accumulated adequate tangible assets at the time of divestiture. 
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The contradictory finding on the relationship between effective tax charge and listed East African firms’ leverage is also interesting. It shows that debt tax shield is not apparently a reason why an East African listed firm would use debt finance. A probable explanation for this result is that foreign investors, who have substantial stakes in these firms, enjoy tax relief through other avenues (e.g. tax holidays) and debt-tax shield would not be an attraction to use debt finance. Another probable explanation is that these firms were originally poorly performing because of poor management and had accumulated huge losses by the time they were listed on the stock markets. Those firms with accumulated losses had no tax charges that they could use debt finance to reduce, hence no attraction to use debt finance. Along the same vein, the conflicting finding on earnings and cash flow volatility means that for listed East African firms, the more volatile the earnings and cash flows, the more debt the firm uses. For these firms, volatile earnings and cash flows seems to drive the need to use debt finance to fill the gap in liquidity that volatility creates. Volatility seems not to be a barrier to obtaining debt finance. This is probably because the East African financial markets have fewer companies competing for the available credits on offer, and to maintain business the financial institutions still offered credits to firms with volatile earnings and cash flows. In addition, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, most of the East African listed firms have adequate tangible assets (acquired when they were still state-owned) and the assets provided the collateral that gave the lenders assurance to lend to firms, even if their earnings and cash flows were volatile. Nonetheless, the findings on the influence of firm age and product uniqueness on the leverage of East African listed firms were inconclusive. The cross-country comparison of the results across Kenyan firms and Tanzanian/Ugandan firms show that: Firstly, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were less sensitive to changes in firm size, assets’ tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, and growth opportunities than leverage of firms in Kenya. Secondly, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were more sensitive to changes in the firm age, uniqueness of products, and effective tax rate 
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than leverage of firms in Kenya. Thirdly, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities and effective tax charge have opposite influences on leverage of firms in Kenya compared to those in Tanzania and Uganda. Macroeconomic and institutional context of the East African economies appear to be responsible for the observed differences.  As noted in section 2.4, the probable effect of various internal firm-specific factors on financial structure decisions of firms in East Africa is less understood. By examining the correlation between the nine variables (lagged leverage, firm’s age, firm’s size, asset tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness and effective tax charge) and leverage, this research extends the current knowledge on financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. 
 174 
8 Ownership Structure, Financial Structure and 
Performance of Private Firms  This chapter discusses the results of empirical investigation of factors that might influence the financial structure of East African private firms. In the panel data (sample) for this study there are data for ownership structure (residency, proportion of institutional ownership and concentration); firm performance; and internal firm-specific factors (age, size, asset tangibility, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunity, product uniqueness and tax payment) of the private firms studied. Ownership-financial structures, ownership-performance and firm-specific factors’ models were formulated for the 20 private firms over the 12 years of data available. 
8.1 Ownership-financial structures, ownership-performance 
and internal firm-specific factors’ models for private firms Three models for the relationship between private firms’ financial structure, and ownership structure (residency, institutional/non-institutional and concentration of ownership); firms’ performance and ownership structure; and firm-specific factors (age of firm, size of firm, asset tangibility, volatility of earnings and cash flow, growth opportunity, product uniqueness and effective tax rate) were tested.  To examine the impact of ownership structure of private firms on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and ownership structure on private firms’ performance, equations 4-3 and 4-8 were estimated; whilst to the examine the influence of other internal firm-specific factors on leverage equation 7-1 was estimated using the private firms’ data. 
8.1.1 The ownership-financial structures model for private firms The model for ownership-financial structures of listed firms is represented by equation 4-3.  Starting with the model in equation 4-3, the East African private firms’ panel data collected was inspected to establish whether data was available for all the variables in the model. All the variables that were empirically examined for listed firms were relevant to private companies; thus, the panel data for private firms in Uganda, which had data on all the ownership variables examined in Chapter 5 and Equation 4-3, has been estimated. 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖            (4-3) Equation 4-3, applied to private firms, shows that for the East African private firms, 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage, as measured by the debt ratio, at time t) is a function of the residency of shareholders (RES), the proportion of shareholding of the top five shareholders (TOP5), the level of institutional shareholding – measured by the ratio of institutional shareholders to non-institutional shareholders – (INEX), and the random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2. The intercept term is ∝, and the parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 quantify the impact of a firm’s shareholding structure: residency, concentration and level of institutional shareholding respectively, on its financial structure.  
8.1.2 The ownership-performance model for private firms The ownership-performance model was represented in Chapter 4 by equation 4-8.  Equation 4-8 was therefore the starting point for specification of the ownership-performance model for private firms. In the panel data collected on private firms for this research, data was available for all the variables in the listed firms’ ownership-performance model. There was data for all the variables and the model in equation 4-8 was therefore estimated for the private firms.  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +   𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (4-8) 
8.1.3 Internal firm-specific factors model for private firms The model for the internal firm-specific factors of listed firms was represented in Chapter 7 by Equation 7-1.  The panel data collected on private firms has data for all the variables included in Equation 7-1. The model in equation 7-1 was therefore estimated for private firms as is. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =     𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   +  𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                   (7-1) 
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The three models were then estimated using fixed-effects and random-effects methods (for equations 4-3 and 4-8), and the GMM estimation methods (for equation 7-1); based on the assumption that the regressors are strictly exogenous. The results of the estimations are presented, analysed and discussed in sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 respectively. 
8.2 Ownership structure and private firms’ leverage This section presents analyses and discusses the results of the estimation of the ownership-financial structures model specified in section 8.1 for private firms using the fixed-effects and random-effects. The results of the estimation using these three methods are shown in Table 8-1.  
Table 8-1: Estimation results – ownership-financial structures model for 
private firms Ownership structures and leverage across 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to individual shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 87 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the private firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t (z) statistics.  lnLEV  Coef. Robust Std. Err.    FE Ϯ RE Ϯ Ϯ FE RE FE RE 
     t p>|t| z p>|z| lnRES  -0.2197  -0.1974 0.0138 0.0766 -15.40 *** 0.000 -2.58 *** 0.010 lnTOP5  0.7601   0.6667 0.0861 0.1614    8.82 *** 0.000     4.13 *** 0.000 lnINEX 0 -0.1468 omitted 0.0565 - -  -2.60 *** 0.009          _cons -2.1190 -2.7942 0.3371 0.6332 -6.29 *** 0.000 -1.76 * 0.078 sigma_u    0.8790   0.9491   sigma_e    0.7048   0.7048   rho   0.6087   0.6445 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level.   ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
  *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.    Ϯ  Fixed-effects    Ϯ Ϯ  Random-effects  
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8.2.1 Fixed-effects estimates For the East African private firms, as Table 8-1 shows, an increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to a decrease in the firm’s leverage. However, there was a positive relationship between the proportion of shareholding of the top five largest shareholders and the private firm’s leverage; whilst, the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders was dropped from the estimation. Both the coefficients of residency and the concentration of shareholding in the top five largest shareholders were statistically significant at 99% confidence level. As explained in section 3.443 the fixed-effects estimation appears to be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters in equation 4-3. Therefore, the properties of the random-effects method and its suitability for estimation of the ownership-financial structures model of private firms based on transformed equation 4-3 (transformed using quasi-difference transformation), were also explored. 
8.2.2 Random-effects estimates The results of the random-effects model GLS regression (Table 8-1) show that an increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to a decrease in an East African private firm’s leverage. Similarly, an increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders led to a decrease in the private firm’s leverage. However, the relationship between the proportion of shareholding of the five largest shareholders and the firm’s leverage is positive.  As with the fixed-effects estimates, all the coefficients were statistically significant at 99% confidence level. 
8.2.3 Fixed-effects versus random-effects estimation methods What is revealing, about both the fixed-effects and random-effects (GLS) estimators, is that residency of a private firm’s shareholders is negatively related with leverage; whilst concentration of shareholding in the five largest shareholders is positively related to leverage. Besides, under the random-effects method, the level of institutional shareholding is negatively related to leverage.  Yet, as discussed in section 5.3.3, the random-effects estimation is more appropriate for the ownership data set than the fixed-effects estimation.                                                         43 The fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods are explained in section 4.4. 
Chapter 8             Factors Infuencing Private Firms | 178  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Table 8-2: Random-effects test of the ownership-financial structures 
hypotheses (private firms) 
Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Foreign/indigenous ownership H1aa − − 0.010 *** Not Rejected Top five shareholding H1bb ? + 0.000 *** Rejected Institutional/non-institutional ownership H1cc − − 0.009 *** Not Rejected  Note: *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.  The theoretical underpinning of the ownership-financial structures hypotheses developed for this research was discussed in section 5.3.3. When the random-effects coefficients and p-values for the private firms’ estimation are compared to the ownership-financial structures hypotheses, they are either rejected or not rejected as shown in Table 8-2. 
8.2.4 Analysis of results In this section, the results of the estimations of the ownership-financial structures model for private firms have been analysed and discussed. As discussed in Chapter 5, the fixed-effects and random-effects methods were found to be more suitable methods to use. The ownership data for the East African private firms has limited time span, and the potential for fixed-effects and endogenous regressors has determined the choice of the estimators used. Table 8-3 shows the results from applying these estimation methods. Table 8-3 and Table 8-4 report the ownership-financial structure regressions for the 12 private companies within the sample over the period 2000 to 2011. Table 8-3 compares the F-test and Wald Chi-square test results of the fixed-effects and random-effects GLS estimations. From these results, the ownership-financial structure models specified for the tests appear to be satisfactory. In the models specified for this research, firm factors, assumed fixed included: sources of finance; 
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the quality of company leadership; leadership style, formal structure of the firm; organisational culture; firm image; firm’s mission or vison; company’s location; equipment and facilities; human resources; natural resources; patents; copy rights; trademarks; and customer base44. 
Table 8-3: F/Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-financial structures 
model (private firms) F or Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-financial structures model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011.   p-value Fixed-effects (Within)   F(2,11) =   323.65         0.000 *** Random-effects GLS              Wald chi2(3) = 54.63       0.000 ** 
 Note:  
***  The coefficient is significant at 1 per cent significance level. 
 Table 8-4 reports the relationship between financial structure and ownership structure revealed by the two estimation methods.  The methods use the t-tests or 
z-tests to analyse the relationship between financial structure and ownership structure.  As noted in section 2.2, the probable effect of separation of ownership from control on financial structure decisions of firms is not clear. This research has identified that ownership of private companies in the East African emerging economies can be classified by residency, concentration of shareholding and level of institutional shareholding. By examining residency of controlling shareholders, concentration of controlling shareholding (measured by proportion of shareholding owned by top five shareholders), and level of institutional shareholding, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between ownership structure and financial structure of private firms. 
                                                        44 Random factors include: current processes (such as employees’ programs, software systems, and departmental hierarchies); relationship between and within departments (which impacts on effectiveness and efficiency); how well the employees work together; operational efficiency; financial resources; investment opportunities; the strength or value of employees (talents, motivation, attitude to work, and role of key staff). 
Chapter 8             Factors Infuencing Private Firms | 180  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Table 8-4: Estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model 
(private firms) Combined estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two estimation methods. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 87 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the private firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX Fixed-effects (Within) -0.220 0.760 Omitted 
-15.96 *** 8.82 *** - Random-effects GLS -0.197 0.667 -0.147 
-2.58 *** 4.13 *** -2.60 ***  
Note:  
*** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level. 
 The most striking result to emerge from the data is that all three variables (residency of shareholders, the concentration of shareholding and the level of institutional shareholding) are significant ownership structure variables to influence financial structure (represented by leverage). The results in Table 8-4, show that residency is negatively correlated with leverage under both estimation techniques; whilst concentration is positively correlated with leverage under both estimation techniques. Under random-effects estimation, the level of institutional shareholding is negatively correlated with leverage. All the coefficients are statistically significant under both the fixed-effects (Within) and random-effects (GLS) estimations. These findings are similar to the findings for quoted companies and probable explanations for the results are similar to those discussed in section 5.4. Regarding financial structure choice, the correlation between concentration of ownership in five shareholders and leverage shown by both the fixed-effects and random-effects is fascinating.  It indicates that, for the East African private firms, the objectives of the top five shareholders are closely aligned to those of the managers who prefer cheaper debt finance.  
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8.3 Ownership structure and private firms’ performance This section presents analyses and discusses the results of the estimation of the ownership-performance model specified in section 8.1 for private firms using the fixed-effects and random-effects methods. The results of the estimation using these methods are shown in Table 8-5. 
Table 8-5: Estimation results – ownership-performance model for private 
firms Ownership structures and performance across 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 87 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and t statistics (z statistics for random effects) of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics.  lnPROF Coef. Robust Std. Err.    FE Ϯ RE Ϯ Ϯ FE RE FE RE 
     t p>|t| z p>|z| lnRES    0.3264  0.0751 0.0042 0.0273  7.40 *** 0.000   2.75 *** 0.006 lnTOP5 -0.1099  0.5556 0.0299 0.2238 -3.70 *** 0.000    2.48 ** 0.013 lnINEX 0  0 (Omitted) (Omitted) - - - -          _cons -3.3699 -5.3063 0.1170 0.8317 -2.90 *** 0.000 -6.38 *** 0.000 sigma_u    0.8672 0.7452   sigma_e    0.8370 0.8370   rho    0.5177 0.4421 (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
Note: **  The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
   ***  The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.     Ϯ   Fixed-effects     Ϯ Ϯ   Random-effects  
8.3.1 Fixed-effects estimations Table 8-5 shows that, under both fixed-effects and random-effects estimations, only the coefficients of residency and the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders were statistically significant at 95% confidence level. It indicates that as the proportion of shareholding by the top five shareholders (given that other variables in the ownership-performance model are held constant) increased, an East 
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African private firm’s performance decreased. However, as the proportion of foreign shareholders in a private firm increased, the private firm’s performance tended to improve. As explained in section 4.445 the fixed-effects estimation appears to be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters in equation 4-8; thus random-effects method was also used to estimate equation 4-8 for private firms. 
8.3.2 Random-effects estimation The results in Table 8-5 show that an increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to an increase in a private East African firm’s performance. Similarly, an increase in the proportion of shareholding concentrated in the top five shareholders led to an increase in the private firm’s performance. The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding variable was, due to collinearity, dropped from the estimation. Both coefficients were statistically significant at 95% alpha level used for this research.  
8.3.3 Fixed-effects versus random effects estimations results From Table 8-5, the fixed-effects and random-effects (GLS) estimators, show that residency of a private firm’s shareholders is positively related with private firms’ performance. However, concentration of shareholding in the five largest shareholders is negatively related to performance under the fixed-effects method but positively related to performance under random-effects method.  Yet, as discussed in section 5.3.3, the random-effects estimation is more appropriate for the ownership data set than the fixed-effects estimation. 
8.3.4 Analysis of results In this section, the results of the estimations of the ownership-performance model have been analysed and discussed.  The ownership data for the East African private firms has limited time span, and the potential for fixed-effects and endogenous regressors has determined the choice of the estimators used. Tables 8-6 and 8-7 report the ownership-performance regressions for the 12 private companies within the sample over the period 2000 to 2011.                                                         45 The fixed effects and random effects estimation methods are explained in section 4.4. 
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Table 8-6 compares the F-test and Wald Chi-square test results of the fixed-effects and random-effects GLS estimations. From these results, the ownership-performance model specified for the tests appear to be satisfactory. In the models specified for this research, firm factors assumed fixed included: sources of finance; the quality of company leadership; leadership style, formal structure of the firm; organisational culture; firm image; firm’s mission or vison; company’s location; equipment and facilities; human resources; natural resources; patents; copy rights; trademarks; and customer base46. 
Table 8-6: F/Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-performance 
model (private firms) F or Wald chi-square statistics for the ownership-performance model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011.   p-value Fixed-effects (Within)   F(2,10) =   2.40         0.1290 Random-effects GLS              Wald chi2(3) = 9.28       0.0097** 
 
Note:  
**  The coefficient is significant at 5 per cent significance level. Table 8-7 reports the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure revealed by the two estimation methods.  The methods use the t-tests or 
z-tests to analyse the relationship between financial structure and ownership structure. As noted in section 2.3, the probable effect of separation of ownership from control on performance of firms is less not clear. This research has identified that ownership of private companies in the East African emerging economies can be classified by residency, concentration of shareholding and level of institutional shareholding. By examining residency of controlling shareholders, concentration of controlling shareholding (measured by proportion of shareholding owned by top five shareholders), and level of institutional shareholding, this research extends the current knowledge on the correlation between ownership structure and performance of private firms. 
                                                        46 Random factors include: current processes (such as employees’ programs, software systems, and departmental hierarchies); relationship between and within departments (which impacts on effectiveness and efficiency); how well the employees work together; operational efficiency; financial resources; investment opportunities; the strength or value of employees (talents, motivation, attitude to work, and role of key staff). 
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Table 8-7: Estimation results for the ownership-performance model (private 
firms) Combined estimation results for the ownership-performance model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two estimation methods. Performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 87 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t (z) statistics of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the private firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t or z (in italics) statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnRES lnTOP5 lnINEX Fixed-effects (Within) 0.326 -0.110 Omitted 
7.40 *** -3.70 *** - Random-effects GLS 0.075 0.556 Omitted 
2.75 *** 2.48 ** -  
Note:  
** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
*** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level. 
 
 
 The interesting result to emerge from the data is that two variables (residency of shareholders and the concentration of shareholding are significant ownership structure variables to influence private firms’ performance. The results in Table 8-7 show that residency is positively correlated with performance under both estimation techniques; whilst concentration is negatively correlated with performance under the fixed-effects technique but positively correlated with performance under the random-effects. All the coefficients are statistically significant under both the fixed-effects (Within) and random-effects (GLS) estimations. These findings are similar to the findings for quoted companies and probable explanations for the results are similar to those discussed in section 6.4. Regarding performance of private firms, the correlation between residency of owners and performance shown by both the fixed-effects and random-effects is fascinating.  It indicates that, foreign ownership brings more focus on improving the performance of the firm.  
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8.4 Firm-specific factors and private firms’ leverage This section presents the results of GMM dynamic panel data estimations of the firm-specific factors’ model specified in section 8.1. The one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM and two-step system GMM were employed to yield estimators for the firm-specific factors’ model (Equation 7-1) for private firms. The panel data from 20 East African private firms was used to estimate the firm-specific factors’ model. The rationale for the choice of the GMM methods was discussed in section 7.2.3. In addition, from among the three GMM estimations, focus was on the results of the one-step system GMM, which was the only technique to yield meaningful results. The one-step system GMM also benefits from the advantages of GMM system techniques discussed in section 7.3. 
8.4.1 One-step system GMM dynamic panel data estimations of the firm-
specific factors’ model for the East African private firms The results of the one-step system GMM estimation, presented in Table 8-8, show that lagged leverage had a negative (statistically significant at 5% confidence level) influence on the firm’s leverage for the current period.  This implies that an increase in the previous period’s leverage, leads to a decrease in the East African private firms’ leverage for the current year. Therefore, an East African firm with a higher increase in leverage in the previous year would have a much lower current year’s leverage than a firm with a lower increase in previous year’s leverage. This indicates that East African private firms adjust to a target leverage; a manifestation of the trade-off theory. Table 8-8 also shows that firm size, tangibility of assets and profitability are the only three variables with statistically significant influence on East African private firms’ financial structure choice. An increase in the size of an East African private firm, led to an increase in leverage; which means that a bigger private firm, would have a lot higher leverage than a smaller firm.     
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Table 8-8: Estimation results – firm-specific factors’ model for private firms Estimation results for the firm-specific factors’ model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the five estimation methods. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, i.e. total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 87 leverage and firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The coefficients and the t statistics of GMM estimations for LEVt-1, AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported. Under each method figures in the first row are coefficients and figures in the second row are t statistics. The results confirm the stability condition: |?̂?𝛽| < 1.   lnLEVt-1 lnAGE SIZE lnASTAN lnPROF lnEARCF lnGRO lnPDT lnTAX One-step system -0.708 -0.520 0.739 -0.545 -0.214 -0.895 0.014 0.245 -0.042 -2.42* -1.02 4.31*** -2.70** -2.63** -1.53 0.08 0.88 -0.52 Two-step difference -0.699 -3.373 0.117 -1.647 -0.100 omitted 0.327 0.210 -0.060 -0.65 -0.67 0.05 -0.63 -0.55 - 0.79 0.35 -0.41 Two-step system -0.882 3.719 4.747 1.519 -2.162 4.127 -2.433 -4.215 -0.137 -1.14 0.91 1.03 1.11 -1.14 0.82 -1.03 -0.96 -1.03  Note: *, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels respectively.   In contrast, the relationship between asset tangibility / profitability and leverage is negative. An increase in profitability of the East African private firms (other variables held constant), led to a decrease in the firms’ leverage. This implies that a more profitable a private firm, would have a much lower leverage than a less profitable private firm; which is in line with the pecking order theory. Also, an increase in the tangible assets of a private firm (other variables held constant), led to a decrease in the firm’s leverage. This means that, a private East African firm which has more tangible assets would have a lower leverage than a firm with fewer tangible assets. The coefficients of the remaining firm-specific factors (age, earnings and cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, there is indication in the results of: a positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunities and product uniqueness; and a negative relationship between leverage and age and effective tax charge. These results are analysed in sub-section 8.4.2. 
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8.4.2 Analysis of results The results of the estimations of firm-specific factors’ model for the East African private firms, presented in sub-section 8.4.1 are analysed and discussed in this section. As Table 8-9 shows, the p-values of the F statistics for the one-step system GMM (p = 0.0001) is statistically significant at all 0.01 alpha level. A small p-value from the test, <0.01, led me to conclude that at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero. Overall, the F test results of the one-step system GMM indicate that the firm-specific factors’ model specified for the test is satisfactory for the one-step system GMM. 
 
Table 8-9: F Statistics – firm-specific factors’ model for East African private 
firms   p-value One-step system GMM F(8, 9)       =     91.89         0.000 *** Two-step difference GMM F(7, 9)       =      7.44         0.005 *** Two-step system GMM F(8, 9)       =      1.26 0.367 
 Note: *** significant at 1 percent significance level.  
 The negative relationship between the lagged leverage and subsequent year’s leverage of East African private firms reported in Table 8-8 is worth noting. This result can be contrasted with the association between lagged leverage and subsequent year’s leverage for quoted firms, which yielded a statistically significant positive relationship. The result suggests that private firms adjust to the target leverage quicker than quoted firms. The positive relationship between the firm’s size and leverage is consistent with trade-off theory that there is an inverse relationship between firm size and the likelihood of bankruptcy, and consequently a positive relationship between firm size and leverage.  The result is similar to that found in the quoted companies’ data and it supports the findings reported in prior research discussed in section 7.4.1. However, the negative relationship between assets tangibility and leverage seems 
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to defy conventional wisdom that firms with more tangible assets would have the collateral that debt providers would require and be able to acquire debt more easily. In the case of the private East African firms, access to finance seems not to be the main reason for choosing to use debt finance. Finally, the negative relationship between profitability and leverage reinforces our knowledge on the influence of firm performance (profitability) on private firms’ financial structure decisions in emerging economies. It supports the predictions of the pecking order theory47, and like the quoted firms, the private firms in the East African economies seem to use internally generated funds first before looking outwards for financing. This result is similar to the findings reported in prior research as discussed in section 7.4.1 Applying the one-system GMM technique to the firm-specific factors’ model for the East African private firms yields proper diagnostics. The diagnostics are satisfactory, with the Hansen test not rejecting the over identification conditions and the tests for serial correlation finding no serial correlation for both first order and second order. 
8.4.3 Results of test of firm-specific factors’ hypotheses revealed by the 
one-step system GMM estimation Table 8-10 summarises the results of tests of the firm-specific factors’ hypotheses revealed by the one-step system GMM estimators. The tests show that for the private firms, hypotheses H3b and H3d should not be rejected; whilst hypothesis H3c should be rejected. The results for the remaining hypotheses H3a, H3e, H3f, H3h and H3g are indeterminate. Again, unlike for the ownership structure models, the dynamic firm-specific model for private firms seems to be affected by the long-run effect of firm-specific factors; effects that are picked up in a dynamic analysis with LEV.  
                                                        47 The pecking order theory was discussed in section 2.2.  
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Table 8-10: One-step system GMM dynamic panel-data test of the firm-
specific factors’ hypotheses (private firms) Estimation results for firm-specific factors’ model for the 12 private East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the one-step system GMM estimation. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 87 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The hypotheses tested, hypothesised signs, and signs of coefficients in the results are reported. In addition, p-values of the coefficients under one-step system GMM estimation for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported.  Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Firm’s age (lnAGE) H3a – – 0.332 Indeterminate Firm’s size (SIZE) H3b + + 0.002 Not rejected Asset tangibility (lnASTAN) H3c + – 0.024 Rejected Firm’s performance (lnPROF) H3d – – 0.028 Not rejected Earnings and cash flows volatility (lnECFV) H3e – – 0.160 Indeterminate Growth opportunities (lnGRO) H3f + + 0.939 Indeterminate Product uniqueness (lnPDT) H3g – + 0.403 Indeterminate Effective tax charge (lnTAX) H1h + – 0.617 Indeterminate 
8.5 Summary This chapter empirically examined influences of ownership structure on the financial structure and performance of private firms, and the influences of firm-specific factors on the the financial structure of private firms. Research on private firms’ is generally lacking in literature and no work at all seems to have been done on the ownership structure, financial structure and performance of private firms in emerging economies. Three models (ownership-financial structures, ownership-performance and firm-specific factors’) were specified for the empirical examination. The ownership-financial structures and ownership-performance models were then estimated using the fixed-effects and random-effects; whilst the firm-specific factors’ model was estimated using the three GMM estimation frameworks. However, of the three, the results of the one-step system GMM were more meaningful. This section ties together the key empirical evidence that emerged from estimation of the three models. 
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Ownership types and financial structure of private firms:  The empirical evidence discussed in section 8.2.4, indicates that three ownership types (i.e. residency; level of concentration of shareholding; and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders) are related to leverage of private firms. Ownership data that was available could only allow three ownership types, i.e. residency, concentration, the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding, to be specified. The fixed-effects and random-effects estimations of the ownership-financial structures model showed that residency and the ratio of institutional to ono-institutional shareholders were negatively related to leverage; whilst concentration of shareholding was positively related to leverage. All the relationships were statistically significant. The results provide empirical evidence that private East African firms with a higher proportion of foreign shareholders would have lower leverage than those with lower proportion of foreign shareholders. There is also evidence in the raw data that private firms with foreign owners often have substantial equity funding from the foreign owners. The government of Uganda requires foreign investors to invest a prescribed minimum amount to be licensed and awarded the incentives associated with such licenses. The results indicate that a higher proportion of institutional shareholders in a private firm led to the firm utilising less debt. In contrast, in the East Africa private firms highly concentrated shareholding seemed to encourage the firms to use a lot more debt finance. In line with the pecking order theory, concentrated ownership seems to encourage the use of the cheaper source of finance, debt, in the East African private firms.  
Ownership types and performance of private firms:  The empirical evidence discussed in section 8.3.4, indicates that two ownership types (i.e. residency and level of concentration of shareholding) are related to performance of private firms. Ownership data that was available could only allow three ownership types, i.e. residency, concentration, the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding, to be specified. Both the fixed-effects and random-effects estimations of the ownership-performance model showed that residency was positively associated with performance of the private East African firm. However, concentration of 
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shareholding was negatively related to performance under the fixed-effects method but positively related to performance under the random-effects method. The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders was dropped from the test. Both relationships tested were statistically significant. The results provide empirical evidence that private East African firms with a higher proportion of foreign shareholders would perform better than those with lower proportion of foreign shareholders. There is also evidence in the raw data that foreign-owned East African private firms manage costs better than indigenous-owned private firms. The significant cost-savings that are achieved in these firms tend to enhance their operating profits. In contrast, the results for the relationship between concentration of shareholding and performance are indeterminate. Normally, concentrated ownership would be expected to benefit most from good performance as the random-effects’ results indicate. The owners in such firms would have put in place the infrastructure that led to improved performance in the private firms. The drive to enhance performance and the economic benefits accruing to the concentrated ownership might also explain the positive relation with leverage (use of the cheaper source of finance) observed in the preceding section. 
Firm-specific factors and financial structure of private firms: The relationship between firm-specific factors and leverage of private firms in the East African emerging economies is lacking from literature. Empirical examination of the relationship between eight firm-specific factors (age, size, assets structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) and private firms leverage were discussed in section 8.4.2.  The one-step system GMM results indicate that three of the eight factors (size, assets’ tangibility and profitability) had statistically significant relationship with private firms’ leverage. Profitability and tangibility of assets were both inversely related with private firms’ leverage; whilst, private firm’s size was positively related. These findings can be contrasted with the findings for listed firms under the two-step system GMM method. The inverse relationship between profitability and asset tangibility and private firms’ leverage is comparable to that established for listed companies. Similarly, the positive relationship between firm’s size and leverage is similar to that established for listed companies.  
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9 Conclusions This chapter concludes the thesis and presents the athour’s final reflections.  It summarises the findings of the empirical chapters; highlights the thesis’ original contribution to knowledge; the significance of the research; the limitations of the research; and areas for further scholarship. The thesis has investigated how ownership structure, firm-specific variables and macroeconomic factors are related to financial structures of listed and private firms in the emerging economies of the East African region. It also investigated how ownership structure and macroeconomic factors are related to firm performance. It was designed to determine the effect of these factors (identified in the literature survey in Chapter 2) on leverage and performance of the East African firms. The factors were empirically examined within the conceptual framework of theories of the firm and capital structures theories of trade-off and pecking order. The chapter is divided into five sections. It summarises findings of chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, to peovide an overarching conclusion, in section 9.1. It then discusses the conclusions drawn from these findings in section 9.2. Then in Chapter 9.3 it highlights the thesis’ contributions to knowledge and its implications; whilst section 9.4 presents its limitations and section 9.5 areas for further research and the author’s final reflections.    
9.1 Summaries of findings of the empirical chapters In Chapter 5, the author set out to empirically examine the impact of ownership structure on firms’ financial structure choices. Chapter 5 provides some answers to the research question: “Do ownership combinations in firms (indigenous/foreign, concentrated/dispersed, or institutional/non-institutional) in the emerging markets of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda influence their financial structure decisions?” The author found, for the East African firms, that ownership structure, as measured by residency of shareholders and the ratio of institutional to individual shareholders have a statistically significant influence on listed firms’ leverage. Residency is negatively related to leverage, whereas ratio of institutional to individual shareholders is positively related. Concentration of shareholding did not have a statistically significant influence. 
Chapter 9    Conclusions | 193  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Chapter 6 addressed the research question: “In what way do ownership combinations of firms (quoted and private) operating in the emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, influence firm performance?” The author found that in listed East African firms, only concentration of shareholding has a statistically significant and inverse influence on listed firms’ performance.  Furthermore, Chapter 7 focused on the research question: “For firms (quoted and private) operating in emerging economies of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, what are the firm-specific factors that influence financial structure choice?” The the empirical results of the two-step system GMM estimation show that, statistically, six firm-specific factors (size, asset tangibility, profitability, earnings and cash flows volatility, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness) significantly influence leverage of listed East African firms. Whereas profitability and asset structure (tangibility) negatively influence leverage; size of the firm, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness positively influence the leverage of listed East African firms. Finally Chapter 8 examined all the three research questions using private firms’ data. The author found in relation to research question 1 that, for private companies, residency of shareholders, concentration of shareholding in the top five shareholders and ratio of institutional to individual shareholders are all significantly related to leverage.  Residency and the ratio of institutional to individual shareholders are inversely related to leverage; whilst concentration is positively related. In relation to research question 2, for private companies, residency and concentration of shareholding in the top five shareholders are significantly related to leverage.  Residency is positively related to performance; whilst, the sign for the coefficient is contradictory under the fixed-effects and random-effects methods. In relation to research question 3, for private firms, only three of the eight factors (firm size, asset structure and profitability) have statistically significant relationship with firms’ leverage. The relationship between the other five of the eight factors (age, volatility of earnings and cash flow, growth opportunities, product uniqueness and effective charge) and leverage was statistically insignificant. Asset structure and profitability are inversely related with private firms’ leverage; whereas, size had a positive relationship. 
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9.2 Conclusions on the findings of the empirical chapters This study has empirically examined two key dimensions of financial structure choice: the influence of ownership structure and internal firm-specific factors. It also examined the influence of ownership structure on firm performance. For both quoted and private companies the effects of ownership structure and firm-specific factors on firm leverage and of ownership structure on firm performance were evaluated. Returning to the research questions (and associated hypotheses) that arose from survey of literature presented in Chapters 1 and 4, it is now possible to draw the following conclusions on the findings summarised in section 9.1.  
9.2.1 Ownership structure and leverage of quoted firms The empirical evidence in Chapter 5, obtained using the fixed-effects and random-effects estimations, indicated that different ownership structures influences agency relationship differently. It showed the influence of residency of shareholders, the proportion of shareholding of the five largest shareholders, and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding on leverage (measured by the debt ratio as discussed in Chapter 4) of firms in emerging economies of the East African countries. The author have argued that, statistically, only two ownership variables (residency and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders) significantly influence leverage of a firm. The results of the two estimation methods (fixed-effects and random-effects indicated that, statistically, residency of a firm’s shareholders significantly influences leverage. An increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders led to a decrease in leverage. This confirms the argument, in developing countries, that foreign investors bring with them substantial finance. Also, what this finding seems to indicate is that the bulk of such finance is equity finance. Regarding the influence of institutional ownership on leverage, the results of both the fixed-effects (Within) and random-effects (GLS) show that ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders significantly influences leverage. An increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders would lead to an increase in leverage. In the literature, it is argued that institutional shareholders emphasise 
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performance and Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) noted that debt is a cheaper source of finance than equity. Therefore, as the proportion of institutional shareholders in a firm increases, leverage of the firm increases. However, the findings on the proportion of the five largest shareholders were not statistically significant under both estimation methods used. 
9.2.2 Ownership structure and performance of quoted firms The empirical evidence in Chapter 6, obtained using the fixed-effects and random-effects estimations, indicated that different ownership structures influences firm performance differently. It showed that the proportion of shareholding by the five largest shareholders negatively and significantly influences performance of East African firms. It also indicated that there is a positive relationship, albeit not statistically significant, between residency of shareholders or the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding and leverage of firms in the emerging economies of the East African countries. 
9.2.3 Influences of firm-specific factors on leverage of quoted firms Overall, the estimates of the firm-specific factors’ model show that lagged leverage significantly influences firms’ leverage decision in the subsequent year. The empirical evidence from the two-step system GMM estimation in Chapter 7 showed that, statistically, six firm-specific factors (size, asset structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness) significantly influence leverage of East African firms. An increase in the profitability would lead to a decrease in leverage, which confirms the argument in literature that higher profits means that there are substantial internally generated cash available to finance a firm’s operations and investments. Also, this finding indicated that, under the two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation, profitability is the second most significant factor, after asset structure (tangibility), influencing firms’ leverage decision. The two-step system GMM estimation also showed that asset tangibility and effective tax charge negatively influences leverage. The conclusions contained in this section are based on the results of the two-step GMM. 
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First, looking at the coefficients of the firm-specific factors, asset tangibility is the most influential factor, based on elasticity as all the variables are logarithms. However, the negative relationship contradicts conventional wisdom that tangible assets provide a firm with collateral against which debt can be raised. There are arguments in literature (e.g. Galai and Masulis, 1976; and Jensen and Meckling 1976) that if the debt is secured against tangible assets, debtholders’ guarantee of repayment and rate of recovery of debt would improve. The author argue that the asset structure result can probably be explained by the fact that the East African firms (operating in emerging economies) prefer to use equity finance rather than debt for investment. This evidence also confirms the argument (Myers, 1977; Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) that where assets are firm-specific or trade in illiquid secondary markets (as the East African), high debt levels are discouraged. It is also argued in the same literature that firms with fewer tangible assets tend to choose higher debt levels to limit consumption of perquisites. Second, the author concludes that the pecking order theory applies in East Africa. That is, as profitability of East African listed firms increases, the firms raise most of the finance needed for operations and investments internally thereby reducing the need to seek external finance. Third, the author concludes that the positive relationship between size and leverage confirms the widely held view that bigger firms have better access to debt finance than smaller firms. Fourth, growth opportunities positively influence leverage of East African firms. An increase in growth opportunities would lead to an increase in leverage. This result contradicts the argument in literature (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986); that firms with more investment opportunities would have less leverage because they have stronger incentives to avoid underinvestment and asset substitution that might arise from shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts. It is argued in the literature that leverage tend to induce managers to engage in asset substitution and underinvestment.  The author conclude that the East African firms prefer to finance growth opportunities using debt and are not concerned about underinvestment and asset substitution.  
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Fifth, unlike the indeterminate influence of volatility of earnings and cash flows in literature, the results in this study showed a statistically significant positive relationship. However, the data available could not allow the argument that firms with volatile earnings and cash flows tend to depend more on short-term borrowing (Diamond, 1991a; 1991b) to be examined in the context of firms in these emerging economies. Sixth, the author concludes that the positive association between product uniqueness and leverage contradicts the observation of Titman and Wessel (1988) that firms, which produced unique products, were likely to be less leveraged.  It however reinforces the results of Bhaduri (2002a; 2002b) that product uniqueness was one of the key factors that influenced financial structure choices of Indian firms. The East African firms, which produced unique products, seem to have easy access to debt finance contrary to Titman and Wessel’s (1988) observations.  Finally, the results on the influence of effective tax charge seems to contradict the argument in literature (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 1963) that debt is a cheaper source of finance than equity as it provides tax shield for the firms. Unlike the negative relationship between effective tax charge and leverage (as effective tax charge increases, leverage decreases), which the empirical results show, in literature a positive relationship is envisaged. This contradictory evidence might be explained by the regime of tax incentives, which the East African countries offer to investors to encourage investment as well as efficient use of tax preferences by the East African firms. 
9.2.4 Cross-country comparison of the results of the ownership-financial 
structures and firm-specific factors’ models of quoted firms The empirical results discussed in sections 5.5.3, 6.5.3 and 7.5.3 show the influence of country-wide and institutional factors on firms’ financial structure choices and performance. The author concludes that leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more sensitive to changes in the ownership variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. Residency of shareholders has negative influence on leverage of both Kenyan and Tanzanian/Ugandan firms. Yet, leverage in Kenyan firms is more sensitive to 
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increase in foreign shareholding. However, institutional shareholding has positive influences on leverage of firms in both Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda; though the Tanzanian/Ugandan firms’ leverage is more sensitive to changes in institutional shareholding than firms in Kenya. He also concludes that performance of firms in Tanzania and Uganda are more sensitive to changes in the ownership variables than performance of firms in Kenya. Institutional shareholding has positive influence on performance of firms in Kenya but negative influence on performance of firms in Tanzania/Uganda; though the Tanzanian/Ugandan firms’ leverage is more sensitive to changes in institutional shareholding than firms in Kenya. In addition, foreign residency and concentration of shareholders have indeterminate influences on performance of Kenyan and Tanzanian/Ugandan firms; though, performance in Kenyan firms is less sensitive. Furthermore, the author conclude that leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were less sensitive to changes in the size, assets’ tangibility, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, and growth opportunities variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. In other words, the influence of these firm-specific factors on leverage seemed to be more pronounced in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. Next, leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda were more sensitive to changes in the firm age, uniqueness of products, and effective tax rate variables than leverage of firms in Kenya. The influence of these firm-specific factors on leverage seemed to be less pronounced in Tanzanian and Ugandan firms. Moreover, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities and effective tax charge have opposite influences on leverage of firms in Kenya compared to those in Tanzania and Uganda. Whilst an increase in volatility of earnings and cash flows and growth opportunities variables led to an increase in leverage in the Kenyan firms, an increase in each of the two variables led to a decrease in leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda. Similarly, even though an increase in effective tax charge led to a decrease in leverage in Kenyan firms, an increase in effective tax charge led to an increase in leverage of firms in Tanzania and Uganda. Macroeconomic and institutional context of the East African economies appear to explain some of the observed differences. Overall, the results are consistent with the greater development of capital market in Kenya than in Tanzania and Uganda. 
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9.2.5 Factors influencing leverage and performance of private firms  Research on private firms’ is generally lacking in literature and no work at all seems to have been done on the financial structure of private firms in emerging economies; therefore, this research is novel. Three dynamic models (ownership-financial structures, ownership-performance and firm-specific factors’) were specified for the empirical examination. The conclusions presented in this sub-section are based on the empirical evidence from the fixed-effects and random-effects estimations (for the ownership-financial structures and ownership-performance models); and the one-step system GMM estimations (for the firm-specific factors’ model). The empirical evidence in Chapter 8 indicated that two ownership categories (i.e. residency and level of concentration of shareholding in the largest five shareholder) are related to leverage of private firms. Ownership data that was available could only allow three ownership types, i.e. residency, concentration, the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholding, to be specified. The relationship between these ownership types and leverage (measured by the debt ratio as discussed in Chapter 4) or performance of private firms in emerging economies of the East African countries appear not to have been researched before. 
Ownership types and leverage of private firms: The fixed-effects and random effects estimations of the ownership-financial structures model showed that residency of shareholders was significantly negatively related to leverage; whilst the concentration of shareholding was significantly positively related to leverage. The ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders was significantly negatively related to leverage but only under the random-effects estimation. The empirical evidence indicates that private East African firms with a higher proportion of foreign shareholders would have lower leverage than those with lower proportion of foreign shareholders. The author concludes that foreign owners of private firms are likely to discourage the firms’ management from using debt. This is probably because private firms with foreign owners often access far cheaper loans from foreign financial institutions. The foreign owners would obtain such loans and use them to increase their equity in the local private firms. He next concludes that, 
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where shareholding is concentrated in a few shareholders, the shareholders are apt to encourage the private firm to use debt finance. In line with the pecking order theory, where a few individuals hold most shares, they tend to prefer the cheaper debt finance. Finally, he concludes that high proportion of institutional shareholders in a private firm seems to discourage the firm from using more debt finance. In the East African economies, investment opportunities for institutional investors, particularly pension funds, are limited; and such investors discourages management decisions to use debt finance. These investors are usually ready to provide the finance needed through other types of shares (e.g. preference shares). 
Ownership types and performance of private firms: The empirical evidence discussed in Section 8.3.4 revealed intriguing findings. The author concludes that East African private firms with higher proportion of foreign shareholders performed better than those with lower proportion of foreign shareholders. The foreign owners often enhance cost management and savings, which lead to improvement in the operating profits of the firm they own shares in. He also concludes (based on the random-effects results) that concentration of shareholding enhanced performance, probably because the owners would benefit most from good performance. They would therefore put in place the infrastructure that should lead to improved performance in the private firms they own. The drive to enhance performance and the economic benefits accruing to the concentrated ownership might also explain the positive relation with leverage observed in the preceding paragraph. 
Firm-specific factors and leverage of private firms: The relationship between firm-specific factors and leverage of private firms in emerging economies of the East African is lacking from literature. Empirical examination of the relationship between eight firm-specific factors (age, size, assets structure, profitability, volatility of earnings and cash flows, growth opportunities, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge) and private firms leverage discussed in Chapter 8 revealed very interesting findings. The eight factors were identified in literature (Chapter 2) as factors influencing financial structures of quoted firms. The one-step system GMM estimators indicated that three of the eight factors (size, assets’ tangibility and profitability) had statistically significant relationship with private firms’ leverage. 
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The author concludes that the positive relationship between firms’ size and leverage confirms the widely-held view that older and bigger firms have better access to debt finance than newer and smaller firms. Older and bigger firms would have built reputations and accumulated substantial tangible assets to make them more attractive to lenders than newer and smaller firms. He also concludes that the negative relationship between assets’ tangibility and leverage is contrary to widely held views that firms with substantial tangible assets use more debt because they have the collateral that is required. Private East African firms with substantial tangible assets seem to have adequate internally generated finance and therefore no need for debt finance. Finally, the findings of this research show that profitability is negatively related to private firms’ leverage. He concludes that as profitability of a private firm increases, more finance would be raised internally and the need for external finance is reduced. The East African private firms seem to satisfy their finance need through sources other than borrowings. More profitable private firms tend to have more retained earnings and need to borrow less. 
9.3 Contributions and implications of the study This research contributes to existing knowledge on firms’ ownership structures, financial structure choices and firm performance. It provides empirical evidence on how financial structure choices are related to ownership structure, firm-specific factors of firms in East African region and macroeconomic factors; and how performance is related to ownership structure. This section highlights the contributions the study makes and the implications of the findings. 
9.3.1 Contributions and significance of the study By empirically examining the impact of ownership structure and firm-specific factors and macroeconomic factors on firms’ (both listed and private) leverage of the East African firms; this research provides new insights into and understanding of what influences financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. It provides a more complete and clearer picture of the influences on financial structure of firms in emerging economies than had been done before. In addition, by 
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examining the influence of ownership structure on firm performance, it provides a more complete and clearer picture of the influences of ownership structure on performance firms in emerging economies. Firstly, while ownership structure and performance of the firm has been widely researched within the agency theoretical framework, it is not as evident in literature on financial structure of firms that the relation between ownership structure and leverage has been researched. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the literature reviewed that the relationship between ownership structure and financial structure of firms in developing countries has been extensively researched. Another point of departure from the knowledge that already exists, is that available research on ownership structure and financial structure has focused on quoted firms in developed economies; this study has looked at the relationship between ownership structure and financial structure of both quoted and private firms. Accordingly, this study makes an original and significant contribution to knowledge on firms’ financial structure choices. Secondly, while there is abundance of knowledge on the relationship between firm-specific factors and financial structure of quoted firms in the developed economies, there is virtually none on emerging economies. Moreover, there is lack of knowledge on the relationship between these two variables for private firms in both developed and developing economies. Therefore, this study highlights an area, which has not seen much research, and accordingly makes an original and significant contribution to knowledge on the relation between firm-specific factors and financial structure of quoted and private firms in emerging economies. Another original and significant contribution to knowledge is that the current study augments the ways in which financial structure of firms in less developed economies is understood, analysed and researched. This had lagged behind due to lack of availability of high quality data.  The current study has used high quality financial data of quoted and unquoted firms. It therefore contributes significantly to the body of scholarly work on financial structure. Thirdly, in the literature reviewed, the effect of countrywide (macroeconomics and institutional) factors on leverage of firms in both developed and developing economies is indeterminate. There is a relatively small amount of knowledge on this aspect of the 
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financial structure topic; moreover, research on firms in developing sub-Saharan Africa is lacking. The present study provides additional evidence with respect to the effect of macroeconomic and institutional factors on leverage of firms in the East African region. In view of that, this study makes original and significant contribution to knowledge on the topic. Fourth, the three models (discussed in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) that were specified for this study provide insights into problems with established models of financial structure. The author proposes frameworks for reviewing knowledge of financial structure choices, which can be used for further scholarly work on ownership and financial structures of firms in emerging economies. These frameworks may be applied to other ownership and financial structure studies elsewhere in the developing world; and this research will serve as a base for future studies on financial structure of firms in developing economies. Hence the study makes original and significant contribution to knowledge. Finally, the study provides useful insights into the determinants of financial structure decisions of private firms in emerging economies. The relevant literature reviewed shows that this area had not been researched by scholars and this empirical research contributes to the body of scholarly work on financial structure. 
9.3.2 Implications of the study The empirical evidence from this research study reveals very fascinating findings that should have several implications for scholars and policy makers. The results of this study on ownership structure indicate that, for both quoted and private companies, residency of shareholding, concentration of shareholding and ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholder are important influences on financial structure choices of firms in developing countries. The model for ownership-financial structure that was developed for this research has implications for future scholarly work in that it can be used for future research on financial structures of firms in developing economies. Next, the findings of this research suggest that firm-specific factors that have significant influence on quoted firms’ financial structure choice would not 
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necessarily have the same influence on financial structure choice of private companies. Only six of the eight factors (size, assets’ tangibility, profitability volatility of earnings and cash flow, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness) significantly influence financial structure of quoted and private firms. The evidence shows that although, the age of the firm and earnings and cash flow volatility have an inverse relationship with leverage of quoted firms, its relationship with leverage of private firms in East Africa is positive. Furthermore, for the private firms, coefficients of only three of the common factors (size, assets’ tangibility and profitability) were significant. An implication of these findings is the possibility of developing a different theoretical framework for studying financial structure choices of private firms. Besides, since the key source of debt finance for private firms is the banking sector, the evidence that growth opportunities positively influence private firms’ decision to use debt finance has implication for policy makers. Therefore, policy makers need deliberate thoughtful and affirmative policies that allow easier access to debt finance by private firms. Taken together, these results have implication for future scholarship in that it has provided clearer and useful insights on financial structure choices of both quoted and private firms in emerging economies; and the methods used are highly replicable and can be replicated in future studies of financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. 
9.4 Limitations of the study The contributions, significance and implications of the present study have been discussed in the preceding section. However, a few caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. First, this study did not gather data on financial institutions, which were intentionally excluded. Financial institutions reporting requirements are different from those for firms in other sectors. Therefore, the data that would be obtained from financial institutions would be of a different nature than those of firms from other sectors. Second, although in the literature reviewed, industry effects, debt rating, interest rates and market signalling were identified as factors affecting financial structure choices, the 
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current study was unable to analyse these variables. Also, the types of debt (i.e. short-term versus long-term or bank versus non-bank), which managers used to lever the firm needs to be investigated. The author could not obtain data on these variables in the East African data. Therefore, although the present study provides a more comprehensive empirical examination of factors related to financial factors of quoted and private firms in developing countries, it is not exhaustive. Third, the current research only used existing theories of capital structure as conceptual frameworks for empirical examination of financial structure choices of firms in the East African region. Although it provides evidence of application of pecking order and trade off theories, the research was not specifically designed to test the applicability of existing capital structure theories in developing economies though. In this respect, the empirical evidence of this study only indirectly tested, and should not be interpreted as a comprehensive test of, theories of financial structure. Fourth, the study used a sample limited to firms whose financial records were properly kept and audited by external accountants. Also with the small sample size (47 firms over 12 years for quoted firms and 20 firms over 12 years for private firms) used for this study, caution must be applied in interpreting the findings, as the findings might not be transferable to firms across the entire sub-Saharan Africa. The sample was nationally representative of medium and large firms in the East African economies but tended to miss micro and small firms whose financial records were not available. Nonetheless, although the current study is based on a small sample of firms, the findings greatly enhance our understanding of firms’ financial structure choice. Finally, due to the small sample from each of the three countries studied, the study could not fully undertake cross-country comparison of financial structure choice. An issue that was not fully addressed in this study was whether the effects of the factors examined on firm leverage were consistent across each of the three countries. Due to the paucity of data available this dimension of financial structure could not be thoroughly examined; however, the research did look at Kenya versus Tanzania and Uganda. Nonetheless, the issue of cross-national comparison is an intriguing one which could be usefully explored in further research. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the study makes original and significant contributions to knowledge and has several implications for knowledge and policy. 
9.5 Areas for further research and personal reflection This thesis has reported on the journey the author took from the unknown to the known as chapters 1 to 8 has documented. However, within the time-frame for the thesis not every aspect of firm financial structure choice could be examined. This research has thrown up many new questions in need of further investigation, and this section highlights areas that require further research. The author shall also use the section to personally reflect on the research process. 
9.5.1 Areas for further research The findings of this study provide several insights for future research and it is recommended that further research be undertaken in the following areas: First, further work needs to be done to establish the influences on financial structure choice of firms in the financial and insurance sectors. These firms were excluded from the current study. It is important that how the banking sector chooses their financial structures and the soundness of the banking system are investigated as these might have a bearing on availability of credit to firms in the other sectors. The author suggest that a study similar to this one should be carried on financial institution to further our understanding of firm financial structure choice. Second, as a cross-national analysis was not possible on the data that was available for this study, what is now needed is a cross-national study involving private firms from the three East African countries. In addition, two questions need answers: how varied is the relationship between ownership combinations and leverage across levered foreign-owned firms; and how varied is the relationship between ownership combinations and leverage across levered indigenous-owned firms? Third, further research might investigate sectoral differences in the factors identified as significant in influencing financial structure choices of firms in these emerging economies. If the debate on financial structure choice for firm growth and 
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economic development is to be moved forward, a better understanding of sectoral similarities or differences in firm financial structure choice needs to be developed. Fourth, it is suggested that the association of firm size and volatility of earnings and cash flows, and quoted firms’ leverage; firm size, asset structure, growth opportunities and effective tax charge, and private firms’ leverage; and the relation between leverage and performance (for both quoted and private firms) are investigated in future studies. More research is needed to better understand the impact of these factors on the financial structure decisions and performance of firms. Fifth, it would be interesting to survey decision makers (managers) within the firm to compare their experiences in making financial structure choices and probably establish common and key factors that emerge with the findings of this study. This would allow scholars to find out how managers go about making such important decision and the reasons they choose one and not another financial structure. Finally, using the same empirical design a number of possible future studies are apparent. It would be interesting to assess the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on firm financial structure choice by obtaining two samples, for a period pre- and the period post- 2008. Such a study would provide more information on how firms make financial structure choice during an economic crisis and should help us to learn valuable lessons on this matter that can be passed on to budding managers. 
9.5.2 Final reflections The journey the author took from the unknown to the known during this study was fascinating, though not without elements of hindrance dotted along the way. When he started the research journey deep within him was an urge to complete the journey as quickly as possible, he had this strong believe that he had the capabilities to complete the research in record time. However, the research journey he took taught him the virtue of patience, a valuable life lesson.  During the process, his capacity to be patient greatly increased; with patience grew his skill to be in charge and control of tricky situation, not allowing the situation to control him. 
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He has also learnt from this process that a meaningful and successful research project takes a great deal of effort, time and resources. Careful, critical and repeated thought about what is to be accomplished, why it is meaningful to accomplish it, and how it will be accomplished is vital in conducting a study. The time he spent thinking and planning the research turned out to be time well spent. The literature survey part of the research was thrilling. As he learnt more and more of the knowledge that already existed on financial structure, he was swarmed with brilliant ideas; he felt there were many aspects of the subject that he could examine in the context of emerging economies. He was very passionate about the research project; however, during the process he learnt that passion is a great asset but passion can also lead to overly ambitious topics. As he began collecting data, frustration set in. He had thought that colleagues within the accounting profession would avail me the data he required when contacted; in any case if he were in their position he would have provided them the data in confidence. But how wrong he was, there were only a few who understood his request and valued the work he was undertaking. He also found that peers and supervisors are invaluable resources during the entirety of the research process, they pointed out what he was doing well and what he needed to improve on. They were critical friends who offered constructive criticisms. He learnt that a researcher should not to be afraid of asking others the question: “Am I making sense?” The answers to this question only improved his research and increased his confidence. Finally, the model specification and empirical tests of the models that the author undertook was the most inspiring part of the research. It was thrilling when the evidence that had been hiding within the data started to emerge, when upon empirical interrogation, the data started speaking the inferential statistical language. It was like a flower, budding and then blossoming into beautiful coloured petals. However, the author learnt that, as Aaron Levenstein stated “Statistics are like a bikini. What they reveal is interesting. But what they hide is vital.” To give the statistics meaning, it is necessary to look beyond the figures for plausible reasons. He also learnt that with the benefit of educational hindsight researchers see research projects differently from when they initiate, design and implement them; and see things that they would have done differently.  
 209 
References 
African Financial Markets Initiative (AFMI), 2017. Country Profiles East Africa. [online] Available at: <https://www.africanbondmarkets.org/en/country-profiles/east-africa/>. [Accessed 16 November 2017]. Agrawal, A. and Nagarajan, N.J., 1990. Corporate capital structure, agency costs, and ownership control: The case of all-equity firms. The Journal of Finance, 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.  Alderson, M.J. and Betker, B.L., 1995. Liquidation costs and capital structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 39(1), pp. 45-69. Alves, P.F.P. and Ferreira, M.A., 2011. Capital structure and law around the world. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 21(3), pp. 119-150. Anderson, T.W. and Hsiao, C., 1982. Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 18(1), pp. 47-82.  Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A. and Reeb, D.M., 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), pp. 263-285.  Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M., 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), pp. 1301-1328. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M., 2003. Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage. The Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2), pp. 653-684. Andres, C., 2008. Large shareholders and firm performance—An empirical examination of founding-family ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), pp. 431-445. Ang, J.S., Chua, J.H. and McConnell, J.J., 1982. The administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy: A note. The Journal of Finance, 37(1), pp. 219-226.  Antoniou, A., Guney, Y. & Paudyal, K., 2008. The determinants of corporate debt ownership structure: Evidence from market-based and bank-based economies. 
Managerial Finance, 34(12), pp. 821-847.  Antoniou, A., Guney, Y. & Paudyal, K., 2008. The determinants of capital structure: Capital market-oriented versus bank-oriented institutions. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 43(01), pp. 59-92.  
References    | 210  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 58(2), pp. 277-297. Arellano, M. & Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp. 29-51. Baker, M. & Wurgler, J., 2002. Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), pp. 1-32. Baltagi, B.H. and Li, Q., 1990. A Lagrange multiplier test for the error components model with incomplete panels. Econometric Reviews, 9(1), pp.103-107.  Bancel, F. and Mittoo, U.R., 2004. Cross-country determinants of capital structure choice: a survey of European firms. Financial Management, pp. 103-132. Bany-Ariffin, A.N., Nor, F.M. and McGowan, C.B., 2010. Pyramidal structure, firm capital structure exploitation and ultimate owners' dominance. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 19(3), pp.151-164.  Barakat, M. & Rao, R., 2012. The role of taxes in capital structure: Evidence from taxed and non-taxed Arab economies. Available at SSRN 2026751, Browser 
Download This Paper.  Berle, A.A. & Means, G.G.C. 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction Books.  Bessler, W., Drobetz, W. & Kazemieh, R., 2011. Factors Affecting Capital Structure Decisions. In Capital Structure and Corporate Financial Decisions: Theory, 
Evidence and Practice, eds. H.K. Baker & G.S. Martin, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, pp. 17-40.  Bessler, W., Drobetz, W. and Grüninger, M.C., 2011. Information asymmetry and financing decisions. International Review of Finance, 11(1), pp. 123-154. Bevan, A.A. and Danbolt, J.O., 2004. Testing for inconsistencies in the estimation of UK capital structure determinants. Applied Financial Economics, 14(1), pp. 55-66.  Bevan, A.A. and Danbolt, J., 2002. Capital structure and its determinants in the UK – a decompositional analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 12(3), pp. 159-170. Bhaduri, S.N., 2002. Determinants of capital structure choice: a study of the Indian corporate sector. Applied Financial Economics, 12(9), pp. 655-665. 
References    | 211  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Bhaduri, S.N., 2002. Determinants of corporate borrowing: some evidence from the Indian corporate structure. Journal of Economics and Finance, 26(2), pp. 200-215.  Blundell, R. and Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), pp. 115-143. Booth, L., Aivazian, V., Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V., 2001. Capital structures in developing countries. The Journal of Finance, 56(1), pp. 87-130.  Bougheas, S., Mizen, P. and Yalcin, C., 2006. Access to external finance: Theory and evidence on the impact of monetary policy and firm-specific characteristics. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(1), pp.199-227. Brailsford, T.J., Oliver, B.R. and Pua, S.L., 2002. On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure. Accounting & Finance, 42(1), pp. 1-26. Britannica, I.E., 2010. Encyclopaedia. Nabu Press. Business Week, 1984. Will Money Managers Wreck the Economy? Bloomberg Finance LP, New York, United States, New York.  Cameron, A. and Trivedi, P., 1990. Regression-based tests for over-dispersion in the poisson model. Journal of Econometrics, 46(3), pp. 347-364.  Cantillo, M. and Wright, J., 2000. How do firms choose their lenders? An empirical investigation. The Review of Financial Studies, 13(1), pp.155-189. 
Capital Markets Authority Act 1996. (c.98). Entebbe: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation. 
Capital Markets Authority Act 1989. (No. 17). Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting. 
Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act 1994. (No. 5). Dar es Salaam: Government Printer. Central Inteligence Agency (CIA), 2017. The World Factbook. [online] Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. [Accessed 14 November 2017]. Chaganti, R. and Damanpour, F., 1991. Institutional ownership, capital structure, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 12(7), pp. 479-491. Cho, M. H., 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 47(1), pp. 103-121.  
References    | 212  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.H.P., 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), pp. 81-112.  Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., 2005. Bankruptcy around the world: Explanations of its relative use. American Law and Economics Review, 7(1), pp. 253-283. Cotei, C., Farhat, J., Baker, H.K. and Martin, G.S., 2011. Worldwide patterns in capital structure. In Capital Structure and Corporate Financial Decisions: Theory, 
Evidence, and Practice, eds. H.K. Baker & G.S. Martin, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, pp. 111-126.  Craswell, A. T., Taylor, S. L., & Saywell, R. A., 1997. Ownership structure and corporate performance: Australian evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
5(3), pp. 301-323. De Jong, A., Kabir, R. and Nguyen, T.T., 2008. Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm-and country-specific determinants. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
32(9), pp. 1954-1969. Deloitte, 2016. Tanzania Economic Outlook 2016: The Story Behind the Numbers. Dar es Salaam: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited. De Miguel, A., Pindado, J. and De La Torre, C., 2004. Ownership structure and firm value: New evidence from Spain. Strategic Management Journal, 25(12), pp. 1199-1207. DeAngelo, H. and Masulis, R.W., 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1), pp. 3-29. Deesomsak, R., Paudyal, K. and Pescetto, G., 2004. The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from the Asia Pacific region. Journal of Multinational 
Financial Management, 14(4), pp. 387-405. Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R., 1996. Stock market development and financial intermediaries: Stylized facts. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), pp. 291-321.  Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R., 1996. Stock markets, corporate finance, and economic growth: An overview. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), pp. 223-239.  Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V., 1996. Stock market development and financing choices of firms. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), pp. 341-369.  Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V., 1999. Institutions, financial markets, and firm debt maturity. Journal of Financial Economics, 54(3), pp. 295-336.  
References    | 213  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Demsetz, H., 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. The Journal 
of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp. 375-390. Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), pp. 1155-1177.  Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of corporate finance, 7(3), pp. 209-233. Diamond, D.W., 1991. Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106(3), pp. 709-737. Diamond, D.W., 1991. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4), pp. 689-721. Driffield, N., Mahambare, V. and Pal, S., 2007. How Does Ownership Structure Affect Capital Structure and Firm Value? Recent Evidence from East Asia. Economics of 
Transition, 15(3), pp. 535-573.  Drucker, P., 1986. To end the raiding roulette game. Across the Board, 23(4), pp. 30.  Du, J. and Dai, Y., 2005. Ultimate corporate ownership structures and capital structures: Evidence from East Asian economies. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13(1), pp. 60-71. Easterbrook, F.H., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. The American 
Economic Review, 74(4), pp. 650-659. Ezeoha, A.E. and Okafor, F.O., 2010. Local Corporate Ownership and Capital Structure Decisions in Nigeria: A Developing Country Perspective. Corporate 
Governance, 10(3), pp. 249-260.  Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26(2), Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, pp. 301-325.  Faulkender, M. and Petersen, M.A., 2006. Does the source of capital affect capital structure? Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), pp. 45-79. Flannery, M.J. and Rangan, K.P., 2006. Partial adjustment toward target capital structures. Journal of financial economics, 79(3), pp. 469-506. Frank, M.Z. & Goyal, V.K., 2009. Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably important? Financial Management, 38(1), pp. 1-37.  Franks, J., Mayer, C. & Rossi, S., 2009. Ownership: evolution and regulation. Review 
of Financial Studies, 22(10), pp. 4009-4056.  
References    | 214  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Galai, D. & Masulis, R.W., 1976. The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1–2), pp. 53-81.  Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L., 2001. Investment policy, internal financing and ownership concentration in the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), pp. 257-284. Górriz, C.G. and Fumás, V.S., 1996. Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain. Managerial and Decision Economics, pp. 575-586. Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D., 1982. Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives. In The economics of information and uncertainty (pp. 107-140). University of Chicago Press.  Gruber, M.J. and Warner, J.B., 1977. Bankruptcy costs: some evidence. The Journal of 
Finance, 32(2), pp. 337-347.  Han, K.C. and Suk, D.Y., 1998. The effect of ownership structure on firm performance: Additional evidence. Review of Financial Economics, 7(2), pp. 143-155. Hansen, L.P., 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments’ estimators. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 1029-1054.  Harris, J.R., Schiantarelli, F. and Siregar, M.G., 1994. The effect of financial liberalization on the capital structure and investment decisions of Indonesian manufacturing establishments. The World Bank Economic Review, 8(1), pp. 17-47. Harris, M. and Raviv, A., 1991. The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 
46(1), pp. 297-355.  Harris, M. and Raviv, A., 1990. Capital structure and the informational role of debt. 
The Journal of Finance, 45(2), pp. 321-349.  Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1994. Debt and seniority: An analysis of the role of hard claims 
in constraining management (No. w4886). National Bureau of Economic Research. Hausman, J.A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, pp. 1251-1271. Hay, D.A. and Morris, D.J., 1979. Industrial Economics: Theory and Evidence, illustrated, reprint edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U. K.  Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S., 1988. The determinants of board composition. 
The RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4), pp. 589-606. 
References    | 215  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of financial economics, 53(3), pp. 353-384. Holderness, C.G., Kroszner, R.S. and Sheehan, D.P., 1999. Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock ownership since the great depression. The 
Journal of Finance, 54(2), pp. 435-469. Hsiao, C., 2014. Analysis of Panel Data, (3rd Ed). Cambridge University Press, New York.  Hsiao, C., 2003. Analysis of Panel Data, (2nd Ed). Cambridge University Press, New York.  Hsiao, C., 1986. Analysis of Panel Data, Volume II of Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press, New York.  Huang, G., 2006. The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from China. China 
Economic Review, 17(1), pp. 14-36.  Huisman, J. and Hermes, N., 1997. Financial liberalization in India and the impact on business investment. International Journal of Development Banking, 15(2), pp. 3-14.  International Monteray Fund (IMF), 2017. World Economic Outlook, October 2017, 
Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-term Rcovery, Long-term Challenges. [online] Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/09/19/world-economic-outlook-october-2017>. [Accessed 16 November 2017]. Jensen, G.R., Solberg, D.P. and Zorn, T.S., 1992. Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, debt, and dividend policies. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative analysis, 27(02), pp. 247-263. Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
The American Economic Review, 76(2), Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 323-329.  Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp. 305-360.  John, K. and Williams, J., 1985. Dividends, dilution, and taxes: A signalling equilibrium. The Journal of Finance, 40(4), pp. 1053-1070.  
References    | 216  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Kapopoulos, P. and Lazaretou, S., 2007. Corporate ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from Greek firms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(2), pp.144-158. Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., 2002. Privatization in sub-Saharan Africa: On factors affecting 
implementation (No. 2002/12). WIDER Discussion Papers//World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER). Khanna, T. and Palepu, K., 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), pp. 867-891. Kisgen, D.J., 2009. Do firms target credit ratings or leverage levels? Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(06), pp. 1323-1344. Korajczyk, R.A. and Levy, A., 2003. Capital structure choice: macroeconomic conditions and financial constraints. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(1), pp.75-109. Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R.H., 1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance, 28(4), pp. 911-922.  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of finance, 54(2), pp. 471-517. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2008. The economic consequences of legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), pp. 285-332. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, pp. 1131-1150. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp. 1113-1155. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), pp. 222-279. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 2000. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), pp. 1-33. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), pp. 3-27. 
References    | 217  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. The Journal of Finance, 57(3), pp. 1147-1170. Lauterbach, B. and Vaninsky, A., 1999. Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from Israel. Journal of Management and Governance, 3(2), pp. 189-201. Lawriwsky, M.L. 1984, Corporate Structure & Performance: The Role of Owners, 
Managers, and Markets, illustrated edn, Croom Helm, London and New York.  Leech, D. and Leahy, J., 1991. Ownership structure, control type classifications and the performance of large British companies. The Economic Journal, 101(409), pp. 1418-1437. Lemmon, M.L. and Zender, J.F., 2010. Debt capacity and tests of capital structure theories. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), pp. 1161-1187.  Levy, A. and Hennessy, C., 2007. Why does capital structure choice vary with macroeconomic conditions? Journal of monetary Economics, 54(6), pp.1545-1564. Li, K., Yue, H. and Zhao, L., 2009. Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 37(3), pp. 471-490.  Lichtenberg, F.R. and Pushner, G.M., 1994. Ownership structure and corporate performance in Japan. Japan and the World Economy, 6(3), pp. 239-261. Loderer, C. and Martin, K., 1997. Executive stock ownership and performance tracking faint traces. Journal of Financial Economics, 45(2), pp. 223-255. Mahrt-Smith, J., 2005. The interaction of capital structure and ownership structure. 
The Journal of Business, 78(3), pp. 787-816. Maury, B., 2006. Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), pp. 321-341. Maury, B. and Pajuste, A., 2005. Multiple large shareholders and firm value. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 29(7), pp. 1813-1834. McConnell, J.J. and Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial economics, 27(2), pp. 595-612. McEachern, W.A. 1975, Managerial Control and Performance, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.  
References    | 218  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Miller, M.H. and Modigliani, F., 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. The Journal of Business (pre-1986), 34(4), pp. 411.  Miller, M.H. and Modigliani, F., 1963. Dividend policy and market valuation: a reply. 
The Journal of Business, 36(1), pp.116-119. Miller, M.H. and Rock, K., 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information. The 
Journal of Finance, 40(4), pp. 1031-1051.  Mitroff, I.I., Mohrman, S.A. and Little, G., 1987. Business not as usual: rethinking our 
individual, corporate, and industrial strategies for global competition, 1st ed. edn, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.  Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H., 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American economic review, 53(3), pp. 433-443.  Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American economic review, pp. 261-297.  Moore, W.T., 1986. Asset composition, bankruptcy costs, and the firms choice of capital structure. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 26(4), pp. 51-61.  Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20, pp. 293-315. Mudambi, R. and Nicosia, C., 1998. Ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from the UK financial services industry. Applied Financial Economics, 
8(2), pp. 175-180. Myers, S.C., 2001. Capital Structure. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), pp. 81-102.  Myers, S.C., 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), pp. 574-592.  Myers, S.C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5(2), pp. 147-175.  Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), pp. 187-221.  Ngugi, R. W., 2008. Capital financing behaviour: evidence from firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The European Journal of Finance, 14(2), pp. 609-624.  Nickell, S., 1981. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, pp. 1417-1426.  
References    | 219  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Noulas, A. and Genimakis, G., 2011. The determinants of capital structure choice: evidence from Greek listed companies. Applied Financial Economics, 21(6), pp. 379-387. Osano, E., 2011. Bond Market Development in Africa – Strategy and Issues. In IFC/World Bank, Africa Bond Markets Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, 7 November 2011. Washington: International Finance Corporation.  Öztekin, Ö. and Flannery, M.J., 2012. Institutional determinants of capital structure adjustment speeds. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1), pp. 88-112.  Pandey, I.M., 2004. Capital structure, profitability and market structure: Evidence from Malaysia. The Asia Pacific Journal of Economics & Business, 8(2), pp. 78-91, 97-98. Perrini, F., Rossi, G. and Rovetta, B., 2008. Does ownership structure affect performance? Evidence from the Italian market. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16(4), pp. 312-325. Prasad, S., Green, C.J. and Murinde, V., 2006. Company financial structure: A survey and implications for developing economies. In Finance and Development: 
Surveys of Theory, Evidence and Policy, eds. C.J. Green, C. Kirkpatrick & V. Murinde, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham Glos, pp. 356-429.  Prasad, S., Green, C.J. and Murinde, V., 2009. Capital structure and ownership: A new approach with comparative evidence from Malaysia and Thailand. Journal of 
Financial Decision Making, 5(10, pp. 39-50.  
Privatisation Act 2005. (No. 2 of 2005). Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting. 
Privatisation Trust Act 1997. (No. 7 of 1997). Dar es Salaam: Government Printer. Privatisation Unit MOFEP, 2011. Rationale for the reform and divestiture policy. [online] Available at: <http://www.perds.go.ug/index.php/reform-and-divestiture-2>. [Accessed 16 November 2017]. 
Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Act 1993. (c.98). Entebbe: Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation.  Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L., 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), pp. 1421-1460.  Ross, S.A., 1985. Debt and taxes and uncertainty. The Journal of Finance, 40(3), pp. 637-657.  Ross, S.A., 1977. The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signalling approach. The Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1), pp. 23-40.  
References    | 220  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Scott, J.H., 1977. Bankruptcy, secured debt, and optimal capital structure. The 
Journal of Finance, 32(1), pp. 1-19. Secretariat, E.A.C., 2017. East African Community. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The journal of 
finance, 52(2), pp.737-783. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach. The Journal of Finance, 47(4), pp. 1343-1366.  Short, H., 1994. Ownership, control, financial structure and the performance of firms. Journal of Economic Surveys, 8(3), pp. 203-249. Shyam-Sunder, L. and Myers, S.C., 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(2), pp. 219-244.  Smith, A., 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature & Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen & Co., Ltd, London.  Stulz, R., 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 26(1), pp. 3-27.  Stulz, R., 1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp. 25-54. Titman, S. and Wessel, R., 1988. The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The 
Journal of Finance, 43(1), March, pp. 1-19.  Vernimmen, P., Quiry, P., Dallocchio, M., Le Fur, Y. & Salvi, A., 2009. Corporate 
Finance: Theory and Practice, 2nd edn. John Wiley & Sons, Chicester.  Villalonga, B. and Amit, R., 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), pp. 385-417. Voutsinas, K. and Werner, R.A., 2011. Credit supply and corporate capital structure: Evidence from Japan. International Review of Financial Analysis, 20(5), pp.320-334. Wald, K., 1999. How firm characteristics affect capital structure: an international comparison. The Journal of Financial Research, 22(2), pp. 161-187. Welch, I., 2004. Capital structure and stock returns. Journal of Political Economy, 
112(1), pp. 106-131. Williamson, O.E., 1988. Corporate finance and corporate governance. The Journal of 
Finance, 43(3), pp. 567-591.  
References    | 221  
skomakech  phdthesis2018 
Williamson, O.E., 1987. Transaction cost economics: The comparative contracting perspective. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 8(4), pp. 617-625.  Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. Free Press, New York.  Windmeijer, F., 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), pp. 25-51.  Wiwattanakantang, Y., 1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7(3–4), pp. 371-403.  World Bank Group, 2017. Countries and Economies. [online] Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/country>. [Accessed 14 November 2017]. Zeckhauser, R.J. & Pound, J., 1990. Are large shareholders effective monitors? An investigation of share ownership and corporate performance, in Asymmetric 
information, corporate finance, and investment University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 149-180.    
 222 
        
Appendices    
 223 
AP1 Appendix 1 
The dynamic panel-data model framework and GMM estimations 
of the ownership-financial structures model  A target adjustment financial structure model fitted to time-series ownership data would result into a distributed-lag relationship. A single lag in the dependent variable (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is therefore introduced into the ownership model (Equation AP1-1). The single lag structure in this model is underpinned by the dynamism of the target adjustment theory on which the ownership structure model is based. Managers’ leverage decision is expected to be influenced by the gearing level at the time the decision is being made, i.e. the underlying leverage, as well as the ownership variables. Whilst, the current gearing level would itself have been determined by the conditions of ownership variables during the period the gearing level was established. The presence of adjustment costs of high leverage in the form of risk of bankruptcy and agency costs would prevent firms from jumping at once to an optimal financial structure. It is assumed that at current leverage level, the firm attempt to adjust instantaneously to optimal leverage level by acquiring more debt or reducing debt or increasing equity to incorporate the influence of the different ownership variables. The lag distribution should be empirically and statistically stable and regular with respect to variations in the ownership data; it represents empirical regularities, which the target adjustment financial structure theory accounts for. Dynamic optimisation model is the basis for dynamic economic theory. A dynamic ownership model was formulated and the GMM estimation framework applied to estimate it. The difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) linear GMM estimators are frequently used by researchers. Both estimators are designed for panel data with few time periods and many individuals (for this research there is a small T = 12 and large N = 67); with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (i.e. correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error); with fixed effects; and with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. When a single lagged leverage variable is introduced into Equation 4-3 it becomes:  
Appendix 1    | 224  
skomakech                                                                                                                                                           phdthesis2018 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                            (AP1-1) Equation AP1-1 shows that for the East African firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the ith firm’s leverage, as measured by the debt ratio, at time t) is a function of firm’s leverage at time t-1 (lagged leverage), the residency of shareholders (RES), the proportion of shareholding of the top five shareholders (TOP5), the level of institutional shareholding – measured by the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders – (INEX), the firm-specific error component (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖), and idiosyncratic error component (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) of the random disturbance (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) with a mean of zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2. The parameter 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 quantifies the degree to which leverage in period t depends on its value in the previous period, and therefore 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 is non-negative. The value of 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣 is also strictly less than one, signifying that the dynamics on this model are stable. It is assumed that the dynamic adjustment process also applies to time-periods before the observed sample.  The parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 quantify the impact of a firm’s shareholding structure: residency, concentration and level of institutional shareholding respectively, on its financial structure. The error components 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 are assumed to be independent of one another for all values of i and t, including for the periods before the observed sample.  In other words, it is assumed that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is serially uncorrelated, non-autocorrelation that has been induced by including the lag in the model.  Once one or more lags are included in a model, the model becomes a dynamic model and dynamic panel data model estimation framework, such as the GMM framework, might be used to estimate the model. The remainder of this section presents the results of the GMM estimations. The author used the Arellano-Bond estimators (one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM) to estimate the dynamic ownership structure model based on Equation AP1-1; and the results obtained are compared.  
AP1-1. One-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation The author use the one-step system GMM dynamic panel–data estimation to estimate lagged Equation AP1-1. The results, of the one-step system GMM estimation of the ownership-financial structure model, are shown in Table AP1-1. 
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The coefficient estimate of the lagged leverage is 0.346, which means that a one percent increase in the East African firms’ leverage level in the previous year would lead to a 0.346 percent increase in current year’s leverage. The results also show that for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership model are held constant, an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.032 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the proportion of shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s leverage decreases by 0.054 per cent. However, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s leverage increases by 0.061 per cent. Yet, only the lagged leverage and residency coefficients were statistically significant at alpha level of 0.10 (i.e. 90% confidence level), p-value of 0.052. 
Table AP1-1: One-step system GMM estimates of the ownership-financial 
structures model Ownership structures and leverage across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 306 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The table shows p-values of one-step system GMM estimations for LEV(t-1), RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms. It also reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnLEV(t-1)   0.3463 0.1732         2.00 * 0.052 lnRES -0.0322 0.0581  -0.55 0.583 lnTOP5  -0.0539 0.3920  -0.14 0.891 lnINEX   0.0614 0.0771   0.80 0.431 _cons   0.0329 1.6285   0.02 0.984        Note: * The coefficient is significant at 10 per cent significance level.  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.94  Pr > z =  0.052 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.68  Pr > z =  0.497 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  33.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.000   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  12.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.245   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)   
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Table AP1-2: One-step system GMM estimates of the ownership-financial 
structures model (incorporating the long-term effects of leverage) The p-values of one-step system GMM estimations, when 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1, for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnRES -0.0581 0.0948  -0.61 0.543 lnTOP5   0.4271 0.5821    0.73 0.467 lnINEX   0.0397 0.1261     0.31 0.754 _cons   -2.0340 2.3740    -0.86 0.397        The author also computed coefficients using one-step system GMM to incorporate long-run effects when 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 and obtained the results in Table AP1-2. Comparing these results to those obtained using the fixed-effects and random-effects methods48, the coefficients for the residency, proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders and the ratio of institutional to individual shareholders are all less than the coefficients under the fixed-effects and random-effects methods. The signs of the coefficients are identical; however, none of the coefficients is statistically significant under 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha levels. 
AP1-2. Two-step difference and two-step system GMM estimations The author also used the Arellano–Bond two-step GMM estimator to estimate Equation AP1-1; however, since the two-step estimation produces biased standard errors, he used the two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data estimation, which yields robust standard errors. He further used the two-step system GMM estimation to estimate Equation AP1-1. The results, of the two-step difference estimation, are shown in Table AP1-3; whilst those of the two-step system estimation are presented in Table AP1-4.  
Two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data results: An initial estimation of the ownership-financial structure data yielded a coefficient for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖−1 very close to zero; therefore, no lag is needed. The aouthor estimated Equation AP1-1 excluding the lag leverage using the two step GMM estimation. The results reported in Table AP1-3 show that for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign                                                         48 The results of the fixed effects and random effects estimations are reported in Table 5-2. 
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shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership model are held constant, an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.144 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s leverage decreases by 0.053 per cent. Whilst, for a one per cent increase in the proportion shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s leverage increases by 0.112 per cent. However, none of the coefficients was statistically significant. Moreover, applying two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data estimation to the ownership-financial structure model yields proper diagnostics and overturns the results for ownership concentration and institutional ownership. The diagnostics are fine; the Sargan/Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions; and the tests for serial correlation find no serial correlation for both first order and second order. 
Table AP1-3: Two-step difference GMM estimation of the ownership-financial 
structures model (incorporating long-term effects of leverage) Ownership structures and leverage across 41 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 301 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of two-step difference GMM estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The Table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Corrected Std. Err. t p>|t| lnRES    -0.1439 0.0994 -1.45 0.156 lnTOP5     0.1115 0.6193  0.18 0.858 lnINEX    -0.0526 0.0537 -0.98 0.334 
         Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -0.64  Pr > z =  0.523 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.29  Pr > z =  0.774   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  98.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.000   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  17.68 Prob > chi2 =  0.089   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)    
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Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation results: The two-step system GMM estimation introduces more instruments, and is believed to dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system of two equations (the original equation as well as a transformed one). It also makes the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the reported standard errors in two-step estimations, without which those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. It also introduces finer control over the instrument matrix. In addition, it offers automatic difference-in-Sargan/Hansen testing for the validity of instrument subsets; offers support for observation weights; and allows the forward orthogonal deviations transformation (an alternative to differencing proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)) that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. The results of the two-step system GMM estimation (Table AP1-4) show that the coefficient of the lagged leverage is 0.366. Also for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership model are held constant, an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.043 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the proportion shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), a firm’s leverage decreases by 0.168 per cent. However, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), a firm’s leverage increases by 0.089 per cent. All the other coefficients were not statistically significant.  Nonetheless, applying system GMM to the ownership model yields proper diagnostics. However, it overturns the results of ownership concentration and ratio of institutional ownership variables. The Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions (at 95% level) and the tests for serial correlation indicate no serial correlation for both first order and second order.  When compared to the results of the static fixed-effects and random effects techniques, the results of the one-step system, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM estimations of the dynamic ownership-financial structure panel data are weak. The introduction of a lag in the ownership-financial structure model seems to mask the effect of ownership structure on financial structure decision. The evidence from the dynamic 
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(GMM) estimation methods are, overall, consistent those under the static methods but not very strong. 
Table AP1-4: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation of the 
ownership-financial structures model Ownership structures and leverage across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 306 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of two-step system GMM estimations for LEV(t-1),  RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnLEV Coef. Corrected Std. Err. t p>|t| lnLEV(t-1)   0.3660 0.3027   1.21 0.233 lnRES -0.0425 0.0743 -0.57 0.571 lnTOP5 -0.1679 0.5110 -0.33 0.744 lnINEX   0.0888 0.0975   0.91 0.368 _cons   0.3921 2.1553  0.18 0.857   Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.60; Pr > z =  0.110 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.56; Pr > z =  0.574   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   = 32.02; Prob > chi2 = 0.000   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  13.76; Prob > chi2 =  0.184   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
Table AP1-5: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data test of the 
ownership-financial structures hypotheses Combined estimation results for the ownership-financial structures model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two-step system GMM estimation. Leverage (LEV) is book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding. The sample consists of 346 leverage and ownership structure firm-year observations. The hypotheses tested, hypothesised signs, and signs of coefficients in the results are reported. In addition, p-values of the coefficients under two-step system GMM estimation for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported.  Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Residency (lnRES) H1aa - - 0.571 Indeterminate Concentration (lnTOP5) H1bb ? + 0.744 Indeterminate Institutional/ non-institutional ownership (lnINEX) H1cc - - 0.368 Indeterminate   
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AP1-3. Results of test of ownership hypotheses revealed by the two-step 
system GMM estimation Table AP1-5 summarises the results of tests of the ownership models revealed by the two-step system GMM estimators. The tests show that the proportion of shareholding held by foreign owners in relation to that held by indigenous owners has an influence that is negative but insignificant on East African firms’ leverage. However, with a p-value of 0.571 the test of hypothesis H1aa is indeterminate at 5% and 10% significance level. The tests also indicate that hypotheses on the influence of ownership concentration on the East African firms’ leverage, H1bb should not be rejected at 5% and 10% significance levels. Although there is an indication that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of five largest shareholding and East African firms’ leverage, this positive relationship is not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.744. Therefore, the result is indeterminate too. Finally, since the p-value for the relationship between the proportion of institutional investors to non-institutional shareholding and leverage is 0.368, the weak negative relationship with leverage is not statistically significant.  Accordingly, the result of the test for hypothesis H1cc is also indeterminate. The dynamic model appears to eliminate the statistical significance of the ownership variables on leverage (financial structure). A probable explanation for this is that since ownership changes slowly over time it would only have a long-run effect; therefore, the effect is not picked up in a dynamic analysis with LEV. 
 
 231 
AP2 Appendix 2 
The dynamic panel-data model framework and GMM estimations 
of the ownership-performance model A target adjustment ownership-performance model fitted to time-series ownership data would result into a distributed-lag relationship. A single lag in the dependent variable (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is therefore introduced into the ownership-performance model (Equation AP2-1). A single lag structure is introduced in Equation 4.8 to obtain a dynamic optimisation model (a basis for dynamic economic theory). The single lag is underpinned by the dynamism of the ownership structure on which the ownership-performance model is based. Firms’ performance is expected to be influenced by the ownership structure at the time the performance is registered. However, the ownership structure would itself have been determined by the performance during the period the ownership structure was established. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                   (AP2-1) The difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) linear GMM estimators are frequently used by researchers. Both estimators are designed for panel data with few time periods and many individuals (for this research there is a small T = 12 and large N = 67); with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (i.e. correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error); with fixed effects; and with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. The Arellano-Bond estimators (one-step system GMM, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM) were used to estimate the dynamic ownership-performance model based on Equation AP2-1; and the results of the estimations are compared.  
AP2-1. One-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation The author used the one-step system GMM estimation to estimate lagged Equation AP2-1. The results of the one-step system GMM estimation of the ownership-performance model are shown in Table AP2-1.
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The coefficient estimate of the lagged profitability is 0.406, which means that a one percent increase in the East African firms’ profitability level in the previous year would lead to a 0.406 percent increase in current year’s performance. The results also show that for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership model are held constant, an East African firm’s performance would increase by 0.024 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the proportion of shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s performance increases by 0.096 per cent. However, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s performance decreases by 0.028 per cent. Yet, only the lagged leverage and residency coefficients were statistically significant at alpha level of 0.10 (i.e. 90% confidence level), p-value of 0.001. 
Table AP2-1: One-step system GMM estimates of the ownership-performance 
model Ownership structures and firm performance across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 273 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of one-step system GMM estimations for PROF(t-1), RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnPROF Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnPROF(t-1)  0.4057 0.1057         3.84 *** 0.001 lnRES 0.0242 0.0477  0.51 0.614 lnTOP5  0.0960 0.2328  0.41 0.682 lnINEX -0.0277 0.0575 -0.48 0.631 _cons -1.5295 0.8624       -1.77 * 0.084        Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.   Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.11  Pr > z =  0.002 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.13  Pr > z =  0.260   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  26.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.004   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  15.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.119   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)    
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The author also re-computed model coefficients using one-step system GMM to incorporate long-run effects when 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 and obtained the results in Table AP2-2. When these results are compared to those obtained using the fixed-effects and random-effects methods49: the coefficients for two variables (proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders and the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders) are less than those under the fixed-effects and random-effects methods; whilst the coefficient for residency is higher. The signs of the coefficients are identical; however, all the coefficients are not statistically significant under 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha levels. 
Table AP2-2: One-step system GMM estimates of the ownership-performance 
model (incorporating the long-term effects of performance) The p-values of one-step system GMM estimations, when 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1, for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnPROF Coef. Robust Std. Err. t p>|t| lnRES   0.0620 0.0736    0.84 0.405 lnTOP5 -0.2298 0.3908  -0.59 0.560 lnINEX   0.0384 0.0906     0.42 0.673 _cons -1.0658 1.5999    -0.67 0.509        
AP2-2. Two-step difference and two-step system GMM estimations The author also used the Arellano–Bond two-step GMM estimator to estimate Equation AP2-1; however, since the two-step estimation produces biased standard errors, the two-step difference GMM estimation, which yields robust standard errors was used instead. Furthermore, the two-step system GMM estimation was used to fit Equation AP2-1. The results of the two-step difference estimation are shown in Table AP2-3; whilst those of the two-step system estimation are presented in Table AP2-4.  
                                                        49 The results of the fixed effects and random effects estimations are reported in Table 6-6. 
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Two-step difference GMM dynamic panel-data results: An initial estimation of the ownership-performance data yielded a coefficient for 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 very close to zero; therefore, no lag is needed. The author estimated Equation AP2-1 excluding the lag leverage using the two-step difference GMM estimation. The results reported in Table AP2-3 show that for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership-performance model are held constant, an East African firm’s profitability would decrease by 0.017 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s profitability decreases by 0.094 per cent. Whilst, for a one per cent increase in the proportion shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), firm’s profitability increases by 0.075 per cent. 
Table AP2-3: Two-step difference GMM estimation of the ownership-
performance model (incorporating long-term effects of performance) Ownership structures and firm performance across 41 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 268 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of two-step difference GMM estimations for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnPROF Coef. Corrected Std. Err. t p>|t| lnRES    -0.0174 0.0499 -0.35 0.729 lnTOP5    -0.0936 0.4878 -0.19 0.849 lnINEX     0.0746 0.0713   1.05 0.302 
         Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.29  Pr > z =  0.022 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.77  Pr > z =  0.076   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  64.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.000   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  17.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.100   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)   However, no coefficients were statistically significant. Moreover, applying two-step difference GMM estimation to the ownership-financial structure model yields proper diagnostics and overturns the results for residency of shareholders. The diagnostics are fine; the Sargan/Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions; and the tests for serial correlation find no serial correlation for both first order and second order. 
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Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation results: The two-step system GMM estimation introduces more instruments, and is believed to dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system of two equations (the original equation as well as a transformed one). It also makes the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the reported standard errors in two-step estimations, without which those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. It also introduces finer control over the instrument matrix. In addition, it offers automatic difference-in-Sargan/Hansen testing for the validity of instrument subsets; offers support for observation weights; and allows the forward orthogonal deviations transformation (an alternative to differencing proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)) that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. 
Table AP2-4: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data estimation of the 
ownership-performance model Ownership structures and firm performance across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Firm performance (PROF) is the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding (FOR) to indigenous shareholding (IND). Ownership concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding (INS) to non-institutional shareholding (EXI). The sample consists of 273 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The p-values of two-step system GMM estimations for PROF(t-1), RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported. The table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t statistics.  lnPROF Coef. Corrected Std. Err. t p>|t| lnPROF(t-1)   0.4637 0.1475         3.14*** 0.003 lnRES -0.0140 0.0468 -0.30 0.766 lnTOP5   0.2361 0.3064   0.77 0.445 lnINEX -0.0197 0.0746 -0.26 0.793 _cons -1.9815 1.1577    -1.71* 0.095  Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.   Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.53  Pr > z =  0.011 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.05  Pr > z =  0.294   Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  26.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.004   (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  15.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.119   (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  The results of the two-step system GMM estimation show that the coefficient of the lagged profitability is 0.464. Also for a one per cent increase in the proportion of foreign shareholders, given that other variables in the ownership-performance model are held constant, an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.014 
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per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the ratio of institutional to non-institutional shareholders (other variables held constant), a firm’s performance decreases by 0.020 per cent. However, for a one per cent increase in the proportion shareholding of the five largest shareholders (other variables held constant), a firm’s performance increases by 0.236 per cent. Apart from the coefficient for lagged profitability all the other coefficients were not statistically significant.  Nonetheless, applying system GMM to the ownership-performance model yields proper diagnostics. However, it overturns the results of all the ownership-performance variables. The Sargan test does not reject the over identification conditions (at 95% level) and the tests for serial correlation finds no serial correlation for both first order and second order.  Section AP2-3 compares, analyses and discusses the results of the one-step system, two-step difference GMM, and two-step system GMM estimations of the dynamic ownership-performance model. 
Table AP2-5: Two-step system GMM dynamic panel-data test of the 
ownership-performance hypotheses Combined estimation results for the ownership-performance model for the 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011 using the two-step system GMM estimation.   Ownership structures and performance across 42 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Residency (RES) is the ratio of foreign shareholding to indigenous shareholding. Concentration (TOP5) is the proportion of the firm’s shares owned by the top five largest shareholders. Institutional ownership (INEX) is the ratio of institutional shareholding to non-institutional shareholding. The sample consists of 346 performance and ownership structure firm-year observations. The hypotheses tested, hypothesised signs, and signs of coefficients in the results are reported. In addition, p-values of the coefficients under two-step system GMM estimation for RES, TOP5 and INEX across the quoted firms are reported.  Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Residency (lnRES) H2a ? - 0.766 Indeterminate Concentration (lnTOP5) H2b - + 0.445 Indeterminate Institutional/non-institutional ownership (lnINEX) H2c + - 0.793 Indeterminate  
AP2-3. Results of test of ownership-performance hypotheses revealed 
by the two-step system GMM estimation Table AP2-5 summarises the results of tests of the ownership-performance model revealed by the two-step system GMM estimators. The tests show that the proportion of shareholding held by foreign owners in relation to that held by 
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indigenous owners has an influence that is negative but insignificant on East African firms’ performance. However, with a p-value of 0.766 the test of hypothesis H2a is indeterminate at 5% and 10% significance level. The tests also indicate that hypotheses on the influence of ownership concentration on the East African firms’ performance, H2b should not be rejected at 5% and 10% significance levels. Although there is an indication that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of five largest shareholding and East African firms’ performance, this positive relationship is not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.445. Therefore, the result is indeterminate too. Finally, since the p-value for the relationship between the proportion of institutional investors to non-institutional shareholding and performance is 0.793, the weak negative relationship with performance is not statistically significant.  Accordingly, the result of the test for hypothesis H2c is also indeterminate. The dynamic model appears to eliminate the statistical significance of the ownership concentration variable on performance. A probable explanation for this is that since ownership changes slowly over time it would only have a long-run effect; therefore, the effect is not picked up in a dynamic analysis with PROF.  
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AP3 Appendix 3 
Internal firm-specific factors and financial structure model 
estimations using fixed-effects and random-effects methods The results of estimating the internal firm-specific factors and financial structure model based on Equation 4-9 using the fixed-effects and random-effects frameworks respectively, are presented in Table AP3-1 
AP3-1. Results of the Fixed-effects estimates of firm-specific model Table AP3-1 shows that for a one per cent increase in the age of an East African quoted firm (given that other variables in the firm-specific factors model are held constant), an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.646 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the tangibility of the assets of a firm (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage decreases by 0.343 per cent.  Also, for a one per cent increase in the profitability of a firm (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage decreases by 0.270 per cent. Furthermore, for a one per cent increase in the effective tax charge of a firm (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage decreases by 0.027 per cent. Whilst, for a one per cent increase in the size of a firm (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage increases by 0.073 per cent. Similarly, for a one per cent increase in the growth opportunities of a firm (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage increases by 0.136 per cent. In addition, for a one per cent increase in the uniqueness of a firm’s product (other variables held constant), the firm’s leverage increases by 0.005 per cent. However, only the profitability and the growth opportunities coefficients were statistically significant at 95% confidence level, p-values of 0.003 and 0.010 respectively. The coefficients for the firm’s age, firm’s size, assets tangibility, earnings and cash flow volatility, product uniqueness, and effective tax charge were not statistically significant at both alpha level of 0.05 and 0.10 (i.e. 95% and 90% confidence levels respectively). As previously explained50 the fixed-effects  
                                                        50 The fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods are explained in section 4.4. 
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estimation appears to be an inefficient way to estimate the parameters in Equation 4-9. Therefore, the author also explore the properties of the random-effects method and its suitability for estimation of the ownership-financial structure model based on transformed Equation 4-9 (transformed using quasi-difference transformation). 
Table AP3-1: Fixed-effects (within) & random-effects (GLS) estimations 
results for the firm-specific model Internal firm-specific factors and leverage across 44 quoted East African companies between 2000 and 2011. Leverage (LEV) is the book debt ratio, total debt (short- and long-term debt) divided by total book equity. Firm’s age (AGE) is the difference between year in question and the firm’s birth year; firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total sales; tangibility (ASTAN) is the book value of property, plant, and equipment; profitability (PROF) is the return on assets, the ratio of operating profit to total assets; growth opportunities (GRO) is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; earnings and cash flow volatility (ECFV) is the standard deviation of operating profit; product uniqueness (PDT) is the ratio of selling expenses to sales; and effective tax charge (TAX) is the ratio of tax paid to operating profit. The sample consists of 346 leverage and internal firm-specific factors’ firm-year observations. The p-values of fixed effects and random effects estimations for AGE, SIZE, ASTAN, PROF, GRO, ECFV, PDT and TAX across the quoted firms are reported. The Table reports the coefficients, robust standard error and the t (z) statistics.  lnLEV  Coef. Robust Std. Err.    FE Ϯ RE Ϯ Ϯ FE RE FE RE 
     t p>|t| z p>|z| lnAGE  -0.6457   0.0006 0.9968 0.1341 -0.65 0.521  0.00 0.996 SIZE  0.0726   0.1362 0.1694 0.0715   0.43 0.670  1.90 * 0.057 lnASTAN -0.3432 -0.4802 0.2299 0.1731 -1.43 0.143 -2.77 *** 0.006 lnPROF -0.2698 -0.3318 0.0860 0.0750 -3.14 *** 0.003 -4.43 *** 0.000 lnECFV  0 (omitted)   0.1552 - 0.1035      - -   1.50 0.134 lnGRO   0.1356   0.1469 0.0505 0.0469  2.69 *** 0.010   3.13 *** 0.002 lnPDT   0.0054 -0.0230 0.0731 0.0576  0.07 0941  -0.40 0.691 lnTAX -0.0274 -0.0338 0.0187 0.0164 -1.47 0.150 -2.06** 0.039          _cons -2.2289 -2.7366 1.8965 1.0927 -1.18 0.246 -2.50 ** 0.012 sigma_u    0.6565 0.5526   sigma_e    0.4303 0.4303   rho    0.6995 0.6225 (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
 
Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
 *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.   Ϯ  Fixed-effects   Ϯ Ϯ  Random-effects  
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AP3-2. Random-effects estimates The results of the random-effects model GLS regression (Table AP3-1) show that for a one per cent increase in asset tangibility, profitability, product uniqueness and effective tax charge (given that other variables in the firm-specific factors model are held constant each time) an East African firm’s leverage would decrease by 0.480, 0.332, 0.023 and 0.034 per cent respectively. However, for a one per cent increase in the age of the firm, size of the firm, earnings and cash flow volatility, and growth opportunities (other variables held constant each time), firm’s leverage increases by 0.001, 0.136, 0.155, and 0.147 per cent respectively.   Interestingly, under the random-effects method, the coefficients of five of the eight variables viz: firm’s size, assets tangibility, profitability, growth opportunities, and effective tax charge coefficients were statistically significant at alpha levels of 0.05 and 0.10 (i.e. 95% and 90% confidence levels), p-values of 0.060, 0.006, 0.001, 0.002 and 0.039 respectively.  The coefficients for the firm’s age, earnings and cash flow volatility, and product uniqueness were not statistically significant at both 95% and 90% confidence levels. 
AP3-3. Fixed-effects versus random-effects estimation methods What is revealing about both the fixed-effects and random-effects (GLS) estimators is that profitability is significantly negatively related with leverage; whilst growth opportunities is significantly positively related to leverage. Overall, the relationship between size and leverage is positive under both methods but only statistically significant under the random-effects method. Similarly, the correlation between asset tangibility / effective tax charge and leverage is negative under both methods but only statistically significant under the random-effects method. Similarly, when the results of the fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods are compared, there is a contradiction in the results of the coefficients of the influence of the firm’s age, volatility of earnings and cash flows, and uniqueness of a firm’s products on the firm’s leverage. The sign of the firm’s age coefficient changed from negative under fixed-effects estimation to positive under random-effects estimation. In contrast, the sign of the coefficient of uniqueness of a firm’s 
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products changed from positive to negative. Furthermore, the variable volatility of earnings and cash flows, which was dropped due to collinearity under the fixed-effects estimation, has a positive coefficient under the random-effects estimation. However, under fixed-effects, these coefficients are not statistically significant under all three alpha levels used in this research. As explained in Section 4.4, the random-effects model assumption is satisfied in this study, and the random-effects estimators of the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝, 
𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  could be used instead of the analogous fixed-effects estimators. The estimators of the two regressions are mostly the same; though, the random-effects regression coefficients estimates would be preferable because they are more precise. Yet, if the coefficient estimates of the two regressions were significantly different from one another, the fixed-effects regression estimates would have been preferable because the random-effects regression coefficients estimates would be inconsistent in that case. From Table AP3-1, apart from the coefficients for firm’s age, the fixed-effects estimators and random-effects estimators are not significantly different from one another. In addition, the signs of the coefficients for firm’s age and product uniqueness, under each method, are reversed. The author performed the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), which assumes that the model errors are homoscedastic and obtained the following results. 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic   chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)    = 5.92  Prob>chi2 = 0.1155   The Prob>chi2 is 0.1155, which means that the null hypothesis that the two sets of parameter estimates are equal should not be rejected.  It suggests that the two methods (fixed-effects and random-effects) would yield consistent estimations. He also tested whether firm-specific heterogeneity is sufficiently important than the random-effects is superior using Baltagi and Li’s (1990)51 test of the null hypothesis that 𝑣𝑣1 … 𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀  are equal to zero, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test. The results                                                         51 Baltagi, B. H., and Q. Li (1990), “A Lagrange Multiplier Test for the Error Component Model with Incomplete Panels,” Econometric Reviews 9, pp. 103 – 107. 
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of this test were shown in Table 5-3. Accordingly, the random-effects estimation is more appropriate for the firm-specific factors’ data set than the fixed effects estimation. The firm-specific factors’ hypotheses are based on a version of the traditional trade-off theory, the target adjustment model of financial structure, which postulates that firms adjust their leverage towards an optimal level. However, achieving the optimal financial structure level requires trade-offs between the benefits of increased debt level and the costs of such high debt level. The trade-offs depend on a number of variables, such as tax benefits of debt, risk of bankruptcy and agency costs, which are not fixed. The variables are random factors and the random-effects method would be more appropriate to examine empirical hypotheses (such as the firm-specific factors’ hypotheses) based on the target adjustment model. When the random-effects coefficients and p-values are compared to the firm-specific factors’ hypotheses, they are either rejected or not rejected as shown in Table AP3-2.  
Table AP3-2: Random-effects test of the internal firm-specific factors’ 
hypotheses 
Factor Hypothesis Tested Sign Hypothesised Sign in Results p-value Hypothesis Rejected/Not Rejected Firm’s age H3a − +  0.996 Indeterminate Firm’s size H3b + + 0.057* Not Rejected Asset tangibility H3c + − 0.006*** Rejected Profitability H3d − − 0.000*** Not Rejected Earnings & cash flow volatility H3e − + 0.134 Indeterminate Growth opportunity H3f + + 0.002*** Not Rejected Product uniqueness H3g − − 0.691 Indeterminate Effective tax charge H3h + −     0.039 ** Rejected  Note: * The coefficients are significant at 10 per cent significance level. 
 ** The coefficients are significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
 *** The coefficients are significant at 1 per cent significance level.     
